Batista-Dominicci v. Gil-De-La-Madrid

First Circuit

Batista-Dominicci v. Gil-De-La-Madrid

39 F. App'x 623

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedJuly 16, 2002

Docket01-2547

StatusPublished

This text of 39 F. App'x 623 (Batista-Dominicci v. Gil-De-La-Madrid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Batista-Dominicci v. Gil-De-La-Madrid, 39 F. App'x 623 (1st Cir. 2002).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Francisco Batista-Dominicci appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of his civil rights action, brought under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against his former defense counsel, Julio Gil-de-laMadrid, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) who prosecuted him, Jacabed Rodriguez-Coss. He claimed that his attorney and the AUSA conspired against him and coerced him into signing a plea bargain agreement that the district court later allowed to be withdrawn. Additionally, Batista asserted many claims of legal malpractice against his attorney, alleging counsel failed to keep confidential information secret and engaged in conflicting representation of a codefendant.

The district court concluded that AUSA Rodriguez was absolutely immune for actions taken in her role as a prosecutor and that Gil-de-la-Madrid was a private actor. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint. We affirm, the dismissal, for essentially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. We add that Batista’s allegations that a conspiracy existed between AUSA Rodriguez and Gil-de-laMadrid were eonclusory, and thus insufficient to convert the private actions of Gilde-la-Madrid into federal action for the purposes of this suit, or to overcome AUSA Rodriguez’s claim to absolute immunity. (We have observed, in dicta, that proper allegations of conspiracy could overcome an absolute immunity claim of a prosecutor. See Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 711 (1st Cir.1986)).

Batista argues, for the first time in his reply brief and without legal support, that a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when a criminal defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are violated. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, see United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 592 (1st Cir.2002), and in any event, find no support in our case law for such a proposition.

The district court’s dismissal of the complaint is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Francisco Batista-Dominicci appeals from the district court’s sua sponte dismissal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, of his civil rights action, brought under the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against his former defense counsel, Julio Gil-de-laMadrid, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) who prosecuted him, Jacabed Rodriguez-Coss. He claimed that his attorney and the AUSA conspired against him and coerced him into signing a plea bargain agreement that the district court later allowed to be withdrawn. Additionally, Batista asserted many claims of legal malpractice against his attorney, alleging counsel failed to keep confidential information secret and engaged in conflicting representation of a codefendant.

The district court concluded that AUSA Rodriguez was absolutely immune for actions taken in her role as a prosecutor and that Gil-de-la-Madrid was a private actor. Consequently, the court dismissed the complaint. We affirm, the dismissal, for essentially the reasons stated in the district court’s opinion. We add that Batista’s allegations that a conspiracy existed between AUSA Rodriguez and Gil-de-laMadrid were eonclusory, and thus insufficient to convert the private actions of Gilde-la-Madrid into federal action for the purposes of this suit, or to overcome AUSA Rodriguez’s claim to absolute immunity. (We have observed, in dicta, that proper allegations of conspiracy could overcome an absolute immunity claim of a prosecutor. See Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 711 (1st Cir.1986)).

Batista argues, for the first time in his reply brief and without legal support, that a prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when a criminal defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are violated. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, see United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 592 (1st Cir.2002), and in any event, find no support in our case law for such a proposition.

The district court’s dismissal of the complaint is affirmed.

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