Bates v. Dresser

229 F. 772, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 960
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 17, 1915
DocketNo. 227
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 229 F. 772 (Bates v. Dresser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bates v. Dresser, 229 F. 772, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 960 (D. Mass. 1915).

Opinion

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.

This is a bill in equity, brought by the plaintiff, as receiver of the National City Bank of Cambridge, Mass., against the defendants, to recover the losses which the bank sustained through the defalcations of George W. Coleman, its bookkeeper, which took place during a period extending from November 24, 1906, to the close of the bank, February 21, 1910.

The plaintiff’s claim of a right to recover is based upon the ground that the defendants, as president and directors of the bank, were bound to use due care and diligence in the management and supervision of its affairs, and that, through their negligence in this respect, they failed to discover Coleman’s misconduct in season to prevent the whole or any part of the losses which the bank sustained during the three years and three months that Coleman’s peculations were going on.

[1] As there is no diversity of citizenship, and the ground of action is for a breach of their duties as directors at common law and in equity, federal jurisdiction depends upon the fact that the proceeding is brought by a receiver of a national bank in the course of, winding up its affairs and is sanctioned by section 24, paragraph 16, of the Judicial Code of 1911. International Trust Co. v. Weeks (C. C.) 116 Fed. 898, 899; Weeks v. International Trust Co., 125 Fed. 370, 373, 60 C. C. A. 236; International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 69, 51 L. Ed. 224; Auten v. United States National Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 141, 19 Sup. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920; Guarantee Co. v. Hanway, 104 Fed. 369, 44 C. C. A. 312; McCartney v. Earle, 115 Fed. 462, 53 C. C. A. 392. The question decided in the recent case [774]*774of Herrmann v. Edwards, 238 U. S. 107, 112, 35 Sup. Ct. 839, 59 L. Ed. 1224, differs from the one under consideration, .as that suit was not brought by a receiver in the course of winding up the affairs of a national bank, and jurisdiction, if it existed, was hel'd to depend upon diversity of citizenship or the presence of a federal question.

[2] On October 16, 1911, pursuant to an agreement of the parties, and under an order of the court, the case was sent to a special master, with directions “to hear the parties and report to the court his findings of fact and rulings of law thereon.” The order also contained the following provision:

“Any party to the suit shall have the right to a review and a determination by the court upon the evidence reported by the master. The master shall report to the court all the evidence bearing upon any question of fact which any party desires to be re-examined and found by the court, and such other portions of the evidence as may be material to any requests for rulings or other question of law which any party may desire to present to the court.”

The case has been heard by the master, and he has filed a report covering 94 typewritten pages, together with a book containing 597 pages of special findings, in addition to the general and special findings contained in his report, and he has made the figures of the expert showing the.state of the depositors’ ledger during the time the defalcations were taking place a part of the report. He has also reported alL the evidence and exhibits in the case. He adopted this course, for the reason that there was no other practical way of complying with the court’s order, in view of the great number of exceptions taken to facts which he found and refused to find, as the labor of separating out the evidence bearing on each particular question would be too great.

After finding many preliminary facts and stating much of the evidence bearing upon the conduct of the defendants, as president and directors, in the management and supervision of the bank, the master reached the conclusion that none of the defendants was negligent.

The plaintiff has excepted to the general finding and ruling of tire master that the defendants were not negligent, as inconsistent with his other findings of fact, and as directly against the weight of the evidence. He has also excepted to the finding and ruling that the defendant Edwin Dresser was not guilty of actionable negligence, as inconsistent and wholly at variance with the master’s special findings of fact, stating in detail wherein it is claimed to be inconsistent, and as against the weight of the evidence; and he has taken numerous other exceptions to special findings of fact and rulings of law.

At the hearing before me on the master’s report, counsel for the defendants took the position (1) that the findings of fact made by the master were conclusive, or (2) that, if not conclusive, they were presumptively correct, and' that the reservation of the right of review contained in the order of the court was not so broad as to render the master’s findings advisory only. In support of the first proposition they rely on the case of Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631, 15 Sup. Ct. 237, 39 L. Ed. 289. That case does not seem ,to me to be in point, for the reason that there the order sending the case to the master con[775]*775tained no reservation of a right of review. On the second proposition reliance is- placed on the decision in Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 9 Sup. Ct. 355, 32 L. Ed. 764. There the order sending the case to the master, as in this case, was by consent of the parties and directed the master “to hear the evidence and decide all the issues between the parties and make his report * * * separately stating his findings of law and fact, together with all the evidence introduced before him, which evidence thereby shall become a part of the report, which report shall be subject to like exceptions as other reports of masters”; and it was held that the findings of the master should be “treated as so far correct and binding as not to be disturbed unless' clearly in conflict with the weight of the evidence upon which they were made.” In the recent case of Goldsmith Silver Co. v. Savage, 229 Fed. 623,-C. C. A.-, decided by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit December 10, 1915, the decision in Kimberly v. Arms was followed; the reservation of the right of review in the two cases being made in substantially the same language. In the present case it would seem that the parties and the court must have understood, from the language employed in the order, that findings of fact made by the master, which the parties did not ask to have re-examined by the court, should be regarded as conclusive; but the language, reserving the right of review as to findings which they did desire the court to re-examine, is so broad it would seem that the decision in Kimberly v. Arms must have been in the mind of the draftsman, and that he was seeking to provide for a more extended right of review than was held to be reserved in that case. For instance, the order directs the master to report all the evidence bearing on any question of fact which either party desired to have re-examined and found by the court, and provides that any party to the suit shall have the right to a review and a determination by the court upon the evidence reported by the master of any finding of fact or conclusion of law made by the master.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Epstein v. Shindler
200 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. New York, 1961)
Noble v. Martin
70 P.2d 1064 (Washington Supreme Court, 1937)
Pearson v. Brennan
75 F.2d 958 (First Circuit, 1935)
Hughes v. Reed
46 F.2d 435 (Tenth Circuit, 1931)
Orth v. Mehlhouse
36 F.2d 367 (D. Minnesota, 1929)
First National Bank of Fairmont v. Smith
103 S.E. 318 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1920)
Dresser v. Bates
250 F. 525 (First Circuit, 1918)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
229 F. 772, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 960, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bates-v-dresser-mad-1915.