Bates v. Dresser

229 F. 772, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 960
District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided December 17, 1915·No. No. 227·Published·Cited by 9 cases

Opinion

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge.

This is a bill in equity, brought by the plaintiff, as receiver of the National City Bank of Cambridge, Mass., against the defendants, to recover the losses which the bank sustained through the defalcations of George W. Coleman, its bookkeeper, which took place during a period extending from November 24, 1906, to the close of the bank, February 21, 1910.

The plaintiff’s claim of a right to recover is based upon the ground that the defendants, as president and directors of the bank, were bound to use due care and diligence in the management and supervision of its affairs, and that, through their negligence in this respect, they failed to discover Coleman’s misconduct in season to prevent the whole or any part of the losses which the bank sustained during the three years and three months that Coleman’s peculations were going on.

[1] As there is no diversity of citizenship, and the ground of action is for a breach of their duties as directors at common law and in equity, federal jurisdiction depends upon the fact that the proceeding is brought by a receiver of a national bank in the course of, winding up its affairs and is sanctioned by section 24, paragraph 16, of the Judicial Code of 1911. International Trust Co. v. Weeks (C. C.) 116 Fed. 898, 899; Weeks v. International Trust Co., 125 Fed. 370, 373, 60 C. C. A. 236; International Trust Co. v. Weeks, 203 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 69, 51 L. Ed. 224; Auten v. United States National Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 141, 19 Sup. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920; Guarantee Co. v. Hanway, 104 Fed. 369, 44 C. C. A. 312; McCartney v. Earle, 115 Fed. 462, 53 C. C. A. 392. The question decided in the recent case [774] of Herrmann v. Edwards, 238 U. S. 107, 112, 35 Sup. Ct. 839, 59 L. Ed. 1224, differs from the one under consideration, .as that suit was not brought by a receiver in the course of winding up the affairs of a national bank, and jurisdiction, if it existed, was hel'd to depend upon diversity of citizenship or the presence of a federal question.

[2] On October 16, 1911, pursuant to an agreement of the parties, and under an order of the court, the case was sent to a special master, with directions “to hear the parties and report to the court his findings of fact and rulings of law thereon.” The order also contained the following provision:

“Any party to the suit shall have the right to a review and a determination by the court upon the evidence reported by the master. The master shall report to the court all the evidence bearing upon any question of fact which any party desires to be re-examined and found by the court, and such other portions of the evidence as may be material to any requests for rulings or other question of law which any party may desire to present to the court.”

The case has been heard by the master, and he has filed a report covering 94 typewritten pages, together with a book containing 597 pages of special findings, in addition to the general and special findings contained in his report, and he has made the figures of the expert showing the.state of the depositors’ ledger during the time the defalcations were taking place a part of the report. He has also reported alL the evidence and exhibits in the case. He adopted this course, for the reason that there was no other practical way of complying with the court’s order, in view of the great number of exceptions taken to facts which he found and refused to find, as the labor of separating out the evidence bearing on each particular question would be too great.

After finding many preliminary facts and stating much of the evidence bearing upon the conduct of the defendants, as president and directors, in the management and supervision of the bank, the master reached the conclusion that none of the defendants was negligent.

The plaintiff has excepted to the general finding and ruling of tire master that the defendants were not negligent, as inconsistent with his other findings of fact, and as directly against the weight of the evidence. He has also excepted to the finding and ruling that the defendant Edwin Dresser was not guilty of actionable negligence, as inconsistent and wholly at variance with the master’s special findings of fact, stating in detail wherein it is claimed to be inconsistent, and as against the weight of the evidence; and he has taken numerous other exceptions to special findings of fact and rulings of law.

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Bates v. Dresser, 229 F. 772, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 960 (D. Mass. 1915).

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