Batcheler v. Lally

66 Pa. D. & C. 25, 1948 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 88
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County
DecidedFebruary 6, 1948
Docketno. 35
StatusPublished

This text of 66 Pa. D. & C. 25 (Batcheler v. Lally) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Batcheler v. Lally, 66 Pa. D. & C. 25, 1948 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948).

Opinion

Valentine, P. J.,

This proceeding originated by plaintiffs’ application for a prelimi[26]*26nary injunction, restraining the removal of certain articles from the premises 99 Claymont Avenue, Hanover Township, this county.

By agreement, the filing of an answer was waived and a stipulation of counsel entered into that the case be disposed of as on final hearing, and that the court “decide the question of title to the articles referred to in the bill”.

Findings of Fact

1. Plaintiffs are the owners of a certain piece of improved land situate in the Township of Hanover, Luzerne County, Pa., which was conveyed to them by defendants by deed dated June 2, 1947, and recorded in Luzerne County Deed Book 936, page 1, which premises are known as 99 Claymont Avenue, Hanover Township, Pa.

2. At the time of the conveyance aforesaid, an apartment on the first floor of said building was occupied by Edwin Lally and Rose Lally, his wife, defendants, and a second-floor apartment was then occupied by plaintiffs, Frederick A. Batcheler and Garnet Batcheler, his wife.

3. The building in question is a three-story apartment house and contains three five-room apartments. Each apartment is equipped with a gas range, screens, radiators, built-in cupboards and combination sink and laundry tubs. The front or main entrance of the building is equipped with a combination storm and screen door.

4. Prior to the purchase of said premises by plaintiffs they made application to the Wilkes-Barre Deposit and Savings Bank for, and later procured, a mortgage on said premises in order to obtain a portion of the purchase price.

5. Said mortgage provided, inter alia: “It is intended that this mortgage shall be a lien on and include all buildings or any other type of improvement now [27]*27on or hereafter to be placed on the above described premises, together with all fences, walks, drives, shrubbery, or any other improvement of any nature whatsoever placed thereon; also all plumbing, heating, electrical or any other type of improvement, fixtures or additions now attached to this property or that may be attached to the same hereafter from time to time during the life of this mortgage."

6. The radiators, which form a part of the steam heating plant, the storm and screen door, the window screens, the combination sink and laundry tubs and the built-in cupboards are fixtures and constitute part of the building.

7. The gas stoves, located in the various apartments, are personal property.

Discussion

The question in controversy is whether the screen and storm door, window screens and other articles above enumerated, as contained in each apartment, passed to the purchaser by virtue of the conveyance of the building.

If the articles are fixtures, title to the same passed to plaintiffs as purchasers of the real estate. If the articles are regarded as personal property, defendants are the owners thereof and may lawfully remove the same from the building.

“Chattels used in connection with real estate are of three classes: first, those which are manifestly furniture, as distinguished from improvements, and not peculiarly fitted to the property with which they are used; these always remain personalty: . . . Second, those which are so annexed to the property that they cannot be removed without material injury to the real estate or to themselves; these are realty, even in the face of an expressed intention that they should be considered personalty:— to them the ancient maxim [28]*28‘Quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedif applies in full force: . . . Third, those which, although physically connected with the real estate, are so affixed as to be removable without destroying or materially injuring the chattels themselves, or the property to which they are annexed; these become part of the realty or remain personalty, depending upon the intention of the parties at the time of the annexation; in this class fall such chattels as boilers and machinery affixed for the use of an owner or tenant but readily removable”: Clayton v. Lienhard, 312 Pa. 433, at page 436.

The articles here in question may, we think, be considered as falling within the third class above enumerated.

In disposing of the question raised, sight must not be lost of the fact that we are here dealing with articles not furnished by a tenant, but installed by the owner. As between vendor and vendee, the rule for determining what is a fixture is to be construed most strongly against the seller. Articles connected with a building by the owner may pass to a purchaser, although if they had been installed by a tenant they might be regarded as removable by him.

Radiators

The radiators are an integral part of the building, and were installed by the owner with the intent and purpose that they were tó be attached to and become a part of the permanent steam plant contained therein. Fifty-four years ago in National Bank of Catasauqua v. North, 160 Pa. 303, it was held that radiators and valves connected with steam heating apparatus, in a dwelling house, were not fixtures attached to the realty. When that decision was rendered in 1894, dwelling houses were very largely heated by coal and wood stoves, rather than by steam heat. A heat plant installed in a modern apartment house must be regarded [29]*29as constituting an integral part of the realty, and as passing to the purchaser of the real estate. See Holland Furnace Co. v. Suzik, 118 Pa. Superior Ct. 406.

Storm and Screen Door and Window• Screens

Ordinary fly screens, such as are purchasable at the usual hardware store, and suitable for use in the windows of ordinary dwellings, are personal property and are hot to be regarded as fixtures: Weaver v. Williams, 15 Northamp. 108. The screens here in question, however, were made specially for the windows in this particular apartment house and adapted for the same. They are, therefore, to be deemed fixtures, and as such pass with the realty.

The modern trend of authority is to hold that chattels adapted to and usable as a part of the realty to which they are annexed are regarded as fixtures: Roderick v. Sanborn, 106 Me. 159, 76 Atl. 263; Fratt v. Whittier, 58 Cal. 126.

In Fish Company v. Young et al., 127 Wis. 149, 106 N. W. 795, the rule is expressed as follows:

“The screens were manufactured specially for and fitted to the house, were adapted to its permanent enjoyment and placed there by the owner. It is true that (according to the findings) they were not physically attached or screwed on, but were simply fastened by buttons (although it is not quite clear how doors could be so attached and serve any useful purpose). Physical annexation, however, though always an important consideration, is not the sole test nor by any means the controlling test in determining the question of fixture or no fixture. The question of the intention of the party making the annexation is the principal consideration: Rinzel v. Stumpf, 116 Wis. 287, 93 N. W. 36. When the owner of a house orders screens to be manufactured and fitted to his house there can be [30]*30no serious doubt as to his intention. Though detachable for convenience during the winter months, the intention is unquestionably to permanently increase the comfort of the house and its desirability for residence purposes.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Central Union Gas Co. v. . Browning
103 N.E. 822 (New York Court of Appeals, 1913)
Clayton v. Lienhard
167 A. 321 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1933)
Roderick v. Sanborn
76 A. 263 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1909)
Cosgrove v. Troescher
62 A.D. 123 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1901)
Fratt v. Whittier
58 Cal. 126 (California Supreme Court, 1881)
Vaughen v. Haldeman
33 Pa. 522 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1859)
National Bank v. North
28 A. 694 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1894)
Hook v. Bolton
85 N.E. 175 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1908)
Rinzel v. Stumpf
93 N.W. 36 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1903)
E. M. Fish Co. v. Young
106 N.W. 795 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1906)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
66 Pa. D. & C. 25, 1948 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 88, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/batcheler-v-lally-pactcomplluzern-1948.