1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Gabriel J. Bassford, No. CV-25-01034-PHX-JAT (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Mesa, City of, et al., 13 Defendants.
14 15 In this civil rights action, Plaintiff sued the City of Mesa and two Mesa Police 16 Officers alleging violations of his constitutional rights after he was arrested for trespassing 17 at a convenience store. The Court ordered service of the Complaint on April 3, 2025 (Doc. 18 7). In that Order, the Court also addressed Plaintiff’s motion challenging the designation 19 of this case as a “prisoner civil rights” action and assigning it a Nature of Suit code of 550.1 20 Between June 26, 2025 and July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed more than sixty separate 21 motions or notices requesting multiple forms of relief. The Court will address each 22 category of request below.2 There is little doubt, however, that the number of the filings 23 and their frivolous nature reflect a vexatious motion practice that impedes the Court’s 24 ability to manage its caseload. Such flagrant abuse of the litigation process will not be 25 allowed to continue. Plaintiff will be permitted to file one motion or notice per week. If 26 27 1 The Court will not repeat the reasons why this action was properly categorized or reiterate why that categorization has no substantive impact on the adjudication of Plaintiff’s 28 action, which was addressed in a prior Order, Doc. 7. 2 The Court takes no action on the myriad Notices or Declarations filed by Plaintiff. 1 Plaintiff chooses to continue his current path, the Court will dismiss this action for failure 2 to comply with the Court’s Orders. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th 3 Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of 4 the Court). 5 I. Requests for Recusal and Accusations of Bias (Docs. 14, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 45, 48) 6 7 The Court will first address Plaintiff’s requests for recusal and accusations of bias. 8 In his requests for recusal, Plaintiff alleges that the “conduct of Judge Teilborg in this 9 matter reflects actual bias, or at a minimum, creates a strong appearance of partiality 10 inconsistent with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the judicial oath of 11 office, and the Constitution of the United States.” (Doc. 31 at 2 (emphasis in original).) 12 Motions to disqualify or recuse a federal judge fall under two statutory provisions, 13 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a “timely 14 and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal 15 bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit must 16 state the facts and reasons for the belief that the bias or prejudice exists. 28 U.S.C. § 144. 17 If the judge finds the affidavit timely and legally sufficient, the judge must proceed no 18 further and another judge must be assigned to hear the motion. Id.; United States v. Sibla, 19 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 455, on the other hand, is self-enforcing on the 20 judge and requires a judge to recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality 21 might reasonably be questioned,” where he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 22 party,” or when he is “a party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1), and (b)(5)(i); 23 see also Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867-68. 24 When a litigant becomes unhappy with a judge’s rulings in a case, a litigant might 25 seek to force the judge to recuse himself by filing a lawsuit against the judge. But a “‘judge 26 is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such an easy 27 method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.” Ronwin v. 28 State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted), rev’d on other 1 grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). Similarly, “[w]here a claim 2 against the undersigned judge is so wholly frivolous that there is no jurisdiction, the 3 assigned judge should be able to decline to recuse and proceed with dismissing the case.” 4 Snegirev v. Sedwick, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1095 (D. Alaska 2006); see also Reddy v. 5 O’Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2007) (“recusal is not required where the 6 claim asserted is ‘wholly frivolous’ or a litigant has named a judicial officer as a defendant 7 to force him out of the case and hence obtain assignment of a judge the litigant considers 8 more desirable.” (quoting Snegirev, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1095)). 9 The same is true here. The undersigned was not named in Plaintiff’s original 10 complaint. Rather, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint after rulings Plaintiff believes 11 were incorrect. Such is not a basis for recusal. 12 As for recusal under § 144, the undersigned must initially determine whether 13 Plaintiff has filed a legally sufficient affidavit. See United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 14 738 (9th Cir. 1978) (“the judge against whom an affidavit of bias is filed may pass on its 15 legal sufficiency”) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921)). He has not. “An 16 affidavit filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 144] is not legally sufficient unless it specifically 17 alleges facts that fairly support the contention that the judge exhibits bias or prejudice 18 directed toward a party that stems from an extrajudicial source.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. 19 Plaintiff’s Affidavit does not contain any facts to support the conclusion that the 20 undersigned has exhibited bias or prejudice that stems from an extrajudicial source. Again, 21 the only articulated basis for recusal is Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the undersigned’s 22 rulings. Thus, the undersigned is not required to assign the recusal request to another judge. 23 See Azhocar, 581 F.2d at 738 (“Only after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit is 24 determined does it become the duty of the judge to ‘proceed no further’ in the case.”). 25 Under §§ 144 and 455, recusal is appropriate where “a reasonable person with 26 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 27 be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 28 States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)), abrogated on other grounds by 1 Simmons v. Himmelreich, 576 U.S. 621 (2016). In nearly all cases, the source of any 2 alleged bias must be extrajudicial. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544-56 (1994). 3 “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 4 motion.” Id. at 555. 5 Plaintiff does not allege the undersigned has an extrajudicial bias against him.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Gabriel J. Bassford, No. CV-25-01034-PHX-JAT (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Mesa, City of, et al., 13 Defendants.
14 15 In this civil rights action, Plaintiff sued the City of Mesa and two Mesa Police 16 Officers alleging violations of his constitutional rights after he was arrested for trespassing 17 at a convenience store. The Court ordered service of the Complaint on April 3, 2025 (Doc. 18 7). In that Order, the Court also addressed Plaintiff’s motion challenging the designation 19 of this case as a “prisoner civil rights” action and assigning it a Nature of Suit code of 550.1 20 Between June 26, 2025 and July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed more than sixty separate 21 motions or notices requesting multiple forms of relief. The Court will address each 22 category of request below.2 There is little doubt, however, that the number of the filings 23 and their frivolous nature reflect a vexatious motion practice that impedes the Court’s 24 ability to manage its caseload. Such flagrant abuse of the litigation process will not be 25 allowed to continue. Plaintiff will be permitted to file one motion or notice per week. If 26 27 1 The Court will not repeat the reasons why this action was properly categorized or reiterate why that categorization has no substantive impact on the adjudication of Plaintiff’s 28 action, which was addressed in a prior Order, Doc. 7. 2 The Court takes no action on the myriad Notices or Declarations filed by Plaintiff. 1 Plaintiff chooses to continue his current path, the Court will dismiss this action for failure 2 to comply with the Court’s Orders. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th 3 Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of 4 the Court). 5 I. Requests for Recusal and Accusations of Bias (Docs. 14, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 45, 48) 6 7 The Court will first address Plaintiff’s requests for recusal and accusations of bias. 8 In his requests for recusal, Plaintiff alleges that the “conduct of Judge Teilborg in this 9 matter reflects actual bias, or at a minimum, creates a strong appearance of partiality 10 inconsistent with the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, the judicial oath of 11 office, and the Constitution of the United States.” (Doc. 31 at 2 (emphasis in original).) 12 Motions to disqualify or recuse a federal judge fall under two statutory provisions, 13 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Section 144 provides for recusal where a party files a “timely 14 and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal 15 bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit must 16 state the facts and reasons for the belief that the bias or prejudice exists. 28 U.S.C. § 144. 17 If the judge finds the affidavit timely and legally sufficient, the judge must proceed no 18 further and another judge must be assigned to hear the motion. Id.; United States v. Sibla, 19 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980). Section 455, on the other hand, is self-enforcing on the 20 judge and requires a judge to recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality 21 might reasonably be questioned,” where he “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 22 party,” or when he is “a party to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1), and (b)(5)(i); 23 see also Sibla, 624 F.2d at 867-68. 24 When a litigant becomes unhappy with a judge’s rulings in a case, a litigant might 25 seek to force the judge to recuse himself by filing a lawsuit against the judge. But a “‘judge 26 is not disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.’ Such an easy 27 method for obtaining disqualification should not be encouraged or allowed.” Ronwin v. 28 State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted), rev’d on other 1 grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984). Similarly, “[w]here a claim 2 against the undersigned judge is so wholly frivolous that there is no jurisdiction, the 3 assigned judge should be able to decline to recuse and proceed with dismissing the case.” 4 Snegirev v. Sedwick, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1095 (D. Alaska 2006); see also Reddy v. 5 O’Connor, 520 F. Supp. 2d 124, 131 (D.D.C. 2007) (“recusal is not required where the 6 claim asserted is ‘wholly frivolous’ or a litigant has named a judicial officer as a defendant 7 to force him out of the case and hence obtain assignment of a judge the litigant considers 8 more desirable.” (quoting Snegirev, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1095)). 9 The same is true here. The undersigned was not named in Plaintiff’s original 10 complaint. Rather, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint after rulings Plaintiff believes 11 were incorrect. Such is not a basis for recusal. 12 As for recusal under § 144, the undersigned must initially determine whether 13 Plaintiff has filed a legally sufficient affidavit. See United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 14 738 (9th Cir. 1978) (“the judge against whom an affidavit of bias is filed may pass on its 15 legal sufficiency”) (citing Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921)). He has not. “An 16 affidavit filed pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 144] is not legally sufficient unless it specifically 17 alleges facts that fairly support the contention that the judge exhibits bias or prejudice 18 directed toward a party that stems from an extrajudicial source.” Sibla, 624 F.2d at 868. 19 Plaintiff’s Affidavit does not contain any facts to support the conclusion that the 20 undersigned has exhibited bias or prejudice that stems from an extrajudicial source. Again, 21 the only articulated basis for recusal is Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the undersigned’s 22 rulings. Thus, the undersigned is not required to assign the recusal request to another judge. 23 See Azhocar, 581 F.2d at 738 (“Only after the legal sufficiency of the affidavit is 24 determined does it become the duty of the judge to ‘proceed no further’ in the case.”). 25 Under §§ 144 and 455, recusal is appropriate where “a reasonable person with 26 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 27 be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 28 States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)), abrogated on other grounds by 1 Simmons v. Himmelreich, 576 U.S. 621 (2016). In nearly all cases, the source of any 2 alleged bias must be extrajudicial. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544-56 (1994). 3 “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 4 motion.” Id. at 555. 5 Plaintiff does not allege the undersigned has an extrajudicial bias against him. The 6 undersigned cannot conclude that the grounds advanced by Plaintiff would cause a 7 reasonable person with knowledge of all the relevant facts to question the impartiality of 8 the undersigned. Thus, the Court, will deny Plaintiff’s filings seeking recusal. 9 II. Motion to Amend Service Deadline; Motion to Waive Redline Requirement; and First Amended Complaint (Docs. 10, 23, 28) 10 11 Plaintiff’s original complaint raised twelve causes of action against the City of 12 Mesa, City of Mesa Police Officers Higgins and Giraldo, and John Does 1-4. The claims 13 involved allegations of false arrest and malicious prosecution stemming from Plaintiff’s 14 arrest for allegedly trespassing at a convenience store. The original complaint has not been 15 served on any Defendant. On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff lodged his First Amended Complaint 16 and seeks a waiver of Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1, which requires a plaintiff to 17 identify by redline and strikeout the ways in which an amended pleading differs from the 18 operative pleading. The Court will consider the First Amended Complaint. 19 As Plaintiff notes (Docs. 59, 74), Rule 15 permits amendment once as a matter of 20 course. The Court will therefore direct the First Amended Complaint to be filed. But the 21 amended complaint consists of 147 pages and 26 claims against 24 Defendants and John 22 Does. And many Defendants named in the First Amended Complaint are entitled to 23 immunity from suit and will therefore be dismissed.3 24 The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim that is “wholly insubstantial 25 and frivolous.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). A 26 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be dismissed as frivolous “where the defense is 27
28 3 Plaintiff lists Defendants in a chart attached to his First Amended Complaint as Exhibit A (Doc. 28-1 at 2). 1 complete and obvious from the face of the pleadings.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 2 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). Such claims include those in which “it is clear that the defendants 3 are immune from suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). See also Snegirev, 4 407 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (claim precluded by judicial immunity was frivolous). Such is the 5 case here. 6 In addition to Defendants named in claims from the original complaint, Plaintiff 7 adds the undersigned, Court staff, Maricopa County Superior Court judicial officers, City 8 of Mesa/Maricopa County Prosecutors, and Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney all of 9 whom are entitled to immunity or are otherwise subject to dismissal. 10 A. Judicial Officers and Court Staff 11 To begin, judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their 12 judicial acts except when they are taken “in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump 13 v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 14 (1871)); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). An act is “judicial” when 15 it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his or 16 her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th 17 Cir. 1990). This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and 18 corruptly, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), or of making grave errors of law or 19 procedure. See Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). 20 In his First Amended Complaint, all of Plaintiff’s allegations against the Defendant 21 judicial officers stem entirely from their judicial acts. Plaintiff attempts to circumvent 22 judicial immunity by a bare allegation the judicial officers acted “outside the scope of their 23 immunity.” Plaintiff cannot use magic words to avoid legal doctrines with which he 24 disagrees. The judicial officers named in the First Amended Complaint will be dismissed. 25 In addition to judicial officers, Plaintiff names multiple Court staff members 26 including Front Window Clerk Jane Doe, Court Clerk KJ, Clerk Harley, Clerk Supervisor 27 Missy, Clerk Does 1-999, Mesa Clerk Does 1-10. “Court clerks have absolute quasi- 28 judicial immunity from damages for [alleged] civil rights violations when they perform 1 tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. United States Bankr. Ct., 2 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). Accepting or denying motions or pleadings is an 3 integral part of the judicial process. Id. Immunity is not lost even if a clerk makes a mistake 4 or fails to carry out her or his duties, even when it results in “‘grave procedural errors.’” 5 Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 359)). These Defendants will also be dismissed. 6 B. Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Attorney 7 Similarly, prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under 8 § 1983 for their conduct in “initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case” 9 insofar as that conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 10 process.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 11 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). Immunity even extends to prosecutors for “eliciting false 12 or defamatory testimony from witnesses or for making false or defamatory statements 13 during, and related to, judicial proceedings.” Id.; see also Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 14 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2003) (prosecutor absolutely immune from liability for failure to 15 investigate the accusations against a defendant before filing charges; for knowingly using 16 false testimony at trial; and for deciding not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material 17 before trial, during trial, or after conviction); Roe v. City & County of S.F., 109 F.3d 578, 18 583-84 (9th Cir. 1997) (absolute immunity for decision to prosecute or not to prosecute 19 and for professional evaluation of a witness and evidence assembled by the police). The 20 prosecutors named in the First Amended Complaint are entitled to immunity and are 21 dismissed. 22 Finally, a prerequisite for any relief under § 1983 is a showing that the defendant 23 has acted under the color of state law. However, an attorney representing a criminal 24 defendant does not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 25 325 (1981); see also Szijarto v. Legeman, 466 F.2d 864, 864 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) 26 (“[A]n attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not act ‘under color of’ state law.”). 27 Laurel Workman, Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney, must therefore be dismissed. 28 /// III. Requests to Stay Proceedings Pending Supreme Court Review; Motion for 1 Transfer and Intervention Under Supreme Court Rule 11 and Rule 14; Motion 2 for Supreme Court Certification; and Motion for Judicial Acknowledgment (Docs. 9, 13, 24, 42) 3 4 Plaintiff requests “a stay of all deadlines, service, requirements, or procedural 5 obligations” while he seeks immediate review in the Supreme Court of his constitutional 6 challenges (Doc. 9 at 3). There is no basis for a stay of this matter and the Court will not 7 issue a stay. Nor is there a basis to certify this action under the extraordinary questions 8 doctrine. 9 IV. Motion for Interim Reimbursement; Motion for Immediate Equitable Relief; Motion to Enforce Interim Relief; Motion for Prejudgment Interest; and 10 Motion for Prospective Cost Accrual and Interim Relief (Docs. 16, 17, 18, 44, 11 58, 72) 12 Plaintiff seeks “interim reimbursement” in the amount of $217,900.00 under Rule 13 54(d) and 60(b)(6) (Doc. 16), equitable relief in the amount of $60,000 (Doc. 17), and 14 emergency enforcement of his requests for reimbursement (Doc. 18). According to 15 Plaintiff, this reimbursement would “mitigate ongoing prejudice, stabilize litigation 16 posture, and remedy the procedural and financial burden imposed by judicial and 17 administrative error.” (Doc. 16 at 5.) Plaintiff also seeks sanctions of $500,000 and 18 $25,000 per day (Doc. 72). 19 There is no basis for any distribution of funds to Plaintiff. No judgment has been 20 entered; indeed, Plaintiff has not yet served any Defendant. Nor is there a basis to award 21 Plaintiff sanctions. His requests for reimbursement, equitable relief, and sanctions will be 22 denied. 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// V. Motion to Compel Preservation of Internal Court, Clerkship, and Judicial 1 Communications; Motion to Compel Identification of Clerkship, Docketing, 2 and Administrative Personnel; Motion to Compel Disclosure of Inter-Judicial Communications; and Request to Preserve Internal Judiciary 3 Communications (Docs. 38, 39, 43, 49) 4 Plaintiff seeks an order compelling the preservation of all internal Court 5 communications regarding this matter and identification of staff members who work in this 6 courthouse. No basis exists for such requests, and they will be denied. 7 VI. Motion for Service by the United States Marshal and Motions to Compel 8 Clerk’s Compliance (Docs. 26, 29, 63) 9 Plaintiff requests that service be performed by the United States Marshal (Doc. 26). 10 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3), a court may, at the plaintiff’s request, “order 11 that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 12 Such an order is mandatory only “if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis 13 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or as a seaman under 28 U.S.C. §1916.” Id. Plaintiff paid the 14 filing fee in this matter; he is not entitled to service by the Marshal. 15 The Advisory Committee Notes for Rule 4 specify that a “plaintiff is expected first 16 to seek service by private means whenever feasible rather than impose the burden on the 17 Marshal’s Service” and that “court orders directing service by marshal should not be issued 18 unless they really are necessary.” Hollywood v. Carrows California Fam. Restaurants, 19 No. CV 18-2098-JGB (GJS) 2018 WL 7461690, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2018) (citing 93 20 F.R.D. 255, 262); see also 4A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1090 (4th ed.) (only after 21 attempting other means of service should the plaintiff request that a marshal effectuate 22 service). Plaintiff’s motion for service will be denied. The Clerk of Court will be directed 23 to issue the Summonses for the Defendants specifically identified. 24 VII. Motion to Allow Electronic Filing; Motion for Emergency Interim E-Filing; 25 and Motion for Waiver of PACER Fees (Docs. 8, 53, 64) 26 Plaintiff seeks leave to file documents electronically and for a waiver of PACER 27 fees (Docs. 8, 53). Plaintiff’s abusive motion practice makes clear it is inadvisable for him 28 1 to have unfettered access to the Court’s electronic filing system, nor is there any basis to 2 waive PACER fees (Doc. 64). The Court will deny the requests. 3 VIII. Miscellaneous Motions (Docs. 19, 47, 50, 59) 4 Plaintiff moves for “admissions by conduct,” because Plaintiff believes the Court 5 has refused to act in a timely manner. It appears Plaintiff further believes the undersigned 6 has committed misconduct in failing to address his motions within 72 hours. (Doc. 52) 7 In his Notice of Declaration of Systemic Injustice, Judicial Sabotage, and 8 Destructive Dereliction of Duty, Plaintiff asserts the “judiciary has actively withheld 9 review, acknowledgment, or action on over 68 filed motions, notices, and pleadings, 10 including multiple urgent filings categorized as “Truthfire Series” and “Doctoral Series” 11 declarations, triggering constitutional urgency.” (Doc. 69.) It appears Plaintiff believes 12 this is the only matter pending in this Court. He is mistaken. Nor does the Court violate a 13 litigant’s rights when it does not rule on an avalanche of motions immediately upon receipt. 14 At bottom, Plaintiff is unwilling or unable to accept the Court’s decision on 15 Plaintiff’s request to modify the Nature of Suit code in this matter. His behavior in 16 response—filing nearly 70 frivolous motions, notices, and other documents—is ill- 17 conceived and ill-advised. These filings divert scarce judicial resources and only serve to 18 delay the resolution of Plaintiff’s underlying claims. Plaintiff may file one motion or 19 notice per week. If he fails to comply strictly with this Order, this action will be dismissed 20 without further notice. 21 IT IS ORDERED: 22 (1) The Clerk of Court must file the First Amended Complaint lodged at Doc. 23 28. 24 (2) The United States District Court for the District of Arizona, James A. 25 Teilborg, Front Window Clerk (Jane Doe), Court Clerk K.J., Clerk Harley, Clerk 26 Supervisor Missy, Clerk Does 1-999, Mesa Prosecutor’s Office, Mesa Veterans Court, 27 Mesa Clerk Does 1-10, Laurel A. Workman, Judicial Officers John/Jane Does, Hon. 28 Elizabeth P. Arriola, Hon Stephanie Olohan, Prosecutor Stacy Good, Prosecutor Austin 1 Brooks, Prosecutor Paul Hawkins, and Police Department John Does 1-4, and John/Jane 2 Does Misc. are DISMISSED for the reasons discussed herein. 3 (3) Plaintiff must serve the First Amended Complaint only on the City of 4 Mesa, the Mesa Police Department, Officer Dominic Higgins, Officer Juan Giraldo, and 5 Sergeant Kevin Bailey. 6 (4) The deadline to serve the First Amended Complaint is extended to August 7 28, 2025. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 8 (5) | The Clerk of Court must issue Summonses only as to the Defendants listed 9 above. 10 (6) Plaintiff's Motions at Doc. 8, Doc. 9, Doc. 10, Doc. 13, Doc. 16, Doc. 17, 11 Doc. 18, Doc. 19, Doc. 23, Doc. 24, Doc. 26, Doc. 29, Doc. 32, Doc. 38, Doc. 39, Doc. 12 42, Doc. 43, Doc. 44, Doc. 45, Doc. 47, Doc. 48, Doc. 49, Doc. 50, Doc. 53, Doc. 58, 13 Doc. 59, Doc. 63, Doc. 64, and Doc. 72 are DENIED for the reasons discussed herein. 14 (7) Plaintiff may file one motion or notice per week. Any additional filings 15 will not be entertained. Failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of 16 this action without further notice. 17 Dated this 16th day of July, 2025. 18 19 20 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28