In the United States Court of Federal Claims
ROBERT C. BASS,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-1411 Filed June 2, 2026 THE UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
Robert C. Bass, Brooklyn, New York, plaintiff, pro se. Sean K. Griffin, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for de- fendant.
OPINION AND ORDER Granting the government’s motion to dismiss
Robert C. Bass, proceeding without an attorney, filed a complaint in this court alleging a
breach of contract and an illegal exaction connected to the government’s 2012 action against the
Swiss bank Wegelin & Co., where he held an account. The government moves to dismiss Mr.
Bass’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, arguing that Mr. Bass’s claims are time barred and that his illegal exaction
claim is frivolous. Because Mr. Bass’s claims are time barred, have already been decided by an-
other court, and are actually directed against a private party, the court will grant the government’s
motion to dismiss.
I. Background
In 2012, the government charged Wegelin in district court in New York with “conspiring
with U.S. taxpayers to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, file false federal income tax returns,
and evade federal income taxes.” ECF No. 40-1 at Appx40. One year later, Wegelin entered into
a plea agreement in which it agreed to forfeit $15,821,000 in proceeds from its tax fraud scheme.
1 Id. Wegelin transferred the funds to a seized-assets deposit account maintained by the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury, and the district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture. Id. at
Appx40-41. The order required the government to publish a forfeiture notice to the public for at
least thirty days. Id. at Appx41. Under the forfeiture notice, anyone “asserting a legal interest in
the Defendant Funds must file a petition within sixty (60) days from the first day of publication of
the notice.” Id. The government posted the notice at www.forfeiture.gov for the required thirty
days, and the district court then issued a final order of forfeiture in 2013. Id. at Appx40-43.
In February 2023, Mr. Bass filed a petition with the IRS requesting the return of $3,500,000
that he alleges he held in an account at Wegelin. ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 40-1 at Appx37-39. The
IRS presumably routed the request to the Department of Justice because the Money Laundering
and Asset Recovery Section of the Department of Justice denied Mr. Bass’s petition, explaining
that he had not established that he qualified “as a victim, owner, or lienholder.” ECF No. 40-1 at
Appx35-36. Mr. Bass filed a reconsideration petition (id. at Appx29-34), which the Department of
Justice denied. ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 40-1 at Appx27-34.
Mr. Bass then, in January 2024, filed a petition in district court in New York seeking review
of the Department of Justice’s decision and seeking remission, or the return, of money that he
alleged the government had seized from his Wegelin account. ECF No. 1 at 2 [¶7]; ECF No. 40-1
at Appx5-26. The government filed a letter opposing Mr. Bass’s petition. ECF No. 40-1 at Appx2-
4. The government’s letter argued that a decision denying a remission petition is not subject to
judicial review because remission is within the Attorney General’s discretion. Id. at Appx3-4. The
government also argued that it had followed the necessary procedural steps when it seized the
Wegelin funds. Id. at Appx4. The district court denied Mr. Bass’s petition in February 2024 “for
essentially the reasons stated in the Government’s letter.” Id. at Appx1. Mr. Bass appealed, and
2 the Second Circuit affirmed. Bass v. United States, No. 24-1079, 2024 WL 5153976 (2d Cir. Dec.
18, 2024). Mr. Bass then sought monetary relief in the district court, and the district court also
denied that motion. ECF No. 1 at 3 [¶9]; United States v. Berlinka, No. 12-cr-2, ECF Nos. 91, 92
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 13 & 14, 2025). Mr. Bass appealed that denial, and the Second Circuit dismissed
the appeal because it lacked “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id. at 3 [¶11]; United States
v. Bass, No. 25-183, ECF No. 52 (2d Cir. July 9, 2025). The Second Circuit denied Mr. Bass’s
request for en banc rehearing. Id. at 3 [¶13]; Bass, No. 25-183, ECF No. 60 (2d Cir. Aug. 18,
2025).
Mr. Bass then sued in this court in August 2025, alleging a taking and a breach of contract.
ECF No. 1 at 5-10. The government moved to dismiss. ECF No. 34. Mr. Bass filed an amended
complaint, which the court accepted, alleging an illegal exaction. ECF Nos. 38, 39. The govern-
ment now moves to dismiss Mr. Bass’s amended complaint. ECF No. 40.
II. Discussion
The government moves to dismiss under rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Rules of the
Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). ECF No. 40 at 1. The government argues that the court lacks
jurisdiction over Mr. Bass’s amended complaint because (1) the forfeiture statute on which Mr.
Bass’s claims rest is not money mandating; (2) his illegal exaction claim is jurisdictionally infirm
and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (3) his breach of contract claim fails
for lack of privity with the government; and (4) his illegal exaction and breach of contract claims
are time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2501. ECF No. 43 at 1. Mr. Bass responds that the court has
Tucker Act jurisdiction over illegal exaction claims regardless of whether the underlying statute is
money mandating when it comes to a direct claim to specific property with an ownership interest
(ECF No. 42 at 10); the government’s exaction occurred without giving him proper notice (id. at
12); there was an implied-in-fact contract that arose when the government undertook its obligation
3 to handle forfeited funds (id. at 16); and the statute of limitations should be tolled or its accrual
suspended because the government’s failure to provide notice prevented him from knowing that
his property interests were at stake (id. at 18).
The jurisdiction of this court is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides the
court with jurisdiction over “any claim against the United States founded … upon any express or
implied contract with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Under RCFC 12(b)(1), “a court
must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163
(Fed. Cir. 2011). If the court determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss
the action. RCFC 12(b)(1); see Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,
94 (1998).
A “plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence.” Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This
court has traditionally held the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff to a less stringent standard than those
of a litigant represented by counsel. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (stating that pro se
complaints “however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers” (marks omitted)). The court has therefore exercised its discretion in this case
to examine the pleadings “to see if [the pro se] plaintiff has a cause of action somewhere dis-
played.” Ruderer v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 456, 468 (1969). Regardless, pro se plaintiffs still
have the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Landreth v. United States, 797 F. App’x 521, 523 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Kelley v. Secretary of
the Department of Labor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
4 This court’s rule 12(b)(6) requires a plaintiff to bring a claim on which the court can grant
relief. On a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept well-pleaded factual alle-
gations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Lindsay v. United States,
295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The court need not accept the parties’ legal conclusions as
true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007)). “A complaint must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts asserted
do not give rise to a legal remedy, or do not elevate a claim for relief to the realm of plausibility.”
Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. United States, 671 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Lindsay,
295 F.3d at 1257, and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
This court cannot hear Mr. Bass’s complaint for three reasons: (1) his claims are barred by
the statute of limitations; (2) Mr. Bass cannot relitigate whether the government gave him effective
notice of the forfeiture; and (3) Mr. Bass’s complaint is more appropriately directed against We-
gelin, a private party over which this court has no jurisdiction. The first and third reasons show the
court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the second reason demonstrates at least a failure to
state a claim. Because the court lacks jurisdiction over the complaint, the court will not defer de-
ciding the government’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 42 at 9) and will deny Mr. Bass’s motion for
a status conference (ECF No. 44) as moot.
A. The statute of limitations bars Mr. Bass’s claims
The statute of limitations bars Mr. Bass’s claims against the government. Mr. Bass charac-
terizes the forfeiture of his funds, which were deposited with Wegelin, as an illegal exaction, and
he contests whether the government published notice of the seized Wegelin funds in 2013. ECF
No. 39 at 4-5. Mr. Bass also argues that, once Wegelin signed the plea agreement, the government
had a duty to Wegelin’s non-criminal clients that it violated in its handling of the plea agreement.
5 Id. at 6-8. Because those claims accrued more than six years ago, they are untimely under the
court’s statute of limitations.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, “[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims
has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim
first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. A claim accrues “when all the events which fix the government’s
alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should have been aware of their existence.”
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quotation marks
omitted).
An illegal exaction claim “involves money that was improperly paid, exacted, or taken
from the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation.” Flander v. United
States, 737 F. App’x 530, 532 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Thus, an illegal exaction claim alleges that “the
Government has the citizen’s money in its pocket.” Ontario Power Generation, Inc. v. United
States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). It accrues when the money has
been transferred to the government. See Townsend v. United States, No. 19-759, 2020 WL 5552043
at *3 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 16, 2020). For a breach of contract claim, the “cause of action accrues when
the breach occurs.” Alder Terrace, Inc. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see
also Rocky Mountain Helium, LLC v. United States, 841 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (ex-
plaining that the time bar depends on the termination date of the contract).
Mr. Bass’s illegal exaction and breach of contract claims both accrued in 2013. Mr. Bass
states in his amended complaint that the government submitted the stipulated preliminary order of
forfeiture and the alleged forfeiture notice in 2013. ECF No. 39 at 4-6. The district court issued
the final order of forfeiture (ECF No. 40-1 at Appx40) and plea agreement (id. at Appx91-98) that
same year. Mr. Bass’s funds were “in [the government’s] pocket” at least after the 2013 final order
6 of forfeiture. Ontario Power Generation, 369 F.3d at 1301. Thus, Mr. Bass’s illegal exaction claim
is time barred.
The same is true for the breach of contract claim. Mr. Bass argues that the United States
breached an implied contract with him when it obtained the district court’s approval of the stipu-
lated preliminary and final orders of forfeiture. ECF No. 39 at 7. Both happened in 2013. Id. at 4-
6; ECF No. 40-1 at Appx40. Thus, Mr. Bass’s claims accrued in 2013, more than six years before
Mr. Bass filed this case in 2025. Mr. Bass’s allegations of an illegal exaction and a breach of
contract are barred under section 2501.
Mr. Bass argues that the statute of limitations should run from when he discovered new
evidence relating to his claim, the unredacted Wegelin sentencing memorandum, in 2024. ECF
No. 1 at 5-6; ECF No. 39 at 2. Alternatively, Mr. Bass argues that his claims are subject to the
accrual suspension rule because the government did not give him notice of the forfeiture. ECF No.
42 at 18.
Because the claims accrued in 2013, Mr. Bass’s first argument essentially requests that the
court apply equitable tolling. But the six-year limitation period is “absolute” in nature. John R.
Sand & Gravel Company v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008). The six-year limitation is
“jurisdictional and may not be waived or tolled.” FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 F.3d 1377,
1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, Mr. Bass’s claims cannot be tolled for his failure to promptly learn
of the unredacted sentencing memorandum.
Mr. Bass also is not entitled to the benefit of the accrual suspension rule, which “is ‘distinct
from the question whether equitable tolling is available under [28 U.S.C. § 2501].’” Young v.
United States, 529 F.3d 1380, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d
1295, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc)). According to the Federal Circuit, “the accrual of a claim
7 against the United States is suspended, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, until the claimant knew
or should have known that the claim existed.” Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319. For the accrual suspen-
sion rule to apply, Mr. Bass must “either show that [the government] has concealed its acts with
the result that [he] was unaware of their existence, or [he] must show that [his] injury was inher-
ently unknowable at the accrual date.” Welcker v. United States, 752 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (cleaned up). The “rule is strictly and narrowly applied.” Id.1
In his amended complaint, Mr. Bass neither pleaded nor presented evidence establishing
that the operative facts of his illegal exaction and breach of contract claims were inherently un-
knowable. Mr. Bass could have checked his bank account at any time between the 2013 forfeiture
and 2025 and discovered that his deposits were missing, with or without an official notice in 2013.
Nor has Mr. Bass alleged facts demonstrating that the government concealed its actions. Even if
the notice of forfeiture posted by the government was inaccessible through the website, as Mr.
Bass alleges (ECF No. 39 at 5), news of the plea agreement with Wegelin was publicly reported
1 The accrual suspension rule appears only in decisions of this court and the Federal Circuit (or their predecessors). And the court of appeals most often denies application of the rule. See Young, 529 F.3d at 1385; Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1319; but see Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1322 (Fed. Cir 2011) (requiring the Court of Federal Claims to apply the accrual suspension rule in the plaintiff’s favor in determining when he reasonably should have known of the alleged breach of contract). While a unique doctrine for a limitations period applicable only to this court is odd, so is the jurisdictional nature of this court’s statute of limitations under John R. Sand & Gravel. See United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 408-09 (2015) (explaining that “most time bars are non- jurisdictional”). Further, some state laws provide that breach of contract actions do not even accrue until after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the breach. See Design Gaps, Inc. v. Dis- tinctive Design and Construction LLC, 162 F.4th 452, 480 (4th Cir. 2025) (applying South Caro- lina law); Bank of America, N.A. v. Dakota Homestead Title Insurance Co., 553 F. App’x 764, 766 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Colorado law). With or without the accrual suspension rule, some con- tract-based statutes of limitations do not begin to run until the plaintiff could have known of his injury. And, regardless, Federal Circuit precedent, including the existence of the accrual suspen- sion rule, is binding on this court.
8 in other ways. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Swiss Bank Sentenced In Man-
hattan Federal Court For Conspiring To Evade Taxes (Mar. 4, 2013); Julia Werdigier, Wegelin
Ordered to Pay $74 Million in Tax Plea, New York Times (Mar. 5, 2013); Reed Albergotti, We-
gelin to Pay U.S. $74 Million, Wall Street Journal (Mar. 4, 2013) (all cited at ECF No. 40 at 16
n.7). Mr. Bass argues that the court should not consider the public reporting of the forfeiture (ECF
No. 42 at 21 n.4), but the court can consider public reporting for purposes of determining its juris-
diction. See Bowers Investment Co., LLC v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 246, 252 (2011), aff’d, 695
F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“When a party challenges the jurisdictional facts alleged in the com-
plaint, the court may consider relevant evidence outside the pleadings to resolve the factual dis-
pute.” (cleaned up)). Between the forfeiture in 2013 and Mr. Bass’s complaint here in 2025, there
was time and the opportunity for Mr. Bass to discover that his funds were missing. Mr. Bass’s
claims were not “inherently unknowable.” Welcker, 752 F.2d at 1580.
B. Several of Mr. Bass’s claims have been addressed by a federal district court and a court of appeals, barring this court’s review
Mr. Bass bases his fraud claim and his argument for the accrual suspension rule on the
government’s alleged failure to provide notice of its seizure of Wegelin’s money. ECF No. 39 at
4-5. But, as the government points out (ECF No. 40 at 14), Mr. Bass has raised the same argument
in other courts and lost. See Berlinka, No. 12-cr-2, ECF No. 82 (reproduced at ECF No. 40-1 at
Appx1), aff’d Bass, 2024 WL 5153976, at *1-2. Issue preclusion bars any attempt to relitigate that
issue here.
“Issue preclusion refers to the effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of a matter
that has been litigated and decided.” Migra v. Warren City School District Board of Educa-
tion, 465 U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984). Issue preclusion “protects the finality of judgments by precluding
relitigation in a second suit of claims actually litigated and determined in the first suit.” Laguna,
9 671 F.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Mr. Bass is precluded from relitigating the issue of the gov-
ernment’s notice if “(1) the issue is identical to one decided in the first action; (2) the issue was
actually litigated in the first action; (3) resolution of the issue was essential to a final judgment in
the first action; and (4) the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first
action.” Id. at 1288.
As noted above, Mr. Bass argued to the New York district court that the government did
not publicize the notice of forfeiture of Wegelin funds, as required by law. ECF No. 40-1 at Appx5-
6. The government’s opposition noted, among other things, that “the applicable procedural require-
ments—specifically, notice of forfeiture—were followed.” Id. at Appx4. The district court denied
Mr. Bass’s petition “for essentially the reasons stated in the Government’s letter.” ECF No. 40-1
at Appx1. The Second Circuit affirmed. Bass, 2024 WL 5153976, at *1-2. The Second Circuit
noted that “[t]he only substantive aspect of the district court’s decision that Bass challenges is its
conclusion that the government complied with the applicable legal notice requirements prior to
forfeiting the property.” Id. at *1. It therefore “address[ed] only that question.” Id. The Second
Circuit held that Mr. Bass had not established “that the government did not publish the notice or
that its website was inaccessible to Bass at the relevant time.” Id. at *2.
Thus, the Second Circuit considered and rejected Mr. Bass’s precise argument that the
Wegelin forfeiture notice had not been published. That determination was essential to the Second
Circuit’s decision and therefore the district court’s final judgment, as it was the only issue the
Second Circuit decided. And Mr. Bass had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in district
court and on appeal. See Laguna, 671 F.3d at 1288. Here, Mr. Bass again argues that the govern-
ment did not provide notice (ECF No. 39 at 5) and asks this court to relitigate the district court’s
and Second Circuit’s decisions. This court cannot. See Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v.
10 Apple Inc., 112 F.4th 1364, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (applying issue preclusion in the patent context
because doing otherwise would allow litigants to maintain an untenable “repetitious litigation strat-
egy”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, 52 F.4th 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (noting
that preclusion “protects the public interest in avoiding inconsistent results and conserving judicial
resources”).
Likewise, “the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a deci-
sion rendered by a federal district court.” Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d
1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015). If this court were to review the determinations of the New York
district court or the Second Circuit, that would effectively be a collateral attack on the judgments
of those courts. Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
C. Mr. Bass’s claims are more appropriately directed against Wegelin, a private party, rather than the government
Although Mr. Bass has brought suit here against the government, his claims are directed
against Wegelin, a private party. His amended complaint states that he seeks monetary civil relief
and the return of his $3,500,000 deposit, along with the interest the account would have accrued
“had Bass’ lawful and legally-earned funds not been seized and forfeited by Wegelin & Co., as
agreed in the Wegelin Plea Agreement.” ECF No. 39 at 3. Wegelin agreed to plead guilty and
signed the plea agreement. Id. at 7. Taking Mr. Bass’s allegations as true, he lost his deposit be-
cause Wegelin pleaded guilty to tax fraud and agreed to forfeit the funds to the government. See
id.; see also Gray v. United States, No. 22-541, 2022 WL 4103075, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sep. 8, 2022)
(noting that the court does not have jurisdiction where a private party, not the government,
breached any alleged duty).
This court lacks jurisdiction over claims against private organizations; it only has jurisdic-
tion over claims against the federal government. 28 U.S.C. §1491; United States v. Sherwood, 312
11 U.S. 584, 588 (1941) (the court is “without jurisdiction of any suit brought against private parties”).
Mr. Bass’s complaint essentially alleges that Wegelin should not have agreed to forfeit the funds,
which were in Wegelin’s possession, to the government. Mr. Bass’s claims are against Wegelin,
not the government. Because this court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims against private parties, it
does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Bass’s claims.
D. The court will not defer deciding the government’s motion to dismiss, and Mr. Bass’s request for a status conference is moot
In his response to the government’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Bass argues that the court
should defer ruling on the motion to dismiss until after a trial. ECF No. 42 at 9. Because the court
does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Bass’s claims, it need not and cannot defer a ruling until after
a trial. RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.”).
While the government’s motion to dismiss was pending, Mr. Bass submitted a motion re-
questing a status conference in the case. ECF No. 44. Because the court is granting the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss, and the court has no jurisdiction over Mr. Bass’s complaint, the motion
for a status conference is moot. The court will deny the motion.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court grants the government’s motion to dismiss Mr.
Bass’s amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (ECF No. 40) and dismisses the
amended complaint. Mr. Bass’s motion for a status conference (ECF No. 44) is denied as moot.
The clerk of the court shall enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Molly R. Silfen MOLLY R. SILFEN Judge