Bass v. John Doe

District Court, D. South Dakota·Decided August 8, 2024·No. 3:23-cv-03014·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA CENTRAL DIVISION

JOHANN A. BASS, 3:23-CV-03014-RAL Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN VS. PART AND DENYNIG IN PART BASS’S MOTION FOR ORDER ASSISTING WITH SHELBY HATTUM, Trooper at South Dakota SERVICE OF SUMMONSES Dept. of Public Safety in her individual capacity; JOHN DOE, Trooper at South Dakota Department of Public Safety in his or her individual capacity; JANE SCHRANK, Director, Driver License Program at South Dakota Dept. of Public Safety in her individual and official capacities; AMANDA HOSSLE, Director at South Dakota Dept. of Public Safety in her individual and official capacities, Defendants.

Plaintiff Johann A. Bass, an inmate at the Greene Correctional Facility, in Coxsackie, New York, filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 1. This Court granted Bass leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 6, and screened his initial complaint, Doc. 12. Bass filed an amended complaint, Doc. 18, which this Court also screened, Doc. 24, Claims against Shelby Hattum and John Doe #3 in their individual capacities survived screening, and claims against Jane Schrank and Amanda Hossle in their individual and official capacities survived screening. Docs. 12, 24. Bass returned a completed summons for Hattum, and the United States Marshal Service (USMS) executed service on Hattum. Doc, 36. Hattum retained private counsel and is not represented by the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office. Docs. 20, 23.

Bass previously returned completed summonses that listed the address for the South

Dakota Department of Public Safety (DPS) as Schrank’s and Hossle’s addresses. Doc. 19. The

summonses were forwarded to the USMS to effectuate service. Id. The USMS was not able to

serve the summonses at the listed addresses because Schrank and Hossle no longer work at the

DPS. Docs. 29, 30. Bass also filed two summonses with Schrank’s and Hossle’s names and “C/O

of South Dakota Attorney General’s Office[,]” but the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office is

not a party to Bass’s lawsuit and not currently representing or employing any named parties. Doc.

33. Bass mailed a letter to the Clerk of Court, Doc. 37, and a letter to this Court, Doc. 38,

requesting the USMS to locate and serve summonses on Schrank and Hossle, which this Court

construed as motions for assistance with service. Doc. 39 at 2. Bass alleges that because his civil rights case focuses on “actions during [Schrank’s and

Hossle’s] employment with the South Dakota Department of Public Safety[,]... the South Dakota

Attorney General’s Office is responsible for their representation in court until they decide to hire

an outside counsel” Doc. 37 at 1. He claims that “[t]here isn’t any reason why the US Marshals

can’t locate these Defendants or serve them at the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office. Even

if they located them and served them individually, the State of South Dakota would still be

responsible for their defense in court.” Doc. 38 at 1. Bass requested that this Court “issue the

Summonses with the South Dakota Attorney General’s address on them and have the Marshals

serve them at the AG’s office or in the alternative have the Marshals locate them for service.”

Doc. 37 at 1. This Court denied Bass’s motions for assistance with service because “[t]his Court

and the USMS cannot order the South Dakota Attorney General’s Office to accept service on

behalf of its former employees.” Doc. 39 at 3

After his motions for assistance with service were denied, Bass sent to the South Dakota

Attorney General’s Office a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of the Summons,

a Waiver of Service of Summons, and an Admission of Service, along with a copy of the Amended

Complaint for Schrank and Hossle, Doc. 43 at 2-3, but neither the Attorney General’s Office nor

Schrank or Hossle returned any of these documents. Id. at 3. Bass now moves for an order

directing that “service be effected in a manner decided by the Court.” Id. Specifically, Bass

requests that the Court “order the U.S. Marshal’s [sic] to locate defendants Shrank and Hossle and

serve them or that they be served at the Office of the South Dakota Attorney General or a manner

of service otherwise prescribed by the Court.” Id. at 4, Bass’s motion is granted in part and denied

in part. As this Court has previously stated, “While in forma pauperis plaintiffs should not be

penalized for a marshal’s failure to obtain proper service, it was [the plaintiff’ s] responsibility to

provide proper addresses for service on [defendants].” Lee v. Armontrout, 991 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). “[A] plaintiff bears the burden of providing proper service information|[.]” Beyer v. Pulaski Cnty. Jail, 589 F. App’x 798, 799 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Relying on Beyer, Bass urges this Court to order the USMS to locate and serve Shrank and Hossle.

Doc. 43 at 3-4. The holding in Beyer is not as broad as Bass contends. In Beyer, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered whether the district court has abused its

discretion in dismissing without prejudice a pro se prisoner’s § 1983 action under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 4(m). After the district court granted Beyer’s motion to proceed IFP, the USMS

attempted to serve the defendant, a correctional officer, at the jail where the alleged excessive force

had taken place. The USMS was unable to serve the correctional officer because the officer was

no longer employed at the jail. When Beyer was unable to provide an address at which the

correctional officer could be served, the action was dismissed without prejudice for failure to

prosecute. Beyer contended that he was in administrative segregation at another prison, had no

access to a law library, and his friends and family were unable to assist him in locating the former

correctional officer. Beyer also alleged that the jail at which the correctional officer was employed should have information that would assist the USMS in locating her, including alternative contact

information she provided while employed there. The Eighth Circuit held that in these

circumstances that district court had abused its discretion in dismissing the action and directed the

district court to order the USMS to seek the correctional officer’s jast-known contact information, including any alternative contact information, from the jail and to re-attempt to serve her.

In this case, it appears that the USMS attempted to obtain from the DPS alternative contact

information for Schrank and Hossle when the USMS attempted to serve these defendants at the

DPS. See Doc. 29 at 3 (“we learned Schrank retired. No follow-up address or phone numbers

were known. Based on the information provided in this process, I cannot locate [Schrank]’’); Doc.

30 (“Hossle no longer works at [the DPS]. It not known where she currently works or resides. As

a result, the process cannot be served and is returned unexecuted.”). The USMS, on its own

initiative, took the steps that the Eighth Circuit held in Beyer that the district court should have

ordered. Jt would be within this Court’s discretion to deny in its entirety Bass’s motion for

assistance with service. However, the Court recognizes that there are some unique circumstances

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