Bass v. Farmer & Cheatham

658 So. 2d 324, 1995 WL 418691
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 30, 1995
Docket94 CA 1281
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 658 So. 2d 324 (Bass v. Farmer & Cheatham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bass v. Farmer & Cheatham, 658 So. 2d 324, 1995 WL 418691 (La. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

658 So.2d 324 (1995)

Cheryl S. BASS
v.
FARMER & CHEATHAM and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.

No. 94 CA 1281.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 30, 1995.
Rehearing Denied August 17, 1995.

*325 Fernand L. Laudumiey, III, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee, Cheryl Bass.

Denis P. Juge, Metairie, for defendants-appellants, Farmer & Cheatham and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

Before GONZALES and PARRO, JJ., and REDMANN[1], J. Pro Tem.

WILLIAM V. REDMANN, Judge Pro Tem.

In this worker's compensation claim for disability from mental injury from mental stress, the hearing officer found that plaintiff legal secretary's posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was caused by "extremely tragic events" (including sexual abuse from age 5 to 12 and triple rape at 15) long before her employment at age 24. The hearing officer awarded disability benefits, ruling that being screamed at and having a book slung in her direction at work "were the sudden and unexpected and extraordinary events that triggered the latent PTSD into full blown active PTSD which disabled claimant," entitling claimant to benefits.

We reverse. Although PTSD is a mental injury with diagnostic criteria within La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(d), the loss of ability to cope with pre-existing mental injury is not itself shown to be a similarly compensable mental injury. In any event, plaintiff did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to her employment as further required by R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) for compensability.

Applicable law

Special statutes apply to worker's compensation claims for disability from mental injury caused by mental stress, and impose special burdens of proof.

R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) and (d) (added, Acts 1989 No. 454; as amended, Acts 1991 No. 468) deny compensability unless both:

(1) "the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence,"

and

(2) "the diagnosis of the condition meets the criteria as established in the most current issue of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders presented by the American Psychiatric Association."[2]

*326 Proof by clear and convincing evidence is described by the Louisiana supreme court in Succession of Lyons, 452 So.2d 1161, 1165 (La.1984) (emphasis in original):

Generally, this third burden of proof requires more than a "preponderance of the evidence" but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt". The existence of the disputed fact must be highly probable, that is, much more probable than its non-existence. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437 (La.1976). This standard is usually employed "where there is thought to be special danger of deception, or where the court considers that the particular type of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds." McCormick on Evidence, Section 340(b), p. 798 (2nd ed. 1972).

Plaintiff's PTSD caused by pre-employment events

Reports and hospital and office notes from plaintiff's psychiatrist Dr. Denney and his associated psychologists, Dr. Culver (who testified by deposition) and Dr. Hanawalt, and testimony and reports from defense psychiatrist Dr. Roniger, reasonably establish plaintiff's PTSD within the DSM-III-R criteria and its disabling effects. But plaintiff did not prove, and especially not by clear and convincing evidence, that (as she contended) comparatively minor incidents at work were the cause of her PTSD.

To the contrary, the record fully supports the hearing officer's finding that plaintiff's PTSD was caused by events that long pre-dated her employment. Most conspicuous were sexual abuse from age 5 to age 12 and three-man rape at age 15.

The hearing officer found that the PTSD was caused by the extremely tragic events in claimant's life prior to her becoming employed by Farmer and Cheatham. These events included: depression, drug use,[3] molestation as a child,[4] gang raped[5] as a teenager, death of two persons close to claimant,[6] eating disorder and obsessive *327 behavior, prior divorce and marital problems, prior mental treatment.[7]

Obviously gang rape and childhood sexual molestation are more comparable to DSM criterion A's "serious threat to one's life," but one may add other specifications to the hearing officer's list of pre-employment tragedies: interpersonal difficulties with her parents, living as a child with grandparents and with an aunt; uterine cervical cancer and ultimately hysterectomy; an automobile accident resulting in concussion, seizures, and four-year-later memory lapses hospital records say "global amnesia"); marriage at 17 for 5 years to an abusive husband; and, continuing up to trial time, lesser but pervasive difficulties (in "interpersonal relationships") with her second husband requiring continuing psychotherapy.

Defense psychiatrist Dr. Roniger diagnosed "elements of delayed posttraumatic stress disorder from childhood molestation and adolescent rape. A great deal of evidence supporting a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder. By that I mean life-long maladapted pattern that has to do with instability of feeling, thinking, and also instability of relationships."

Plaintiff's psychologist Dr. Culver also diagnosed PTSD, but he attributed it to the alleged book-slinging incident, which he said "was a life-threatening event" within DSM-III-R. He appeared to evaluate the "life-threatening" quality of the incident from a subjective point of view, namely that of a mentally ill plaintiff. One may agree that stress affects different persons differently, but DSM criterion A's requirement of a trauma on the order of "a serious threat to one's life," especially when made a legal requirement by La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(d) and coupled with the clear and convincing burden of proof, must be deemed an objective standard. Whether a given event is a serious threat to one's life (or on that order) is a question of fact for the trier of fact to be decided on an objective evaluation. The psychologist's opinion cannot be deemed clear and convincing proof of his position. The hearing officer correctly rejected the book-slinging as the cause of the PTSD.

Loss of ability to cope with pre-existing mental injury not itself a compensable mental injury

La.R.S. 23:1021(7)(d) provides that no mental injury or illness is compensable unless its diagnosis meets the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association.

There is no evidence in this record, much less clear and convincing evidence, that loss of ability to cope with a pre-existing mental injury is itself a mental injury or illness, or that its diagnosis meets the criteria of the DSM.

Stress at work may have contributed to plaintiff's loss of her prior ability to cope with the tragedies causing her PTSD, but did not cause a compensable mental injury within R.S. 23:1021(7)(d).

No "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment"

Furthermore, R.S. 23:1021(7)(b) requires proof of "a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment... demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence."

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
658 So. 2d 324, 1995 WL 418691, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bass-v-farmer-cheatham-lactapp-1995.