Bashir v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 31, 2025
• Docket: 23-2459
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 31 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADNAN BASHIR, No. 23-2459 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-418-736 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 26, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: BOGGS***, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Adnan Bashir, a native and citizen of Pakistan, seeks review of a

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the denial of his

application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for

substantial evidence, Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.

2017) (en banc), and we deny the petition.

1. Petitioner alleges that because he practices Shia Islam, he is at risk of

violence from members of the extremist organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, which

promotes Sunni Islam—the majority religion in Pakistan. The BIA agreed with the

immigration judge (“IJ”) that Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal

claims fail because he did not demonstrate that the government was unable or

unwilling to control Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. See Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d

1069, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2005).

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision. Although Petitioner

testified that the police did not make any arrests when he reported being shot at by

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi members, other evidence in the record indicates that the

government has taken efforts to control Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, including by

designating it as an official terrorist group and arresting militants who were

planning an attack. Petitioner also wrote in his asylum application that, in another

incident, the police responded to his call and arrested three individuals who were

attempting to attack his place of worship. We accordingly affirm the denial of

Petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal claims.

2 23-2459 2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s affirming the denial of

Petitioner’s CAT claim. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Petitioner could relocate

within Pakistan because the country-conditions evidence shows that there are

“large Shia communities in major urban centres . . . where a person would not have

a well-founded fear of persecution.” Dawson v. Garland, 998 F.3d 876, 884 (9th

Cir. 2021) (holding that relocation is “one factor the BIA must consider in

assessing the likelihood of future torture” although it is not “determinative on its

own”). Petitioner argues that because Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is located throughout the

country, its members would be able to find him, but Petitioner’s unsupported

assertion does not compel a different conclusion as to relocation. See Gonzalez-

Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner] testified that

she would ‘never be able to escape from [her husband] in Mexico’ and that he

would ‘force [her] to be with him again.’ These statements, on their own, are

insufficient to meet [Petitioner’s] burden of proof.”). Substantial evidence also

supports the BIA’s conclusion that, for the same reasons explained above as to the

withholding and asylum claims, Petitioner failed to show that the government

would consent or acquiesce to his torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18; Barajas-

Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 363 (9th Cir. 2017) (“CAT relief is unavailable,

despite a likelihood of torture, without evidence that the police are unwilling or

unable to oppose the crime.”). We therefore affirm the denial of Petitioner’s CAT

3 23-2459 claim.

PETITION DENIED.

4 23-2459