BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. The Tug Leander, Jr.

590 F.2d 96, 1979 A.M.C. 1721, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 16, 1979
DocketNo. 77-1091
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 590 F.2d 96 (BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. The Tug Leander, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BASF Wyandotte Corp. v. The Tug Leander, Jr., 590 F.2d 96, 1979 A.M.C. 1721, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849 (5th Cir. 1979).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

AFFIRMED on the basis of the district court’s memorandum and order dated December 27, 1976, which is attached as an Appendix hereto.

APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case presents for determination an interpretation and determination of the le[97]*97gal validity of certain contractual provisions in a towage agreement. The parties have agreed to submit the issue of liability (damages having been severed) on briefs and depositions previously taken.

The essential facts in this case are not in dispute, and a stipulation of facts, filed in the record, indicates that the Court need only determine the contractual issue. However, a brief recital of the pertinent facts is in order.

Since 1966, Dixie Carriers, Inc. (Dixie) and BASF Wyandotte Corp. (BASF) were operating under a towage contract, whereby Dixie agreed to tow BASF’s barges pursuant to a certain schedule. Although regular rate increases took place, the principal contract has undergone virtually no change since its inception. (The contract is appended hereto as Exhibit “A”).

Dixie sub-contracted with Sidney Torres d/b/a Sidney Torres Boat Rental (Torres) to tow BASF’s Barge WYCHEM 114 and three other barges from BASF’s Geismar, Louisiana plant to Lemoine, Alabama.

On December 31, 1972, in the course of the towing process, the operator of the tug dispatched by Torres negligently caused the break-up of the tow and the damage to the WYCHEM 114. The damage caused by the tug’s negligence led to the sinking of the WYCHEM 114, and it is from (his property loss that the present action arose.

Two issues are presented to the Court for determination. The primary issue is whether Special Condition 20.2 of the towage contract is legally enforceable and, following a determination of that issue, whether the defendant can enforce the terms of the contract under Clause 18. The Court believes that, for the following reasons, the questions both must be answered in the affirmative.

The United States Supreme Court, in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S.Ct. 629, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955) held that a contractual provision whereby the tug owner sought to protect himself against his own negligent actions was unenforceable. This rationale was premised on the grounds that overreaching existed in the Bisso case and that a party should not be permitted to insulate itself from responsibility for its own negligent acts.

The Fifth Circuit, in Fluor Western, Inc. v. G & H Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35 (C.5, 1971) and Twenty Grand Offshore, Inc. v. West India Carriers, Inc., 492 F.2d 679 (C.5, 1974), applied the Bisso standard and determined that policy provisions which require the barge owner to obtain coverage and waive subrogation against the tug owner were not within the Bisso prohibition. Thus, despite the large number of briefs filed in this matter, the issue is a simple one.

The plaintiff contends that Fluor and Twenty Grand are inapplicable because a mutuality of waiver of subrogation rights is lacking in the instant case. However, the Court does not believe that mutuality is a necessary requirement for a legally enforceable Fluor and Twenty Grand contract.

Accordingly, the Court holds that the waiver provisions of Special Condition 20.2 are valid and legally enforceable and that, insofar as BASF has obtained payment for losses incurred from its insurer, recovery is prohibited.

It is to be noted that the plaintiff’s contention that it acceded to the terms of the contract “under protest” does not, in the Court’s opinion, render the clause unenforceable but merely served to reserve the plaintiff’s rights to contest the legality of the clause and avoid the defense of estoppel.

Having determined that Special Condition 20.2 is legally .enforceable, the Court must now consider whether Torres is a proper party to seek to enforce the contract.

The defendant contends that Clause 18 which provides:

“18. Privilege is hereby granted for Tower at its discretion to employ vessels not owned by it to perform hereunder, [98]*98and whenever, in the performance of this agreement Tower uses or procures or permits the use of any vessel or equipment not owned by Tower all of the covenants and exemptions from liability and hold harmless agreements herein provided are applicable to Tower shall also be applicable and benefit thereof shall accrue to said vessel and equipment, its master and crew, and to its owner, operators and agents, their servants and employees.”

entitled Dixie to contract out certain work under the terms and conditions of the Dixie/BASF contract. The Court agrees. The Court believes that a fair reading of the contract implies that Dixie may, under certain circumstances, contract out towage work. Therefore, Torres is entitled to claim the defense of Special Condition 20.2 under the shelter of Clause 18.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court; believes that neither of the motivating factors responsible for the Bisso decision are present in the instant case and that the Fifth Circuit decisions of Fluor and Twenty Grand control, and the issue of liability is, accordingly, decided in favor of the defendants.

EXHIBIT “A”

TOWING CONTRACT

Dixie Carriers, Inc. hereinafter sometimes called “Tower”, agrees to tow the following craft designated “Craft to be Towed” upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, when accepted by Owner of the “Craft to be Towed”, hereinafter sometimes called Owner, either by acceptance endorsed at the foot hereof or by delivery of the “Craft to be Towed” to Tower, its agents, servants and employees and/or to Tower’s subcontractors, to-wit:

1. Owner'of “Craft to be Towed”: Wyandotte Chemical Company P. 0. Box 111 Wyandotte, Michigan 42192

2. “Craft to be Towed”: Various Tank Barges

3. Towing vessel: Suitable horsepower , fully found, or a suitable substitute.

4. Voyages: Various origins and destinations on the Gulf Intracoastal Canal, see attachment

5. Rate: See attachment

6. The service above mentioned rests alone upon this contract and neither Tower nor its vessels or servants shall be held in any way to common carrier liability.

7. Owner of the “Craft to be Towed” warrants that at the inception of towage hereunder said “Craft to be Towed” will be seaworthy in every respect, and' fully equipped and supplied.

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590 F.2d 96, 1979 A.M.C. 1721, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 16849, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/basf-wyandotte-corp-v-the-tug-leander-jr-ca5-1979.