Barton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 31, 2020
Docket4:19-cv-00434
StatusUnknown

This text of Barton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner (Barton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, (N.D. Ala. 2020).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

ROBERT BARTON, ) ) Claimant, ) ) v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. ) 4:19-CV0434-KOB ANDREW SAUL, ) ACTING COMMISSIONER OF ) SOCIAL SECURITY ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION Robert Barton, the claimant, filed an application for supplemental security income under Title XVI on March 9, 2016. (R. 25, 62, 170). He alleged disability beginning on August 3, 2013 because of high blood pressure, gout, diabetes, blood clots in his legs, acid reflux, and high cholesterol. (R. 25, 62, 170, 47). The Social Security Administration denied the claimant’s application on April 27, 2016, and the claimant had a video hearing before an Administrative Law Judge on April 25, 2018. (R. 25, 76, 81). In a decision dated June 12, 2018, the ALJ found the claimant was not disabled, and, therefore, not entitled to benefits. (R. 70). The claimant appealed to the Appeals Council. (R. 7- 8). After the Appeals Council denied the claimant’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (R. 1-3). The claimant has exhausted his administrative remedies. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), this court has jurisdiction to decide this case. This court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision for the reasons stated below. II. ISSUE PRESENTED The claimant presents the following two issues for review: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the claimant has a Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to perform light exertional work; and

(2) whether the evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the claimant is not disabled under the Medical Vocational Guidelines 201.12.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s decision is limited. This court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if he applied the correct legal standards and substantial evidence supports his factual conclusions. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). “No . . . presumption of validity attaches to the [ALJ’s] legal conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating claims.” Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. This court does not review the ALJ’s factual determinations de novo. The court will affirm those factual determinations that are supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The court must keep in mind that opinions such as whether a claimant is disabled, the nature and extent of a claimant’s residual functional capacity, and the application of vocational factors “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; i.e., that would direct the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). Whether the claimant meets a Listing and is qualified for Social Security disability benefits is a question reserved for the ALJ, and the court “may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, even if the court were to disagree with the ALJ about the significance of certain facts, the court has no power to reverse that finding as long as substantial evidence in the record supports it.

The court must “scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the [ALJ]'s factual findings.” Walker, 826 F.2d at 999. A reviewing court must not only look to those parts of the record that support the decision of the ALJ, but also must view the record in its entirety and take account of evidence that detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ. Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986). IV. LEGAL STANDARD Residual Functional Capacity Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), a person is entitled to disability benefits when the person is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To make this determination the Commissioner employs a five-step, sequential evaluation process: (1) Is the person presently employed? (2) Is the person’s impairment severe? (3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1? (4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of not disabled. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986)1; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the third step, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, which is a measurement to guide the ALJ in deciding if the claimant is capable of doing past work, or any other work in the economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); SSR 96-8p. A claimant’s RFC “is not the least an individual can do despite his or her limitations or

restrictions, but the most.” SSR 96-8p(5). A claimant must be able to perform “at least substantially all of the activities of work at a particular level” for an ALJ to determine that the claimant has an RFC of that particular level. SSR 83-10. A claimant who can perform work at his or her determined RFC can also perform at a lower RFC; for example, if a claimant has an RFC for light work, that claimant can also perform sedentary work, “unless there are additional limiting factors.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The ALJ’s determination of a claimant’s RFC must be “based on all relevant medical and other evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability despite his impairment.” Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2014).

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Barton v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barton-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-alnd-2020.