1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Jul 13, 2022 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 DOUGLAS ALAN BARTLETT, 9 Plaintiff, No. 2:22-CV-00076-SAB 10 v. 11 JUDGE TONY HAZEL; ORDER GRANTING 12 COMMISSIONER TAMMY CHAVEZ; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 ATTORNEY GARY STENZEL; and KIM DISMISS 14 BARTLETT, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, filed on 18 May 11, 2022. The motion was considered without oral argument. Plaintiff is 19 representing himself. Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez are 20 represented by Matthew Cozza. Defendant Bartlett is represented by Michael 21 Beyer. Defendant Stenzel has not filed a notice of appearance. 22 Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of his First, Fifth, and 23 Fourteenth Amendment rights. The claims arise out of pending family law 24 proceedings before the Spokane County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that 25 (1) Defendant Judge Hazel improperly held him in contempt of court, among other 26 things; (2) Defendant Commissioner Chavez improperly awarded his ex-wife a 27 protective order against him; (3) Defendant Stenzel presented fraudulent 28 spreadsheets regarding his income at trial; and (4) Defendant Bartlett, Plaintiff’s 1 ex-wife, committed perjury and filed fraudulent evidence regarding domestic 2 violence charges. ECF No. 1 at 7–8. 3 Having considered the parties’ submissions to date and pertinent caselaw, 4 the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 5 granted, and any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, the 6 motion to dismiss is granted. 7 Pleading Standard 8 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must include a 9 statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the 10 claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief 11 sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 8(a). As the U.S. Supreme Court instructs:
13 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 14 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 15 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 17 that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads fact 18 that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. 19 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations and 21 quotations omitted). When determining whether a complaint states a claim for 22 relief, the Court accepts the facts alleged in a complaint as true. Id. at 664. 23 However, mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. 24 The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Again, the 26 complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 27 face.” Id. at 570. 28 1 Discussion 2 Defendants argue that Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez 3 are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this 4 action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and in any case, the Court should 5 abstain from hearing the case under the domestic relations abstention doctrine. 6 They ask that the Court dismiss the case. 7 Plaintiff responds summarily by claiming Defendant Judge Hazel violated 8 his constitutional rights by considering fraudulent evidence at trial, Defendant 9 Commissioner Chavez violated his First Amendment rights by the domestic 10 violence protective order ruling, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrines requires a final 11 judgment in a state case and does not apply “when a case is contaminated by fraud 12 or violations of constitutional rights.” ECF No. 7 at 2. 13 Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally due to his pro se status, Plaintiff 14 has failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted and 15 any amendment to the complaint would be futile. 16 First, Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez are entitled to 17 judicial immunity, as Plaintiff’s allegations concern conduct performed solely in 18 their judicial function or “functionally comparable” to the conduct of judges. 19 Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 20 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). The alleged acts are a normal judicial function, which 21 occurred from the bench on the court record in a pending case, and arose directly 22 and immediately out of a confrontation with a judicial officer in his or her official 23 capacity. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 24 Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). While a judge or 25 judicial officer may be liable (1) where their actions were taken in clear absence of 26 all jurisdiction, or (2) when they commit a “non-judicial act,” Plaintiff does not 27 allege either narrow exception, and in any case, the alleged conduct unquestionably 28 constitutes a judicial act. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357, 360 (1978). 1 Second, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Defendants 2 Stenzel and Bartlett, because Plaintiff does not allege Defendants were acting 3 under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes individuals to sue the 4 government for civil rights violations. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state 5 actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 6 federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” 7 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Thus, a § 1983 claim requires a plaintiff 8 to show (1) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the 9 Constitution and its laws by (2) a person acting under the color of state law. 42 10 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that either Defendant Stenzel or Bartlett were 12 acting under color of state law. “Although lawyers are generally licensed by the 13 States, ‘they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.’” Polk 14 County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319 n.9 (1981) (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 15 717, 729 (1973)). Similarly, a private party in adversarial litigation does not act 16 “under color of state law.” See Price v.
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1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Jul 13, 2022 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 DOUGLAS ALAN BARTLETT, 9 Plaintiff, No. 2:22-CV-00076-SAB 10 v. 11 JUDGE TONY HAZEL; ORDER GRANTING 12 COMMISSIONER TAMMY CHAVEZ; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 13 ATTORNEY GARY STENZEL; and KIM DISMISS 14 BARTLETT, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, filed on 18 May 11, 2022. The motion was considered without oral argument. Plaintiff is 19 representing himself. Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez are 20 represented by Matthew Cozza. Defendant Bartlett is represented by Michael 21 Beyer. Defendant Stenzel has not filed a notice of appearance. 22 Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of his First, Fifth, and 23 Fourteenth Amendment rights. The claims arise out of pending family law 24 proceedings before the Spokane County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that 25 (1) Defendant Judge Hazel improperly held him in contempt of court, among other 26 things; (2) Defendant Commissioner Chavez improperly awarded his ex-wife a 27 protective order against him; (3) Defendant Stenzel presented fraudulent 28 spreadsheets regarding his income at trial; and (4) Defendant Bartlett, Plaintiff’s 1 ex-wife, committed perjury and filed fraudulent evidence regarding domestic 2 violence charges. ECF No. 1 at 7–8. 3 Having considered the parties’ submissions to date and pertinent caselaw, 4 the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 5 granted, and any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, the 6 motion to dismiss is granted. 7 Pleading Standard 8 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must include a 9 statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short and plain statement of the 10 claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief 11 sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. 12 R. Civ. P. 8(a). As the U.S. Supreme Court instructs:
13 [A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 14 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 15 the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 16 for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 17 that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads fact 18 that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. 19 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (emphasis added) (citations and 21 quotations omitted). When determining whether a complaint states a claim for 22 relief, the Court accepts the facts alleged in a complaint as true. Id. at 664. 23 However, mere legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. 24 The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 25 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Again, the 26 complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 27 face.” Id. at 570. 28 1 Discussion 2 Defendants argue that Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez 3 are entitled to absolute judicial immunity, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this 4 action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and in any case, the Court should 5 abstain from hearing the case under the domestic relations abstention doctrine. 6 They ask that the Court dismiss the case. 7 Plaintiff responds summarily by claiming Defendant Judge Hazel violated 8 his constitutional rights by considering fraudulent evidence at trial, Defendant 9 Commissioner Chavez violated his First Amendment rights by the domestic 10 violence protective order ruling, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrines requires a final 11 judgment in a state case and does not apply “when a case is contaminated by fraud 12 or violations of constitutional rights.” ECF No. 7 at 2. 13 Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally due to his pro se status, Plaintiff 14 has failed to state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted and 15 any amendment to the complaint would be futile. 16 First, Defendants Judge Hazel and Commissioner Chavez are entitled to 17 judicial immunity, as Plaintiff’s allegations concern conduct performed solely in 18 their judicial function or “functionally comparable” to the conduct of judges. 19 Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 20 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). The alleged acts are a normal judicial function, which 21 occurred from the bench on the court record in a pending case, and arose directly 22 and immediately out of a confrontation with a judicial officer in his or her official 23 capacity. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 24 Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999)). While a judge or 25 judicial officer may be liable (1) where their actions were taken in clear absence of 26 all jurisdiction, or (2) when they commit a “non-judicial act,” Plaintiff does not 27 allege either narrow exception, and in any case, the alleged conduct unquestionably 28 constitutes a judicial act. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357, 360 (1978). 1 Second, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Defendants 2 Stenzel and Bartlett, because Plaintiff does not allege Defendants were acting 3 under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes individuals to sue the 4 government for civil rights violations. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state 5 actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 6 federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” 7 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Thus, a § 1983 claim requires a plaintiff 8 to show (1) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the 9 Constitution and its laws by (2) a person acting under the color of state law. 42 10 U.S.C. § 1983. 11 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that either Defendant Stenzel or Bartlett were 12 acting under color of state law. “Although lawyers are generally licensed by the 13 States, ‘they are not officials of government by virtue of being lawyers.’” Polk 14 County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319 n.9 (1981) (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 15 717, 729 (1973)). Similarly, a private party in adversarial litigation does not act 16 “under color of state law.” See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 17 1991). Plaintiff also does not allege, much more plausibly allege, that either 18 Defendant corruptly conspired with a state actor. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 19 (1980). 20 Having determined that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief which 21 can be granted, the Court declines to consider Defendants’ additional arguments 22 regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and domestic relations abstention doctrine 23 at this time. Given Plaintiff’s detailed submissions, the Court also concludes that 24 any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. 25 Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, the complaint is dismissed 26 without leave to amend. 27 // 28 // 1 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 2 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED. 3 2. The above-captioned action and all claims therein are DISMISSED 4 with prejudice. 5 3. The District Court Executive is directed to enter judgment in favor of 6 Defendants and against Plaintiff. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is hereby directed to file 8 this Order, provide a copy to counsel and pro se Plaintiff, and close the file. 9 DATED this 13th day of July 2022.
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