Bartlett v. Bunn

5 Silv. Sup. 87
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 11, 1889
StatusPublished

This text of 5 Silv. Sup. 87 (Bartlett v. Bunn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bartlett v. Bunn, 5 Silv. Sup. 87 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1889).

Opinion

Putnam, J.

The two actions were brought against defendants as attorneys under a written power, dated September 27, 1883, wherein plaintiffs authorized defendants (and one John T. Bunn, since deceased), or any two of them to rent, sell, divide into lots, manage and control lands of the plaintiffs in Amsterdam, N. Y., and in Rahway, N. J.

Plaintiff Bartlett revoked her power on March 6,1885, and plaintiff Dean on April 20, 1888.

The complaint alleges that defendants had failed to account for their proceedings under said written power, and asked for an accounting.

[88]*88On the trial it was proved by a sealed written release, executed by plaintiffs, dated October 24, 1885, that there was an accounting between defendants and plaintiffs up to June 13, 1885, and that plaintiffs released for all acts of defendants to that time.

It was undisputed that defendant Buckbee ceased on March 6,1885, to act as attorney, and the referee found on sufficient evidence that defendant Bunn also, on March 6, 1885, ceased to act under the said power. It would be difficult to perceive how he could act under it without Mr. Buckbee, it requiring the concurrence of two of the attorneys. We think the conclusion of the referee that both defendants ceased to act under the written power after March 6, 1885, was fully justified by the evidence.

Defendant Bunn did act for the plaintiffs and the other heirs of Thomas Bunn, deceased, after the release, but he so acted under a subsequent and a verbal arrangement not counted on or set out in the complaint, and therefore his proceedings under the verbal arrangement are not proper to be considered in this action.

There was no request to amend the complaint to recover in this action for collections individually of Bunn under the verbal arrangement. The complaint claimed simply an accounting of the two defendants, Bunn and Buckbee, under the written power of attorney. Now, as stated above, there was a written and sealed release, executed on October 24, 1885, which released defendants from all acts and collections up to June 13, 1885, and which acknowledged full settlement up to that time, and the referee has found that defendants did not act under said power after June 13,1885, on sufficient evidence. Hence, the claim of plaintiffs, made in the complaint and asserted in their brief, that defendants had failed to render a" just and true account of their proceedings under the power of attorney, is disproved by the most conclusive and satisfactory evidence, viz.: a written and sealed release, which acknowledged a full settlement up to and [89]*89after the latter defendant ceased to act as said attorney, and on the evidence the referee did not err in finding accordingly.

The plaintiffs claim that the referee erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint. If an amendment was necessary, it is not clear that the amendment asked for could be properly allowed on the trial. Plaintiffs asked to amend their complaint by inserting allegations of fraud and mistake in procuring the execution of the release, and to have the release set aside on account of fraud. The action was for an accounting of attorneys, and the amendment sought to be injected into the complaint was an equitable cause of action to have the release, which barred the recovery of plaintiffs, set aside for fraud. See Button v. Schuyler Steamboat Line, 40 Hun, 422.

But both parties agree that under the pleadings no amendment was necessary ; defendants setting up the release and receipt, plaintiffs could show without amendment of the complaint that the release was obtained by fraud. See Maricle v. Brooks, 21 N. Y. State Rep. 584.

This being so, plaintiffs could have shown on the trial that the release was obtained by fraud. They failed to do so, and our attention has not been called to any evidence offered by plaintiffs to show fraud in obtaining the paper. The evidence pointed out by plaintiffs refers to transactions subsequent to June 13,1885, and was only objected to by defendants on the ground that it did not relate to transactions under the power of attorney. Hence, as plaintiffs had the right to show fraud or mistake in obtaining the release, and failed to offer any evidence in that regard, they are not in any way injured by the refusal of the referee to allow the amendment asked for.

The plaintiffs object to the findings of the referee, holding that the defendants ceased to act as attorneys under the written power at some time prior to June 13, 1885. We have examined the evidence carefully and' are unable to say that the learned referee did not reach correct conclusions [90]*90therefrom. It was a question of fact for him to pass upon; there is sufficient evidence to sustain his findings, and they should not be disturbed.

The plaintiffs insist that it appears from the evidence that defendant, Bunn, after he ceased to act under the power of attorney, did act under some arrangement with plaintiffs and the other heirs, and that plaintiffs were justly entitled to an accounting as against Bunn of those transactions. The trouble with this position is that the complaint does not cover any such claim, nor did plaintiffs ask to amend it in that regard. The complaint simply contained a joint cause of action against Buckbee and Bunn for an accounting for their acts under the written power.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Learned, P. J., and Landon, J., concur.

Note on “Amendments of Pleadings, etc.”

= As of course.—An answer cannot be served as an amendment to a previous demurrer to the complaint under § 542 of the Code. Cashman v. Reynolds, 25 Abb. N. C. 392. An issue of law cannot be changed by an amendment of course to an issue of fact, nor can the latter be, by such process, converted into an issue of law. Id.

The defendant can withdraw a frivolous demurrer, and serve an answer, if within time for service, as of course, of the amended pleading. Robostelli v. Noxon, 52 Hun, 614.

A demurrer cannot be amended, as of course, by the service of an answer. Cashman v. Reynolds, 56 Hun, 333; aff’d 123 N. Y. 138.

The defendant cannot, as matter of right, amend his demurrer by serving an answer. Cashman v. Reynolds, ante.

Before trial.—The court, at special term, may allow an amendment setting up a new defense. Marx v. Cross, 58 Supr. 221.

The answer may be amended upon defendant’s motion before trial by striking out a counterclaim, where he will be prevented at the trial from giving evidence to sustain such counterclaim, on account of his inability to comply with an order directing a bill of particulars. Knauth v. Wertheim, 26 Abb. N. Y. 369.

It is too late, after the cause is finally submitted to the referee who has decided the issues, to move for leave to amend the reply by setting up a further defense to the counterclaim. Brady v. Nally, 26 Abb. N. C. 376. [91]*91The court will not permit, after a trial by a referee, an amendment of the pleadings that will make the referee’s judgment irregular. Id. A reply cannot be amended in order to set up a counterclaim to defendant’s counterclaim. Id.

No amendment to the complaint, that increases the burden upon a defendant who appeared in the action, can be made in his absence and without notice to him. Work v.

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Bluebook (online)
5 Silv. Sup. 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bartlett-v-bunn-nysupct-1889.