[Cite as Bartick v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2025-Ohio-1881.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
JOSEPH M. BARTICK C.A. No. 24CA012130
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE LORAIN COUNTY BOARD OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COMMISSIONERS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO CASE No. 23CV208990 Appellee
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: May 27, 2025
SUTTON, Judge
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph M. Bartick appeals the judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms in part and reverses in
part.
I.
Relevant Background Information
{¶2} The Fortune Ditch and Dickson Ditch run through Lorain County, specifically
Eaton Township and the City of North Ridgeville. Mr. Bartick owns real property in Lorain
County, Ohio and a portion of the Dickson Ditch runs through Mr. Bartick’s property. Over the
years, the ditches fell into disrepair, with overgrown vegetation, downed trees, and silt clogs, which
caused flooding and damage to homes and property. The ditches also caused standing water, which
created mosquito problems. In 2022, Bob Schmitt Homes and numerous property owners affected
by the flooding submitted a petition for the improvement of the Fortune and Dickson Ditches to 2
the Lorain County Storm Water Management District which was then filed with Defendant-
Appellee Lorain County Board of Commissioners (“the Board.”) The petition set forth the work
proposed, including cleaning and removing obstructions from the ditches, straightening, deepening
or widening the ditches, among other improvements, to restore adequate drainage and provide
access “within a new permanent easement for county maintenance.”
{¶3} The ditch project was expected to restore more than 2 ½ miles of a major drainage
course that would benefit hundreds of homes and farms located on more than 700 acres of land,
according to Peter Zwick, Chief Deputy Engineer with the Office of the Lorain County Engineer.
{¶4} The petition proceeded before the Board pursuant to the hearing process set forth
in R.C. Chapter 6131 which governs single county drainage improvements. A final hearing on the
ditch improvement project was scheduled by the Board for April 11, 2023, and notice was sent to
impacted residents, including Mr. Bartick, informing them they could file an exception to the
proposed assessment or a claim for compensation or damages not less than five days before the
date of the hearing.
{¶5} Mr. Bartick timely filed his “Exceptions and Claims for Compensation or
Damages” prior to the final hearing. Mr. Bartick specifically claimed, among other things, the
project did not benefit his property but only burdened it, the project substantially damaged his
property by taking farmland away, and the easements were too wide. Mr. Bartick appeared at the
final hearing on April 11, 2023, along with other affected residents. Mr. Bartick questioned the
need for a permanent easement and stated he expected to be compensated for disabling 35-40% of
his property with the easements. Mr. Bartick stated he leased out his land for farming and the
proposed easements would impact that. Don Romancak of the Lorain County Stormwater 3
Management District disagreed, stating Mr. Bartick’s farm would actually see an increase in yield
and higher rents as a result of the ditch improvement.
{¶6} On April 11, 2023, the Board adopted a resolution finding for the ditch
improvement, confirming the $1,836,000.00 assessment for the project against stormwater
management district funds and not against the property owners, and allowed the letting of contracts
for the ditch improvement. Mr. Bartick was not awarded any damages or compensation.
{¶7} Mr. Bartick appealed the decision of the Board to the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas with a jury demand. In his notice of appeal, Mr. Bartick claimed: (1) the
improvement was not necessary; (2) the improvement was not conducive to the public welfare; (3)
the cost of the improvement was greater than the benefits conferred; (4) the route, termini, or mode
of construction was not the best to accomplish the purpose of the improvement; (5) the assessments
were not levied according to benefits; and (6) the award for compensation or damages was not
just. These are the grounds upon which an appeal to the court of common pleas under R.C. Chapter
6131 are allowed, and mostly focus on the public costs and benefits of the drainage improvement
project, and not on the effect to a particular property owner’s property.
{¶8} The transcript of proceedings before the Board was filed and the trial court set forth
a briefing schedule. The parties submitted their merit briefs. Mr. Bartick’s arguments in his brief
in the trial court varied from the statutory grounds set forth in his notice of appeal, and focused
mainly on the effect of the ditch improvement on his property, and included the following: (1) the
ditch improvement project did not benefit his property, there was no issue with flooding of his
property, and the project benefits “properties far away from” his property; (2) the improvement is
not conducive to the public welfare because ongoing yearly maintenance of the ditch was not
needed; (3) the cost of the improvement is greater than the benefits conferred to his property; (4) 4
the destruction of trees and the “much too large” size of the easements were not the best way to
accomplish the project; (5) the assessments were not levied according to the benefits to his
property; and (6) the finding of $0 damages or compensation to him was not just. In his reply
brief, Mr. Bartick argued the permanent nature of the easements for ongoing maintenance
amounted to a taking of his property due to the significant loss of his farmland.
{¶9} The trial court had initially set the matter for a trial, but after a status conference
with the parties, the trial court ordered further briefing on “the applicable procedure for review by
the [trial] court.”
{¶10} After consideration of the additional briefs, the trial court issued a journal entry
stating:
[B]ased upon the revised statutory language of R.C. 6131.30, the court determines that the “trial,” in a trial de novo, is an independent judicial examination and determination of conflicting issues of fact and law, consisting of the record of the proceedings in the lower tribunal. This trial is not a second event where witnesses personally reappear and reaffirm their previous testimony.
...
However, both parties shall be given the opportunity to present witness testimony if there is some issue in the record which was not fully addressed or developed.
{¶11} Mr. Bartick then filed a brief in support of his request to submit new evidence,
which the Board opposed. Mr. Bartick wanted to submit additional evidence on: (1) whether the
City of North Ridgeville should also be assessed for the ditch project, arguing the project also
benefited North Ridgeville; (2) the alleged damage to his property with the placement of the
easements; (3) potential future assessments on Mr. Bartick’s property for the project; and (4) the
necessity and scope of future maintenance of the ditch. 5
{¶12} The trial court issued its decision on Mr. Bartick’s appeal based on the record from
the proceedings before the Board without allowing additional evidence and without conducting an
evidentiary hearing or a jury trial. The trial court stated in part:
[Mr. Bartick] presented multiple arguments about the conclusions made at the hearing but not what evidence was omitted at the original hearing. There is no documentation or new witness testimony shown to have been omitted from the hearing before [the Board.] It is undisputed that the easements are for purposes of improvement and maintenance of the ditch[.]
While [Mr. Bartick] object[s]to the damage calculation, [he] ha[s] not presented what evidence was omitted that caused [the Board] to make an incorrect decision.
Therefore, the [c]ourt finds no additional evidence shall be considered.
The [c]ourt has reviewed the entire record filed in this appeal and pursuant to R.C. 6131.31(F) finds as follows:
The improvement is necessary and will be conducive to the public welfare and the cost thereof will be less than the benefits, the route, termini, and mode of construction are the best to accomplish the improvement’s purpose, the assessments are levied according to the benefits as the assessment is being paid with Stormwater District funds, and the damages are just as there is no permanent taking of [Mr. Bartick’s] land. The court has reviewed the record, de novo[,] and confirms and certifies the findings to the clerk of the board of county commissioners.
The decision to approve the project is affirmed.
{¶13} The trial court also found because the ditch was an “existing structure being
reconstructed and improved[,] “damages [were] not appropriate because there is no taking of the 6
property[,]” reasoning the improvement project would grant a temporary easement for the
improvement of the ditch and for periodic maintenance.
{¶14} Mr. Bartick appeals, raising two assignments of error for our review. Before
discussing the assignments of error, a brief review of the statutes governing county drainage
improvement projects is warranted.
Drainage Improvement Projects
{¶15} Single county drainage improvements are governed by R.C. Chapter 6131.
Pursuant to R.C. 6131.04(A), “[a]ny owner may file a petition for the construction of a drainage
improvement with the clerk of the board of county commissioners of the county in which is located
a part of the land proposed to benefit from the improvement.” R.C. Chapter 6131 sets forth the
procedures for the board of county commissioners (“the Board”) to hear and decide whether to
approve the proposed drainage improvement project. R.C. 6131.08 allows a property owner who
has not joined in the petition to comment on the proposed improvement at any time before a final
order on the petition is made by the Board. The hearing procedure includes: (1) a preliminary
report by the county engineer which shall include the estimated cost of the project, the feasibility
of the project, and whether the benefits of the project are likely to exceed the estimated cost; (2) a
viewing of the premises by the Board; (3) a first hearing on the petition; (4) if the Board decides
to proceed with the project, an order for reports, plans, schedules, and assessments to be filed by
the county engineer; and (5) a final hearing on the petition. R.C. 6131.17 allows a property owner
to file exceptions to the county engineer’s schedules of assessments or file a claim for damages or
compensation with the clerk of the board.
{¶16} Once a petition is granted and a drainage improvement project is approved, R.C.
6131.22 and R.C. 6131.25 allow a property owner opposed to the granting of the petition to appeal 7
to the court of common pleas. R.C. 6131.25(A)(1)-(6) sets forth the grounds on which a property
owner affected by the project may appeal the decision of the Board, stating: (1) is the improvement
necessary; (2) will the improvement be conducive to the public welfare; (3) is the cost of the
improvement greater than the benefits conferred; (4) is the route, termini, or mode of construction
the best to accomplish the purpose of the improvement; (5) are the assessments levied according
to benefits; and (6) is the award for compensation or damages just.
{¶17} If an appeal to the court of common pleas is filed, R.C. 6131.27 provides in part,
“the clerk of [the Board] shall promptly prepare a transcript of the orders made by [the Board],
and shall file such transcript with the clerk of the court of common pleas, together with the
permanent files of records of the proceedings maintained by [the Board] and county engineer[.]”
{¶18} R.C. 6131.30(A) states in part, “[t]he court of common pleas, on appeal, shall hear
the matters appealed de novo[,]” which includes the approval of the project and the compensation
or damages to be paid. R.C. 6131.30(A) further states, “[t]he court . . . shall bring the entire
proceedings before it in order to determine all the issues raised in the proceedings[.]” As for
damages or compensation, R.C. 6131.32 provides, “[o]n appeal from an order made by the board
of county commissioners allowing or refusing to allow compensation or damages, the owners
interested shall have the right of trial by jury. The jury may view the premises, as in other civil
cases.”
{¶19} R.C. 6131.31(F) provides in part:
If the appeal is from a final order of the board finding in favor of the improvement and approving and confirming the assessments, and if the court finds that the improvement is necessary and will be conducive to the public welfare and that the cost thereof will be less than the benefits, the court shall hear all the matters appealed, shall correct and confirm the assessments according to benefits, and shall certify the findings to the clerk of the board of county commissioners.
We now turn to Mr. Bartick’s assignments of error. 8
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A DE NOVO EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
{¶20} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Bartick argues the trial court erred by not
holding a de novo evidentiary hearing. R.C. 6131.30(A) provides the trial court shall “hear the
matters appealed de novo.”
Statutory meaning of “hear the matters appealed de novo”
{¶21} Part of Mr. Bartick’s first assignment of error involves the interpretation of statutes,
therefore this Court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo. Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 2010-
Ohio-1926, ¶ 6.
{¶22} R.C. 6131.30(A) mandates the trial court in an appeal from the Board to: “bring the
entire proceedings before it in order to determine all the issues raised in the proceedings[.]” R.C.
6131.27 discusses “records of the proceedings maintained by [the Board]” as part of what is to be
filed with the court of common pleas in an appeal pursuant to R.C. 6131.25. In R.C. 6131.30(A),
“raised” is in the past tense, meaning the “proceedings” the trial court must bring before it are the
proceedings that had already occurred before the Board. In other words, the trial court is to review
the record as defined by R.C. 6131.27 de novo and determine the issues raised before the Board
without deference to the Board’s decision.
{¶23} Here, the trial court determined “the ‘trial[,]’ in a trial de novo, is an independent
judicial examination and determination of conflicting issues of fact and law, consisting of the
record of the proceedings in the lower tribunal[]” and cited this Court’s decision in Williams v.
Akron, 141 Ohio App.3d 724 (9th Dist. 2001), as authority. Williams involved the termination of 9
employment of a police officer and a hearing before the civil service commission which was
appealed to the common pleas court. In Williams, this Court cited Chupka v. Saunders, 28 Ohio
St.3d 325 (1986), which discussed the scope of a trial de novo in the context of R.C. 2505.21, a
statute which has since been repealed. The Chupka case nevertheless provides some guidance,
in a trial de novo the court of common pleas is empowered to substitute its own judgment on the facts for that of the commission, based upon the court’s independent examination and determination of conflicting issues of fact. The “trial,” in a trial de novo, is the independent judicial examination and determination of conflicting issues of fact and law[.] The trial is not necessarily a second event where the witnesses personally reappear and reaffirm or respeak their previous testimony. In fact, evidence in addition to the transcript and record of the commission's proceedings may only be admitted with the express permission of the reviewing court.
(Internal citations omitted.) Id. at 327-328.
{¶24} R.C. 6131.30 does not require a “trial” or “hearing.” Similar to the processes in
Chupka and Williams, supra, R.C. 6131.30 requires the trial court to review the entire record of
the proceedings before the Board and make an independent judicial examination and determination
of the evidence and testimony submitted to the Board, which is exactly what the trial court did in
this case.
Additional Evidence
{¶25} Mr. Bartick also argues the trial court erred by not allowing him to present
additional evidence. R.C. Chapter 6131 gives little guidance on new evidence in the court of
common pleas, although R.C. 6131.30(B) allows for, but does not require, a survey, reports, plans,
and schedules by the county engineer if ordered by the trial court. Mr. Bartick argues here that
R.C. 2506.03 should also apply when analyzing whether additional evidence should be allowed in
the appeal to the common pleas court. The Board argues R.C. Chapter 6131 does not require or 10
allow for additional evidence and the trial court is confined to a de novo review of the
administrative transcript.
{¶26} This Court generally reviews a trial court’s decision to take additional evidence in
an administrative appeal for an abuse of discretion. Brenneman Bros. v. Allen County Commrs.,
2013-Ohio-4635, ¶ 41 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment. It
means the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
{¶27} Even assuming R.C. 2506.03 applies, the transcript of the final hearing before the
Board contains a report of all the evidence admitted or proffered by Mr. Bartick at the hearing. It
shows Mr. Bartick, who was represented by counsel, was able to appear and be heard in person
and had the opportunity to present his position, arguments and contentions, offer and examine
witnesses, and present evidence in support of his position and in opposition to the petition. The
testimony before the Board was given under oath.
{¶28} Nevertheless, the trial court did allow the parties to submit requests to present
additional evidence “if there [was] some issue in the record which was not fully addressed or
developed.” The trial court further stated, “[h]owever, it should be clear the court will not hear a
request of witness testimony on matters already presented.” Mr. Bartick did file a request to
present additional evidence, which the trial court denied, stating Mr. Bartick “presented multiple
arguments about the conclusions made at the hearing but not what evidence was omitted at the
original hearing. There is no documentation or new witness testimony shown to have been omitted
from the hearing before [the Board.]”
{¶29} Mr. Bartick’s request to submit additional evidence did not specify what evidence
he planned to submit if the trial court were to consider new evidence. Mr. Bartick argues he should 11
have been able to submit evidence on whether the City of North Ridgeville should be assessed but
does not explain what evidence he would submit or how the lack of assessment against North
Ridgeville affects him, as he and other property owners impacted by the ditch improvement project
are not being assessed anything at all and the cost is being borne by the Lorain County Storm
Water District. Mr. Bartick also failed to specify what additional evidence he would present
concerning the necessity and scope of future maintenance of the ditch.
{¶30} Mr. Bartick also argued the Board did not put “in writing” that no future
assessments for the project would be levied against his property. However, the Board’s resolution
approving the project assessed the property owners nothing for the approved project that is the
subject of this appeal. This Court cannot order the trial court to predict whether future drainage
improvement projects or assessments may be necessary. If future drainage maintenance projects
are necessary, the Board will have to undergo the required legal process to approve those projects
and levy assessments.
{¶31} Finally, Mr. Bartick argued his property should be removed from the flood zone,
but again, did not specify what evidence he would present on this issue, nor did he point to any
authority allowing the Board or the trial court to remove land from a designated flood zone.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing additional evidence on these
issues and did not err in not holding an evidentiary hearing.
{¶32} As for Mr. Bartick’s argument he should have been allowed to present evidence
concerning compensation or damage to his property, we will address that issue under Mr. Bartick’s
second assignment of error.
{¶33} Therefore, Mr. Bartick’s first assignment of error is overruled. 12
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT HOLDING A JURY TRIAL TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION OR DAMAGES TO [MR. BARTICK].
{¶34} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Bartick argues he was entitled to a jury trial
on the issue of compensation for damages allegedly caused by the ditch improvement project. As
stated above, because this assignment of error involves the interpretation of statutes, this Court
reviews the trial court’s decision on whether Mr. Bartick was entitled to a jury trial de novo.
Riedel, 2010-Ohio-1926, at ¶ 6.
{¶35} The current version of R.C. 6131.30 as amended by H.B. 340 in 2020, effective in
2021, applies to this case and provides in relevant part:
(A) The court of common pleas, on appeal, shall hear the matters appealed de novo. The court, exercising equitable jurisdiction, shall bring the entire proceedings before it in order to determine all the issues raised in the proceedings and enter a final judgment, order, or decree for or against the improvement petitioned for and for or against the assessments to be levied and the compensation and damages to be paid.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶36} The previous version of R.C. 6131.30 provided in relevant part:
The court of common pleas, on appeal, shall hear the matters appealed de novo. The proceedings shall be conducted under the rules of law and procedure for civil cases. An appeal shall bring into the court all the owners who in any way may be interested in or affected by the matter appealed. The court, exercising equitable jurisdiction, shall hear all matters appealed, except an appeal from an order allowing or refusing to allow compensation or damages.
{¶37} The prior version of R.C. 6131.30 specifically excluded “compensation or
damages” as a matter the trial court was required to hear, and the current statute states
“compensation and damages” shall be included in what the trial court sets forth in its final
judgment. 13
{¶38} R.C. 6131.32, also amended by H.B. 340 in 2020, effective in 2021, provides, “[o]n
appeal from an order made by the board of county commissioners allowing or refusing to allow
compensation or damages, the owners interested shall have the right of trial by jury. The jury may
view the premises, as in other civil cases.” The prior version of R.C. 6131.32 also provided the
right to a jury trial to determine damages or compensation. Therefore, when the General Assembly
amended R.C. 6131.30 to delete the language excepting “compensation or damages” as a matter
to be heard by the trial court in a drainage improvement appeal, it also specifically left in place the
property owner’s right to a jury trial, as reflected in the Ohio Legislative Service Commission’s
Bill Analysis for H.B. 340.
{¶39} The Board points to R.C. 6131.31(F) in support of its argument that the trial court
could decide the matter of compensation and damages. R.C. 6131.31(F) sets forth the trial court’s
duties in an appeal from the Board’s finding in favor of the ditch improvement and assessments
and currently provides in part: “the court shall hear all the matters appealed[.]” This statute was
enacted in 1981, remains unchanged, and has co-existed with the property owner’s right to a jury
trial to determine compensation or damages.
{¶40} The statutory right of a property owner to a jury trial to determine damages in
drainage improvement cases was discussed in Lucas v. Blaine, 42 Ohio App. 177, 186-187 (4th
Dist. 1931).
And finally we note that the question whether the award for compensation and damages is just or not is a jury issue, made so by the provisions of the statute in that regard. The plaintiff in error in the instant case, if she can show any substantial damage done her property, or if it amounts to the taking of her private property, her remedy is a proceeding to determine her compensation and damages, by pursuing which she will have complete and adequate relief. So that it follows that the finding and judgment in the instant case will be for the appellees and against the appellant upon all questions except the award of compensation and damages, and that matter should be submitted to the consideration of a jury in accordance with the provisions of the statute, if the parties so desire. 14
{¶41} This Court determines Mr. Bartick has the right, pursuant to the plain language of
R.C. 6131.32, to a jury trial to determine the amount, if any, of damages or compensation. “When
the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we
must rely on what the General Assembly has said[,]” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc.,
2003-Ohio-1099, ¶ 12, and apply it as written. Summerville v. Forest Park, 2010-Ohio-6280, ¶
18.
{¶42} Therefore, Mr. Bartick’s second assignment of error is sustained.
III.
{¶43} For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Bartick’s first assignment of error is overruled and
his second assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part and is remanded to the Lorain County Court of
Common Pleas for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 15
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed equally to both parties.
BETTY SUTTON FOR THE COURT
CARR, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
STEPHEN P. HANUDEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ANTHONY CILLO, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACOB W. PULLAR, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.