Barth v. United States Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: March 3, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2920
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN S. BARTH,

Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 23-2920 (CKK) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (March 3, 2026)

In this action, Plaintiff John S. Barth, proceeding pro se, challenges three federal agencies’

responses to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request that he filed seeking records about

himself. Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Now pending before this Court is a [45] Motion for Summary

Judgment by DOJ, the only remaining Defendant in this case, and a [49] Motion for Recusal and

for other relief filed by Plaintiff Barth. Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,1 the

relevant legal authority, and the entire record, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff Barth’s motion for

recusal and for other relief and shall GRANT Defendant DOJ’s motion for summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a FOIA request that Plaintiff Barth submitted in February 2021

seeking records about himself. Compl., Dkt. No. 1; Pl.’s Exs., Dkt. No. 1-1, at 3; see also Decl. of

Jonathan M. Breyan (“Breyen Decl.”), Dkt. No. 45-3, ¶ 4.

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto: • Defendant U.S. Department of Justice’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 45; • Plaintiff Barth’s Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 46; and • Plaintiff Barth’s Motion for Recusal and for “Order of Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act” (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 49.

In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f).

1 As Plaintiff Barth explains in his Complaint, he sought these records because he suspected

that various federal agencies may have received false information about him. See Compl. ¶¶ 1–

3. Plaintiff Barth explains that he believes that this false information may have affected the

agencies’ willingness to investigate information that he has submitted for their consideration about

an alleged racketeering scheme involving various “Florida politicians of one party.”2 See id. ¶ 1.

Plaintiff Barth submitted his FOIA request to the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”),

which is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”). See Pl.’s Exs., Dkt. No. 1-1, at

2; Breyen Decl. ¶ 5. DOJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”), which processes FOIA requests

submitted to OAG, responded to Plaintiff Barth by letter approximately one week after he

submitted this request. Breyen Decl. ¶¶ 1, 6. In its letter, OIP advised Plaintiff Barth that it had

located 26 pages of material that was responsive to his FOIA request. Id. ¶ 6. However, the letter

advised that “[b]ecause this material originated with or is of primary interest to the Criminal

Division,” OIP would refer the material to the Criminal Division for processing and a direct

response. Id.; see also Pl.’s Exs., Dkt No. 1-1, at 6 (copy of letter). Two days later, the Criminal

Division sent Plaintiff Barth a letter acknowledging that it had received the referral from OIP and

would disclose all non-exempt information to him “as soon as practicable.” See Pl.’s Exs., Dkt.

No. 1-1, at 7 (copy of letter).

Before the Criminal Division finished processing the records at issue, Plaintiff Barth filed

an administrative appeal of OIP’s response. See Breyen Decl. ¶ 7. The appeals staff responded

by letter, advising that DOJ regulations allow an appeal “only after there has been an adverse

decision by a component.” Id. ¶ 8; see also Pl.’s Exs., Dkt No. 1-1, at 8 (copy of letter). Because

2 Plaintiff Barth has filed at least five federal lawsuits based on his underlying racketeering allegations, including one in this District in which he sought to compel various federal agencies to investigate. See Barth v. United States, No. 22-cv-0955, Dkt. No. 40 at 1–2 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2022) (JEB) (collecting cases). Other district judges—not the undersigned—have dismissed all five of these lawsuits. See id. at 1–2, 7.

2 Plaintiff Barth had not yet received an adverse determination, the appeals staff concluded that there

was no action to be considered on appeal. See Breyen Decl. ¶ 8. Instead, it forwarded a copy of

his appeal to the Criminal Division and advised that he should contact that Division for further

information. Id.

In September 2023, after receiving no response from the Criminal Division for more than

two years, Plaintiff Barth filed this action against the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), alleging

that they had failed to meet their disclosure obligations in response to his February 2021 FOIA

request. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. This Court later dismissed Defendants FBI and HSI from this

action on Defendants’ motion because the record established that these agencies had not received

Plaintiff Barth’s FOIA request. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 23.

This Court also denied a motion for summary judgment by Plaintiff Barth, in which he

argued that DOJ, FBI, and HSI had committed perjury and obstruction of justice and failed to

comply with their obligations to respond to his FOIA requests. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No.

23. Plaintiff Barth also sought an order requiring the Defendants to investigate his allegations of

wrongdoing by Florida officials, which this Court denied as outside the scope of his Complaint

and beyond the Court’s power to grant in this case. See Minute Order (Feb. 25, 2025). Plaintiff

Barth later renewed these arguments in several submissions seeking reconsideration, which this

Court denied. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 35; Order, Dkt. No. 38; Minute Order (Apr. 18,

2025).

In October 2024, Defendant DOJ produced three documents to Plaintiff Barth in response

to his FOIA request, totaling 26 pages. See Status Report (Nov. 27, 2024), Dkt. No. 37.

3 Defendant DOJ has now filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it has complied

with its FOIA obligations by conducting a reasonable search for responsive records and releasing

all non-exempt responsive records to Plaintiff Barth. Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 45. Plaintiff Barth

opposes DOJ’s motion, renewing arguments that he has presented in his previous submissions.

See Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 46. He also moved to recuse this Court and for an order directing the

Defendants to comply with their FOIA obligations. Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 49.

The parties’ motions are now ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Recusal

A federal judge has a duty to recuse herself “in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality

might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). In this Circuit, a judge must be recused

under this rule if “a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality.”

District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting SEC v. Loving Spirit

Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). When applying this standard, courts “take the

perspective of a fully informed third-party observer who ‘understand[s] all the relevant facts’ and

has ‘examined the record and the law.’” United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1092 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Recusal of a judge is an “extraordinary” measure that should not be “lightly granted.”

United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, “recusal must be

limited to truly extraordinary cases where . . . the judge’s views have become ‘so extreme as to

display clear inability to render fair judgment.’” Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 332 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Accordingly, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or

partiality motion,” including a motion for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. A court’s rulings based

4 on the record and arguments in a case do not afford a basis for such a motion “unless they display

a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” See id.

“Almost invariably,” a court’s rulings “are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” Id.

B. Reconsideration

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow district courts to revise or reconsider

interlocutory rulings any time before the entry of a final, appealable order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(b). Courts grant reconsideration of interlocutory rulings “as justice requires.” See Cobell v.

Jewell, 802 F.3d 12, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d

99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (RCL). “Justice may require revision when the Court has ‘patently

misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court

by the parties, has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension, or where a controlling or

significant change in the law or facts [has occurred] since the submission of the issue to the

Court.’ ” Singh, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 101 (alteration in original) (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 224

F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2004) (RCL)). However, a motion for reconsideration is “not simply an

opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled.” Chennareddy v.

Dodaro, 282 F.R.D. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2012) (EGS) (quoting Black v. Tomlinson, 235 F.R.D. 532, 533

(D.D.C.2006) (ESH)), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 704 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

C. Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment if it “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact is

an issue that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the

5 court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587–88 (1986). However, to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving

party must identify specific material in the record showing that there is a “genuine issue” for trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record are

not sufficient. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462,

465–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for

purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Recusal is not warranted.

Plaintiff Barth’s arguments in support of his motion for recusal amount to disagreements

with this Court’s prior rulings, which are “almost never” a valid basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S.

at 555. In summary, Plaintiff Barth argues that this Court showed “prejudice in favor of the

[D]efendants” in this action by: (1) rejecting his argument that it is improper for federal agencies

to operate a “National FOIA Portal” while requiring FOIA requests to be submitted to individual

agencies, rather than the government as a whole; (2) concluding that only DOJ validly received

his FOIA request; (3) dismissing the FBI and HSI as parties; (4) crediting the Defendants’ evidence

about their receipt of his requests; (4) rejecting his argument that the DOJ improperly “delete[d]

FOIA requests and claim[ed] they were never made”; and (5) “ignor[ing] evidence” that he argues

would support his claims. See Pl.’s Mot. at 3–5.

None of these rulings warrants recusal. Recusal is proper only when a judge’s actions have

been “‘so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.’” Cobell, 455 F.3d at 332

(quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). Here, Plaintiff Barth has not shown that the rulings at issue were

6 unsupported by the record and the law, and he certainly has not shown any error in the Court’s

rulings that is “so extreme” as to warrant recusal. See id. Accordingly, the Court shall DENY

Plaintiff Barth’s [49] Motion for Recusal.

B. Reconsideration of the Court’s prior rulings on Plaintiff Barth’s other requests for relief is not warranted.

In the remainder of his motion, Plaintiff Barth renews arguments and requests for relief

that this Court has rejected on multiple prior occasions. Compare Pl.’s Mot. at 6–17, with Mem.

Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 23; Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 35; Order, Dkt. No. 38; Minute Order

(Apr. 18, 2025). In summary, he seeks an order reinstating the FBI and HSI as parties and directing

them to search for and produce documents responsive to his FOIA request on the grounds that

those agencies received actual or constructive notice of his request. See Pl.’s Mot. at 17.

Plaintiff Barth has not shown that reconsideration of the Court’s prior rulings is warranted.

At the threshold, Plaintiff Barth has not shown any persuasive reason to depart from the Court’s

prior rulings on the issues presented. That alone is sufficient reason to deny his motion. See

Chennareddy, 282 F.R.D. at 15. On the merits, as this Court previously concluded, “there is no

competent evidence in the record to support [Plaintiff Barth’s] contention” that FBI and HSI

received actual notice of the FOIA request at issue in this case. Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 23,

at 9–10. And because “[t]here is no doctrine of constructive notification in the FOIA context,” no

obligation to respond arises until an agency actually receives a proper request. Id. at 12.

Accordingly, the Court shall not reconsider its prior ruling dismissing FBI and HSI as parties and

shall not order those agencies to search for records. As the Court previously noted, if Plaintiff

Barth still seeks records from FBI and HSI, he may submit new FOIA requests to those agencies.

See id. at 10 n.2.

7 For these reasons and for all the reasons stated in the Court’s prior opinions and orders in

this matter, which the Court hereby incorporates and makes part of this Memorandum Opinion,

the Court shall DENY the remainder of Plaintiff Barth’s [49] Motion.

C. Because OIP’s search for records held by OAG was adequate, DOJ is entitled to summary judgment in this action.

Finally, the Court concludes that DOJ is entitled to summary judgment. Summary

judgment is the proper vehicle for resolving “the vast majority of FOIA cases.” Brayton v. Off. of

the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). An agency is entitled to

summary judgment on a FOIA claim when the agency’s affidavits or declarations “describe the

justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information

withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary

evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith.” Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d

857, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).

Here, the only remaining disputed issue on summary judgment is whether DOJ adequately

searched for records responsive to the FOIA request that Plaintiff Barth submitted to the Office of

the Attorney General (“OAG”) in February 2021.

DOJ’s unrebutted declaration in support of its motion for summary judgment shows that

it did conduct an adequate search. See Breyan Decl. ¶¶ 10–19. An adequate search is one that is

“reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1114

(D.C. Cir. 2007). In this case, DOJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) searched the

Departmental Executive Secretariat (“DES”), which is the “official records repository of OAG and

the Offices of the Deputy Attorney General and Associate Attorney General,” for all records

including the name “John Barth,” as well as the variations “John S. Barth” and “John Strickland

Barth.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 14–17. That search returned three sets of records: two pieces of correspondence

8 that Plaintiff Barth sent to the DOJ’s Criminal Division, and one response from the Criminal

Division to Plaintiff Barth. Id. ¶ 16. OIP referred those records to the Criminal Division for

processing, and that Division later responded directly to Plaintiff Barth. See id. ¶ 16; Status Report

(Nov. 27, 2024), Dkt. No. 37. Upon consideration of DOJ’s declaration and the entire record, this

Court is of the opinion that DOJ’s search was “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant

documents” responsive to Plaintiff Barth’s February 2021 FOIA request to OAG. See Morley, 508

F.3d at 1114. DOJ is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff Barth asserts that DOJ’s declaration contains “perjuries” calculated to conceal

additional records that DOJ had not disclosed to him, but he offers no evidence to support this

position. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. In this Circuit, “[a]gency affidavits are accorded a presumption of

good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and

discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C.

Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). In

the absence of contrary evidence, the Court finds DOJ’s affidavits credible and concludes that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

Because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the record shows that DOJ

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it conducted an adequate search, the Court shall

GRANT summary judgment in DOJ’s favor.

* * *

9 IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff Barth's [49] Motion for Recusal

and for an "Order of Compliance with the Freedom of Information Act," and the Court shall

GRANT Defendant DOJ' s [45] Motion for Summary Judgment.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: March 3, 2026

COLLEEN KOLLA -KOTELLY United States District Judge