Bart Richmond v. Jefferson County Attorney

• Court: Supreme Court of Iowa
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 25-0366
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Iowa Supreme Court

No. 25–0366

Submitted February 11, 2026—Filed May 1, 2026

Bart Richmond,

Appellee,

vs.

Jefferson County Attorney,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Jeffrey Farrell,

judge.

A county attorney appeals the district court’s ruling denying his

constitutional challenge to a sheriff’s Brady-Giglio list appeal under Iowa Code

§ 80F.1(25). Affirmed.

McDermott, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

Chauncey T. Moulding, Jefferson County Attorney, and K. Elizabeth Estey

(argued), Assistant Jefferson County Attorney, for appellant.

Charles Gribble (argued) of Gribble Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellee.

W. Charles Smithson, West Des Moines, for amicus curiae Twenty-Eight

Iowa State Senators. 2

McDermott, Justice.

In this case, the Jefferson County Sheriff, Bart Richmond, filed a petition

under Iowa Code § 80F.1(25) (2025) to have his name removed from the Jefferson

County Attorney’s Brady-Giglio list. A Brady-Giglio list is a record maintained by

a prosecutor’s office that contains the names of law enforcement officers who

have a known history of misconduct, dishonesty, or other integrity issues that

could compromise their credibility while testifying. The district court granted the

sheriff’s petition and ordered the county attorney to remove the sheriff from the

list. On appeal, the county attorney argues that the list removal procedures in

§ 80F.1(25) unconstitutionally interfere with his due process obligations to

criminal defendants and violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.

I.

In April 2024, two Fairfield police officers arrested a suspect for driving

while intoxicated. A Jefferson County sheriff’s deputy arrived to assist. As one

officer questioned the driver, another officer handcuffed a passenger. The

passenger and the sheriff’s deputy then got into an argument. Body camera

footage shows that the deputy grabbed the handcuffed passenger and forcefully

shoved his head down toward the vehicle’s trunk. Holding the passenger in that

position, the deputy moved his face inches from the passenger’s and yelled, “You

know what? You’re not going to tell me what I can and can’t do! Do you

understand that young man?” As the passenger proclaimed apologies with his

face pressed against the trunk, the deputy continued, “You better understand

it. . . . And you know what? You’re going to learn what respect is!”

About a week later, the Jefferson County Attorney, Chauncey Moulding,

reviewed the footage. He emailed Richmond to ask if the deputy’s conduct

violated the sheriff’s office’s use-of-force policy. After receiving no response for 3

six days, Moulding emailed again, stating he would interpret further silence as

an admission that the deputy’s actions were consistent with office policy.

Although Richmond never replied to Moulding, Richmond and his chief deputy

met with the deputy in question that same day and ordered him to undergo de-

escalation and communication retraining.

When Richmond failed to respond, Moulding sent the footage to the

Keokuk County Attorney for an independent review. Richmond only learned of

this outside investigation days later when Moulding’s assistant called to request

a copy of the sheriff’s office’s use-of-force policy. Surprised by the request,

Richmond initially refused to provide it, insisting that the Keokuk County

Attorney contact him directly. Four days later, Moulding personally ordered

Richmond to produce the policy, threatening a judicial injunction. Richmond

eventually complied, but declined to share details regarding internal disciplinary

actions, citing privacy concerns with personnel matters.

Dissatisfied with what he viewed as a lack of cooperation, Moulding

initiated the process to place Richmond on a Brady-Giglio list. As required by

law, Moulding notified Richmond of the pending investigation and scheduled a

“list placement interview.” When Moulding refused to reschedule the interview to

accommodate Richmond’s legal counsel, Richmond declined to participate.

Shortly thereafter, Moulding officially added Richmond to the county’s

Brady-Giglio list, asserting that Richmond’s conduct during the investigation

cast doubt on his “judgment, credibility, candor, and truthfulness.” Moulding

sent a separate letter to various state and federal law enforcement officials

throughout Iowa, including officials with the Fairfield Police Department, Iowa

State Patrol, Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation, Iowa Attorney General’s

Office, and United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Iowa. The 4

letter advised that Richmond was no longer considered a credible witness and

“should not place himself, and should not be asked to place himself, into

positions where he may be called as a witness to testify.”

Richmond requested a reconsideration of his placement on the list under

Iowa Code § 80F.1(24)(a)(4). Although Moulding asked Richmond to appear in

person for the meeting, Richmond appeared only virtually. Richmond also

refused to turn on his camera during the meeting despite Moulding’s repeated

requests, and further refused to explain why he wouldn’t turn it on. After the

reconsideration interview, Moulding upheld his original decision. Richmond then

filed a petition for judicial review under Iowa Code § 80F.1(25), which allows a

district court to affirm, modify, or reverse the prosecutor’s decision, including

ordering the officer’s name removed from the list.

Moulding moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the statute violated due

process and the separation-of-powers doctrine. The district court denied the

motion and, after reviewing the evidence in camera (i.e., privately in chambers),

ruled in Richmond’s favor. The district court found that although Richmond’s

actions lacked forthrightness, they did not constitute actual deceit or dishonesty.

As a result, the district court ordered that Moulding remove Richmond’s name

from the list. Moulding filed this appeal.

II.

The Brady-Giglio list is named after two precedent-setting United States

Supreme Court cases. In Brady v. Maryland, the Court held that the prosecution

violates due process if it suppresses evidence favorable to the accused that is

material to either guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Giglio v. United

States, the Court expanded this rule to include impeachment evidence, holding

that when a witness’s reliability is central to determining guilt or innocence, 5

failing to disclose evidence that undermines the witness’s credibility justifies a

new trial. 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972).

Under the Brady-Giglio line of cases, the failure to disclose an officer’s prior

misconduct, such as untruthfulness or criminal activity, can warrant the

reversal of a defendant’s conviction. Some prosecutors thus create Brady-Giglio

lists that identify compromised witnesses. Because prosecutors want to avoid

building a case around an untruthful officer, being included on a Brady-Giglio

list presents serious risks to an officer’s career. Without the ability to investigate,

arrest, or testify, there is often little traditional police work left for the officer to

do.

Before 2022, prosecutors in Iowa generally had free rein to manage their

Brady-Giglio lists as they saw fit, with officers lacking a formal path to challenge

their placement on a list. But the legislature has since passed two major rounds

of reform granting officers an opportunity to challenge a listing. In 2022, the

legislature enacted an amendment that defined a Brady-Giglio list as “a list

compiled by a prosecuting agency containing the names and details of officers

who have sustained incidents of untruthfulness, criminal convictions, candor

issues, or some other type of issue which places the officer’s credibility into

question.” 2022 Iowa Acts ch. 1142, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 80F.1(1)(a)

(2023)). The amendment required prosecuting agencies to follow specific

guidelines when adding an officer to a Brady-Giglio list, including providing

notice to officers and allowing them to request reconsideration of their placement

on a list. Id. § 4 (codified at Iowa Code § 80F.1(24) (2023)).

In 2024, another amendment added a layer of judicial oversight. See 2024

Iowa Acts ch. 1121, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 80F.1(25) (2025)). Under new

subsection (25), officers are granted the right to petition a district court for review 6

of the prosecutor’s listing decision. Iowa Code § 80F.1(25). Now, upon either

party’s request or the district court’s own motion, the district court “shall

perform an in camera review of the evidence and may hold a closed hearing.” Id.

Evidence offered as part of the review is generally kept confidential. Id. As to

remedies, the statute grants the district court authority to “affirm, modify, or

reverse” a prosecuting agency’s Brady-Giglio determination and order relief,

“including removal of the officer from a Brady-Giglio list, as justice may require.”

Iowa Code § 80F.1(25).

In this appeal, Moulding does not contest the district court’s specific order

to remove Richmond from the county’s Brady-Giglio list. Instead, he raises a

challenge to the constitutionality of § 80F.1(25) itself, which he presented in an

unsuccessful motion to dismiss. He asserts three grounds on appeal: (1) the

statute violates the due process rights of criminal defendants, (2) the statute

violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by limiting prosecutorial discretion,

and (3) the statute is void for vagueness.

A. Due Process. Moulding argues that judicial review of Brady-Giglio list

determinations violates the due process rights of criminal defendants by

restricting a prosecutor’s ability to disclose impeachment evidence to the

accused. Again, under Brady, prosecutors violate a defendant’s due process

rights if they withhold evidence that is favorable to the defendant and material

to either guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also, Harrington v.

State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 521–22 (Iowa 2003).

Moulding’s argument is built on the premise that a prosecutor cannot

disclose impeachment evidence about an officer in a particular case if the court

has previously removed the officer from a Brady-Giglio list. But this premise is

incorrect, because § 80F.1 only regulates the list, not the disclosure of 7

information in a particular case. The court’s removal of an officer from a Brady-

Giglio list does not prevent a prosecutor from disclosing exculpatory evidence

about that officer to a defendant in a case. See Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No.

5 v. City of Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531, 553 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2021) (“[T]he

[prosecutor] may provide information about any police officer to criminal defense

counsel regardless of whether that officer is on the [Brady-Giglio] List.” (emphasis

omitted))

This is because the constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory

material exists independently of whether a prosecutor maintains a Brady-Giglio

list. Indeed, nothing in § 80F.1 requires a prosecutor’s office to create a separate

Brady-Giglio list at all. See Iowa Code § 80F.1(24)(a) (requiring “[a] prosecuting

agency that maintains a Brady-Giglio list” to adopt various policies) (emphasis

added). And nothing in § 80F.1 dictates what a prosecutor must—or must not—

disclose in any defendant’s case.

In his attack on the statute, Moulding advances an overly broad notion of

what constitutes a Brady-Giglio list. A Brady-Giglio list is not a catchall term for

every internal note, discussion, or evaluation a prosecutor’s office makes

regarding an officer’s credibility. Read in context, § 80F.1(1)(a)’s definition of a

Brady-Giglio list suggests that it is a formal, prospective, and publicly available

declaration of an officer’s unreliability. These characteristics are apparent in this

case, as demonstrated in both Moulding’s detailed letter to Richmond explaining

the placement and Moulding’s separate letter to law enforcement officials around

the state providing notice of the placement.

What’s more, when a court orders an officer’s removal from the list, it may

(as here) be because the court found the underlying evidence neither “material”

nor “favorable” under the Brady standard. 373 U.S. at 87. A defendant’s due 8

process rights are only implicated when a prosecutor is prevented from

disclosing information that meets these specific criteria. As a result, a judicial

determination that evidence falls outside both categories arguably provides an

additional safeguard for the prosecution in ensuring it has met its duty to uphold

a defendant’s due process rights.

We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that § 80F.1(25) does not

intrude on a prosecutor’s due process obligations to defendants.

B. Separation of Powers. Moulding further argues that § 80F.1(25) is

unconstitutional because it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by

limiting prosecutorial discretion and thus improperly permitting judicial

oversight of an inherently executive function. The Iowa Constitution expressly

provides for a separation of powers. Iowa Const. art. III, § 1. “The division of the

powers of government into three different departments—legislative, executive,

and judicial—lies at the very foundation of our constitutional system.” State ex

rel. White v. Barker, 89 N.W. 204, 208 (Iowa 1902). The separation of powers

between the three branches prevents “a gradual concentration of the several

powers in the same department,” The Federalist No. 51, at 349 (James Madison)

(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), and thus operates as a “safeguard against tyranny,”

Webster Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Flattery, 268 N.W.2d 869, 872–73

(Iowa 1978) (en banc).

As we have observed, “the prosecutorial function of a criminal case is

historically within the province of the executive branch.” State v. Hoegh, 632

N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2001). Moulding first notes that because the power to

prosecute belongs exclusively to the executive branch, it necessarily includes the

power to make decisions related to charging, trial strategy, and witness selection. 9

He argues that a court’s power to remove an officer from a Brady-Giglio list

interferes with these prosecutorial functions.

In arguing that such an intrusion occurs with § 80F.1(25), Moulding relies

on Savage v. Maryland, a case regarding prosecutorial immunity. 896 F.3d 260

(4th Cir. 2018). In Savage, a Maryland prosecutor informed city officials that he

would no longer allow a specific officer to testify based on concerns about his

veracity, leading to the officer’s firing. Id. at 266. The officer sued, alleging that

the prosecutor violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 267. The prosecutor

argued he was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity, which applies

when actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal

process.” Id. at 268 (quoting Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117–18 (4th Cir.

2018)). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

determined that decisions regarding witness credibility and whether to call a

witness are core prosecutorial functions directly tied to the conduct of a trial. Id.

at 270. The court held that the immunity must apply when a prosecutor makes

adverse credibility determinations while attempting to comply with disclosure

obligations. Id. at 273–74.

But Savage doesn’t take Moulding as far as he might hope. Savage

addresses a prosecutor’s immunity from suit, whereas § 80F.1(24)(i) affirmatively

disclaims any private cause of action against a prosecutor. See Iowa Code

§ 80F.1(24)(i). Savage also did not address separation of powers concerns; its

discussion of the basic functions of the job defined the scope of immunity, not

the legislature’s authority to regulate. 896 F.3d at 273–74. And Savage focused

on the First Amendment implications of an employment decision, which is

categorically different from the judicial review of a Brady-Giglio list decision. Id.

at 270. 10

Moulding’s separation-of-powers argument encounters the same obstacle

as his due process argument: the statute does not prevent prosecutors from

carrying out their core functions. Section 80F.1(25) only raises a separation-of-

powers problem if it in fact interferes with a core prosecutorial power. Although

under the statute a district court may order a prosecutor to remove an officer’s

name from a list, the statute gives the court no authority to require the

prosecutor to call the officer as a witness at trial or to disclose (or not disclose)

exculpatory or impeachment information in particular cases; those powers

remain with the prosecutor. The statute only authorizes judicial intervention as

to the separate ability to maintain a Brady-Giglio list, and only then in prescribed

situations.

Ultimately, of course, both prosecutors and law enforcement officers are

performing executive functions. The legislature’s enactment of § 80F.1(25), in

effect, regulates certain aspects of their relations and allows judicial review of

disputes under that law. This is the three branches at work, not a violation of

separation of powers. Moulding has failed to establish a separation of powers

violation, and we thus affirm the district court’s ruling on this issue.

C. Void for Vagueness. Moulding argues on appeal that § 80F.1(25)’s

Brady-Giglio provisions were “shoehorned” into a statute originally designed to

protect officers from unfair employment practices within their departments,

resulting in “an incoherent, unconstitutional, and clumsy hybrid.” Moulding’s

appeal brief offers a single example to illustrate the problem, pointing to

§ 80F.1(1)(b)’s reference to a “complaint” and then arguing that a Brady-Giglio

list dispute generally does not involve a formal complaint.

Although Moulding asserts that he raised this “void for vagueness”

argument in the district court, a reader has to squint awfully hard to find it. 11

Moulding’s arguments below offer criticism about the drafting of the Brady-Giglio

provisions, but nowhere do they include a formal constitutional vagueness

challenge. Even if his complaints about the statute’s drafting were sufficient to

make out such a challenge, the district court certainly never ruled on the issue.

As we have said many times, “issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided

by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut,

641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Because Moulding failed to preserve error on

this issue, we will not address it.

III.

For these reasons, we reject Moulding’s constitutional challenges to Iowa

Code § 80F.1 and affirm the district court’s judgment removing Richmond from

the county attorney’s Brady-Giglio list.

Affirmed.