Barry v. City of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-1038
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIKE BARRY; TRPMOI FAMILY No. 25-1038 TRUST; ROYAL HOSPITALITY GROUP, D.C. No. INC., doing business as Mirage Hospitality 2:24-cv-01189-JAK-JPR Group, Inc.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM*

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation,

Defendant - Appellee,

DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 21, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: LEE, BUMATAY, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Mike Barry, Trpmoi Family Trust, and Royal Hospitality Group, Inc.

(collectively, “Barry”) appeal the district court’s order dismissing Barry’s state-law

claims and deferring his federal claims under the abstention doctrine of R.R. Comm’n

of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 497 (1941). We have appellate jurisdiction

over orders of abstention. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Confederated Salish v. Simonich, 29

F.3d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1994). We review de novo whether the elements for

abstention are met and then for abuse of discretion as to the district court’s ultimate

decision to abstain. Gearing v. City of Half Moon Bay, 54 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th

Cir. 2022). We affirm.

A federal court may abstain under the Pullman doctrine only if “(1) the case

touches on a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not

enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open, (2) constitutional adjudication

plainly can be avoided if a definite ruling on the state issue would terminate the

controversy, and (3) the proper resolution of the possible determinative issue of state

law is uncertain.” Am. Encore v. Fontes, 152 F.4th 1097, 1122 (9th Cir. 2025).

First, this case involves a sufficiently “sensitive area of social policy” because

it arises out of the City of Los Angeles’s land-use planning. “We have long held

that land use planning is a sensitive area of social policy that meets the first

requirement for Pullman abstention.” Gearing, 54 F.4th at 1150 (simplified). For

example, we have held a city ordinance was a prototypical example of land-use

2 25-1038 planning justifying Pullman abstention when it restricted short-term hotel occupancy

in favor of long-term residential units. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San

Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, Barry challenges an

ordinance that classifies hotel units as either for transient occupants or for residential

tenants. Thus, just like in San Remo Hotel, Barry’s suit touches on land-use planning

and meets the first element for Pullman abstention.

Second, a federal constitutional issue may be avoided by a definitive state-

court ruling because if Barry succeeds on his state-law claim for a writ of mandate,

the federal issues in the case will be mooted or narrowed considerably. See Sinclair

Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 409 (9th Cir. 1996); Gearing,

54 F.4th at 1150–51 (holding that this requirement was satisfied where a state-court

ruling would “likely narrow the federal litigation”). Barry does not dispute that at

least some of his federal claims would be “narrowed” were a state-law writ of

mandate granted. For instance, although Barry raises a variety of First, Fourth, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, a favorable state-court resolution would

likely moot (at minimum) his as-applied Due Process Clause and Takings Clause

challenges. This is sufficient to “narrow” his federal claims were he to return to

federal court, even though most of his claims concern the federal Constitution. See,

e.g., Pearl Inv. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 774 F.2d 1460, 1464 (9th

Cir. 1985) (holding Pullman abstention was appropriate even though the plaintiff

3 25-1038 raised no independent state-law claims).

Third, the proper determination of state law is uncertain because whether

Barry’s hotel can or should be classified as “residential” is a fact-specific inquiry

under state law. In land-use cases, because of the “localized and complex nature of

land-use regulations,” the uncertainty requirement is met when the state-law claims

turn on how the challenged policy applies to specific property. See Gearing, 54

F.4th at 1151. For instance, in San Remo Hotel, the “entire case . . . hinge[d] on the

designation of [the plaintiff’s] hotel as ‘residential,’” an inquiry which necessarily

raised difficult questions about conflicting zoning laws and hotel-use ordinances.

145 F.3d at 1105. Here, as in San Remo Hotel, Barry’s “entire case . . . hinges” on

whether the hotel was properly designated a transient hotel and thus similarly meets

the third requirement for Pullman abstention. See id.

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to abstain.

Pullman abstention is particularly appropriate in land-use cases. See, e.g., Kollsman

v. City of Los Angeles, 737 F.2d. 830, 836–37 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a district

court abused its discretion by not abstaining in a case involving a denied application

for a permit to build a subdivision which implicated state environmental laws and

local ordinances). Because this case involves archetypal issues of land-use policy,

there was no abuse of discretion in abstaining.

AFFIRMED.

4 25-1038