NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 22 2024
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
BARRY BLAKELEY, No. 23-35061
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00035-SLG
v. MEMORANDUM* DANIEL G. GUNDERSON; CHRISTOPHER RAFFERTY; TIMOTHY WOLFF; THOMAS V. JAMGOCHIAN; STATE OF ALASKA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 22, 2024**
Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
On February 6, 2021, Barry Blakeley was stopped by Defendant Daniel
Gunderson, an Alaska state trooper, on an Alaska highway. Defendants
Christopher Rafferty and Timothy Wolff, who are also state troopers, subsequently
arrived on the scene. Gunderson ultimately issued Blakeley a citation for failing to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). have installed on his vehicle an adequate “device which effectively reduces the
wheel spray or splash of water or other substance to the rear of the vehicle.” See
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 04.265(a).
Blakeley did not thereafter correct this deficiency. Instead, he mailed the
state district court various documents objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over him.
He asserted, inter alia, that the “State of Alaska” was a “Fiction of Law, not a real
entity” and that, as a result, the state troopers and state attorneys pursuing the
matter lacked “standing to proceed” and the court lacked “subject matter
jurisdiction.” He also contended that, because he “was not acting as a driver
engaged in Commerce,” he was not subject to the provision under which he was
cited.
The Alaska District Court served Blakeley by mail with a notice informing
him of the date and time of the trial for his violation of § 04.265(a), but Blakeley
did not appear at the trial. The state court proceeded to enter a default judgment
against him in the total amount of $105. Because the violation underlying this
judgment “is not considered a criminal offense” under Alaska law, see ALASKA
STAT. § 28.90.010(d), the resulting judgment is civil in nature. Blakeley did not
appeal the judgment.
In February 2022, Blakeley filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
federal district court against the three state troopers and the state court judge who
2 entered the default judgment. The 89-claim complaint alleged violations of
multiple federal constitutional provisions, as well as various state law claims. The
complaint sought vacatur of the state court judgment and monetary damages.
The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court held that
this suit was a de facto appeal of a state court judgment and that the court therefore
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, the court
concluded that Blakeley failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Blakeley timely appealed. We affirm.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction ‘to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial
proceedings,’” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted), and this prohibition extends to an action that is the “‘de
facto equivalent’ of such an appeal,” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Reviewing de novo, see Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
1154 (9th Cir. 2003), we agree that Blakeley’s claims relating to the issuance of
the citation, the disposition of the citation, and the resulting state court judgment
are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. These claims allege, as the predicate
legal wrong, “an erroneous decision from the state court,” namely, its rejection of
Blakeley’s jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the issuance and
3 disposition of the citation. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
2004). In addition, the complaint seeks vacatur of that judgment and damages
flowing from the judgment, and the complaint does not seek prospective relief
against future enforcement of the statutes at issue. See id. Thus, these claims fall
squarely within the core of what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. See Noel, 341 F.3d at
1156 (“[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court
asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court
and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a
forbidden de facto appeal.”); see also D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 486 (1983) (holding that the bar of Rooker-Feldman extends to legal claims in
the federal suit that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s case-
specific judgment ruling against the federal plaintiff).
However, Blakeley’s claims relating to the lawfulness of the initial stop and
the alleged examination of his vehicle and papers do not assert injuries arising
from the state court’s judgment and are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Noel,
341 F.3d at 1164. Nonetheless, reviewing de novo, Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000), we conclude that the district
court correctly dismissed these claims on the alternative ground that Blakeley
failed to state a cause of action.
Taking as true only the “well-pleaded factual allegations” of the complaint,
4 we conclude that they fail to “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). As to the initial stop, the complaint
alleges that Gunderson pulled over Blakeley’s vehicle for driving too slowly in
violation of Alaska law. Cf. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 02.295. The
complaint, however, fails to allege any facts that would support a conclusion that
the initial stop was unlawful. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)
(holding that, to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, “officers need
only ‘reasonable suspicion’” that the driver has committed a violation (citation
omitted)); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
50–51 (1993) (holding that constitutional claims involving an “initial detention,”
arrest, or search generally must be evaluated exclusively under Fourth Amendment
standards).
As to the alleged “search” of the vehicle, the complaint alleges only that the
state troopers “looked inside” Blakeley’s vehicle while positioned outside that
vehicle. This allegation fails to state a claim.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 22 2024
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
BARRY BLAKELEY, No. 23-35061
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00035-SLG
v. MEMORANDUM* DANIEL G. GUNDERSON; CHRISTOPHER RAFFERTY; TIMOTHY WOLFF; THOMAS V. JAMGOCHIAN; STATE OF ALASKA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 22, 2024**
Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
On February 6, 2021, Barry Blakeley was stopped by Defendant Daniel
Gunderson, an Alaska state trooper, on an Alaska highway. Defendants
Christopher Rafferty and Timothy Wolff, who are also state troopers, subsequently
arrived on the scene. Gunderson ultimately issued Blakeley a citation for failing to
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). have installed on his vehicle an adequate “device which effectively reduces the
wheel spray or splash of water or other substance to the rear of the vehicle.” See
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 04.265(a).
Blakeley did not thereafter correct this deficiency. Instead, he mailed the
state district court various documents objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over him.
He asserted, inter alia, that the “State of Alaska” was a “Fiction of Law, not a real
entity” and that, as a result, the state troopers and state attorneys pursuing the
matter lacked “standing to proceed” and the court lacked “subject matter
jurisdiction.” He also contended that, because he “was not acting as a driver
engaged in Commerce,” he was not subject to the provision under which he was
cited.
The Alaska District Court served Blakeley by mail with a notice informing
him of the date and time of the trial for his violation of § 04.265(a), but Blakeley
did not appear at the trial. The state court proceeded to enter a default judgment
against him in the total amount of $105. Because the violation underlying this
judgment “is not considered a criminal offense” under Alaska law, see ALASKA
STAT. § 28.90.010(d), the resulting judgment is civil in nature. Blakeley did not
appeal the judgment.
In February 2022, Blakeley filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
federal district court against the three state troopers and the state court judge who
2 entered the default judgment. The 89-claim complaint alleged violations of
multiple federal constitutional provisions, as well as various state law claims. The
complaint sought vacatur of the state court judgment and monetary damages.
The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court held that
this suit was a de facto appeal of a state court judgment and that the court therefore
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, the court
concluded that Blakeley failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Blakeley timely appealed. We affirm.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction ‘to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial
proceedings,’” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted), and this prohibition extends to an action that is the “‘de
facto equivalent’ of such an appeal,” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Reviewing de novo, see Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,
1154 (9th Cir. 2003), we agree that Blakeley’s claims relating to the issuance of
the citation, the disposition of the citation, and the resulting state court judgment
are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. These claims allege, as the predicate
legal wrong, “an erroneous decision from the state court,” namely, its rejection of
Blakeley’s jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the issuance and
3 disposition of the citation. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.
2004). In addition, the complaint seeks vacatur of that judgment and damages
flowing from the judgment, and the complaint does not seek prospective relief
against future enforcement of the statutes at issue. See id. Thus, these claims fall
squarely within the core of what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. See Noel, 341 F.3d at
1156 (“[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court
asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court
and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a
forbidden de facto appeal.”); see also D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 486 (1983) (holding that the bar of Rooker-Feldman extends to legal claims in
the federal suit that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s case-
specific judgment ruling against the federal plaintiff).
However, Blakeley’s claims relating to the lawfulness of the initial stop and
the alleged examination of his vehicle and papers do not assert injuries arising
from the state court’s judgment and are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Noel,
341 F.3d at 1164. Nonetheless, reviewing de novo, Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000), we conclude that the district
court correctly dismissed these claims on the alternative ground that Blakeley
failed to state a cause of action.
Taking as true only the “well-pleaded factual allegations” of the complaint,
4 we conclude that they fail to “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). As to the initial stop, the complaint
alleges that Gunderson pulled over Blakeley’s vehicle for driving too slowly in
violation of Alaska law. Cf. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 02.295. The
complaint, however, fails to allege any facts that would support a conclusion that
the initial stop was unlawful. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)
(holding that, to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, “officers need
only ‘reasonable suspicion’” that the driver has committed a violation (citation
omitted)); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,
50–51 (1993) (holding that constitutional claims involving an “initial detention,”
arrest, or search generally must be evaluated exclusively under Fourth Amendment
standards).
As to the alleged “search” of the vehicle, the complaint alleges only that the
state troopers “looked inside” Blakeley’s vehicle while positioned outside that
vehicle. This allegation fails to state a claim. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
740 (1983) (plurality) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by
police actions in examining, from the outside, “that portion of the interior of an
automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive
passersby or diligent police officers”); id at 745–46 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing with the plurality on this point). To the extent that Blakeley
5 also challenges the officers’ demands to see his license and registration, he fails to
state a Fourth Amendment violation. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348, 355 (2015) (holding that, during a traffic stop, police may “check[] the
driver’s license, determin[e] whether there are outstanding warrants against the
driver, and inspect[] the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance”).
Blakeley’s contention that the state troopers lacked governmental authority
on the ground that they were merely agents of the “fictional” State of Alaska is
frivolous. Subject to the limitations of the Constitution, the States retain traditional
“police powers” to adopt laws and regulations “that relate to public health, safety,
and welfare.” Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021).
Under the complaint’s own factual allegations, the state troopers were enforcing
such regulations and, as we have explained, Blakeley has failed to state a claim
that the limits of the Constitution were transgressed during the traffic stop.
Finally, applying the liberal standard applicable to pro se litigants, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blakeley
leave to amend his complaint. See Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829
F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). Given the factual allegations that Blakeley has already made
in his 100-page complaint, the frivolous nature of Blakeley’s theories, and his
wholesale failure to articulate any potentially plausible amendments that could
6 cure the complaint’s defects, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that “it
is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment.” Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 567 F.3d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.