Barry Bernadas C/O Bella Zoya Properties v. Natasha Edet

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: February 26, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0418
• Status: Published

Opinion

BARRY BERNADAS C/O * NO. 2024-CA-0418 BELLA ZOYA PROPERTIES * VERSUS COURT OF APPEAL * NATASHA EDET FOURTH CIRCUIT * STATE OF LOUISIANA *******

APPEAL FROM SECOND CITY COURT OF NEW ORLEANS NO. 2023-01947-S, “D” Honorable Ernestine Lillie Anderson-Trahan ****** Judge Rachael D. Johnson ****** (Court composed of Chief Judge Roland L. Belsome, Judge Rachael D. Johnson, Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott)

Barry Bernadas Zoya Properties 4545 MacArthur Blvd., Office New Orleans, LA 70131

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE

David Holman Williams Jack Muse SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA LEGAL SERVICES 1340 Poydras Street, Suite 600 New Orleans, LA 70112--2401

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART February 26, 2025 RDJ RLB Appellant, Natasha Edet (“Ms. Edet”), appeals the Second City Court’s NEK amended consent judgment that includes an order that Ms. Edet vacate 4545

MacArthur Boulevard, Apartment 37, New Orleans, Louisiana, 70131 by January

5, 2024. For the following reasons, we affirm the consent judgment rendered in

open court on December 18, 2023. However, we vacate the court’s January 16,

2024 amended consent judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 6, 2023, Pro Se Appellee, Barry Bernadas (“Mr. Bernadas”),

representing Bella Zoya Properties, filed a rule for possession against Ms. Edet,

seeking possession of 4545 MacArthur Boulevard, Apartment 37, New Orleans,

Louisiana, 70131 (“Apartment 37”). The Rule for Possession alleged that Ms. Edet

had not paid $900 in rent. Mr. Bernadas also asserted that Ms. Edet owed $58 in

late fees, $221.50 in court costs, and a $25 trash fee. In total, the amount owed was

$1,204.50.

The hearing on the Rule for Possession was held on December 18, 2023.

During the hearing, Mr. Bernadas and Ms. Edet agreed that she would pay $831 by

December 22, 2023, to satisfy her debt. The parties also discussed a January 5,

1 2024 move out date. A written consent judgment was read, rendered, and signed in

open court by the presiding judge on December 18, 2023. The parties did not sign

the consent judgment. The consent judgment reads as follows:

When, after hearing the law and evidence, the Court considering the law and evidence to be in favor of plaintiff in rule and against defendant in rule, for the reasons orally assigned: It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the rule herein taken be made absolute, and accordingly, there be judgment in favor of Barry Bernadas C/O Bella Zoya Properties plaintiff in rule, against Natasha Edet defendant in rule and occupants, condemning said defendants to $831 by December 22, 2023, 2 p.m. Premises at 4545 Macarthur Boulevard, Apt 37 New Orleans, LA, Rule Executory.

On December 22, 2023, Ms. Edet paid Mr. Bernadas $854 to satisfy the

$831 payment ordered in the consent judgment. On January 11, 2024, Mr.

Bernadas posted a Warrant for Possession of Premises on Ms. Edet’s apartment

door. As a result of the Warrant for Possession, the parties returned to court on

January 12, 2024, for an eviction hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Bernadas was

ordered to show cause why Ms. Edet should be evicted from Apartment 37.

During the January 12, 2024 hearing, the parties disagreed about whether the

consent judgment included Ms. Edet leaving the property on January 5, 2024. Ms.

Edet contended that she and Mr. Bernadas made a separate agreement outside of

court. She alleged that they agreed she would pay Mr. Bernadas an additional $900

to continue living in Apartment 37 during the month of January. Ms. Edet paid Mr.

Bernadas $500 on December 29, 2023, and $400 on January 5, 2024. Mr. Bernadas

argued that the $900 Ms. Edet paid was not a payment for January’s rent but

2 instead a payment to satisfy the previous debt and late fees. There was no evidence

of a separate lease agreement between the parties. The only evidence offered at the

hearing was a ledger showing the Cash App payments of $900 and an email, read

in open court, showing a tentative payment schedule made to satisfy a January rent

payment and late fees.

After reviewing the December 18, 2023 record, the presiding judge found

that the omission of the January 5, 2024 move out date in the written consent

judgment was done in error. Further, the judge determined that any additional

agreement between the parties made outside of court would not be considered in

the current proceeding. Also, the alleged agreement would not supersede her

judgment and would be considered a “totally separate suit” that Ms. Edet would

have to file separately. On January 16, 2024, the presiding judge amended the

written consent judgment to include the January 5, 2024 move out date. This

timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Ms. Edet raises the following assignments of error: (1) Second

City Court erred as a matter of law in issuing, over the objection of a party, a

supposed amended consent judgment to authorize Ms. Edet’s eviction, which did

not reflect the terms that had been recited on the record on December 18, 2023;

and (2) if the trial court found that the December 18, 2023 consent agreement did

not include all terms that would have been essential to one of the parties, it erred in

failing to rescind the agreement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a city court’s interpretation of a compromise agreement and

whether it is valid, we apply a manifest error/clearly erroneous standard of review.

3 Morris, Lee & Bayle, LLC v. Macquet, 14-1080, p. 14 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/23/16),

192 So. 3d 198, 208 (citations omitted). “The trial court’s judgment determining

the existence, validity and scope of a compromise agreement depends on a finding

of the parties’ intent, which is an inherently factual finding.” Id. (citations

omitted).

DISCUSSION

Ms. Edet first argues that the agreement made in open court on December

18, 2023, rather than the written consent agreement signed by the presiding judge,

is the actual binding agreement made between the parties. Ms. Edet further argues

that the terms of the agreement in open court made no mention of a January 5,

2024 move out date, and the written consent judgment accurately portrays the

terms made on the record on December 18, 2023. Lastly, Ms. Edet argues that the

judge did not have the authority to amend the consent judgment to include the

January 5, 2024 move out date without both parties’ consent. After review of the

law and record, we find that the presiding judge correctly determined the scope of

the agreement between the parties. The consent judgment recited in open court

reflected the agreement between the parties, and it included a January 5, 2024

move out date. However, the amended consent judgment is invalid and without

effect and should be vacated.

This Court has recognized that a consent judgment is deemed the same as a

compromise agreement and can be a final enforceable judgment under Louisiana

law. Macquet, 14-1080, p. 14, 192 So. 3d at 208. La. C.C. art. 3071 defines a

compromise as “a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one

or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or

4 other legal relationship.” La. C.C. art. 3072 governs the formal requirements to

implement a compromise agreement, stating that “[a] compromise shall be made in

writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible of

being transcribed from the record of the proceedings.” “The requirement that the

compromise be in writing or recited in open court and susceptible of being

transcribed from the record aims at avoiding litigation over what the terms of the

settlement are.” Macquet, 14-1080, p. 17, 192 So. 3d at 210 (citation omitted)

(internal quotations omitted). According to La. C.C.P. art. 1916(B), when parties

reach a compromise agreement that is recited in open court and capable of being

transcribed, “the court may order counsel for a party to prepare and submit a

judgment to the court for signature….” A consent judgment has binding force from

the presumed voluntary acquiescence of the parties and not from adjudication by

the trial court.” Peeler v. Dural, 06-936, p. 6 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/11/07), 958 So. 2d

31, 35. “A compromise agreement recited on the record in open court will be

treated as though it is a written contract, conferring upon each party the right of

judicial enforcement of performance of the agreement even though the substance

may later be written in a more convenient form.” Macquet, 14-1080, p. 16, 192 So.

3d at 209 (citing Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. United, Inc., 04–0100, p. 10

(La. 3/2/05), 894 So. 2d 1096, 1104; Sileo v. Berger, 11-0295, p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir.

9/28/11), 74 So. 3d 753, 759).

The two essential elements of a compromise are “(1) mutual intention of

preventing or putting an end to the litigation, and (2) reciprocal concessions of the

parties to adjust their differences.” Trahan, 04-0100, p. 10, 894 So. 2d at 1104; La.

C.C. art. 3071. For a written compromise agreement to be enforceable, “the written

5 agreement must be signed by both parties [or their agents], obligating both to do

what they have agreed on.” Sullivan v. Sullivan, 95-2122, p. 4 (La. 4/8/96), 671 So.

2d 315, 317 (citation omitted). To determine whether a compromise recited in open

court is enforceable, we rely on extrinsic evidence. When parties have a written

compromise, the meaning and intent of the parties are “ordinarily determined from

the instrument’s four corners, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible either to

explain or to contradict the instrument’s terms.” Ortego v. State, Dep't of Transp.

& Dev., 96-1322, p. 7 (La. 2/25/97), 689 So. 2d 1358, 1363 (citations omitted).

However, if the dispute pertains to the scope of the compromise agreement,

“extrinsic evidence can be considered to determine exactly what differences the

parties intended to settle.” Id. at p. 7, 689 So. 2d at 1363-64 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, it is undisputed that both parties had a mutual

intention to end the litigation, and reciprocal concessions were made in court on

December 18, 2023. During the December 18, 2023 hearing, the presiding judge

stated: “Let’s try to make it work and get the full amount [sic] you can move on the

5th by morning, by consent. So those are the two things that were working.” The

two terms the judge considered were (1) the amount due to Mr. Bernadas on

December 22, 2023, by 2:00 p.m. and (2) Ms. Edet’s move out date of January 5,

2024. The judge mentioned a January 5, 2024 move out date on several occasions,

and there were no objections lodged on the record regarding the move out date.

Further, Ms. Edet’s counsel stated that Ms. Edet would be able to pay the $831

amount and “be ready to be out of there by January.” They went on to discuss that

if Ms. Edet would pay the $831 by December 22, 2023, at 2:00 p.m., Mr. Bernadas

would not seek a warrant to evict Ms. Edet. The judge then reiterated that if Ms.

6 Edet failed to make the payment by the due date and time, then Mr. Bernadas

would be able to contact the court to facilitate an eviction. Again, both parties

made concessions to end the litigation. Mr. Bernadas agreed to receive $831,

which was only a portion of the $1,204.50 owed. And, Ms. Edet agreed to only pay

a portion of the total amount she owed and to move out of Apartment 37 by

January 5, 2024.

To determine whether a compromise made in writing or recited in open

court is enforceable, we consider whether the formal requirements outlined in La.

C.C. art 3072 were followed. In Macquet, this Court found that the written consent

judgment did not qualify as a valid, enforceable compromise because it was not

signed by both parties. 14-1080, p. 19, 192 So. 3d at 211. Instead, the Macquet

Court found that the compromise agreement recited in open court reflected the

intent of the parties regarding the terms of the compromise. Id. at p. 20, 192 So. 3d

at 211. The defendant fully satisfying the terms of the compromise agreement

recited in open court further showed the intent of the parties and that the

compromise agreement was valid and enforceable. See id.

We find the same happened in the case sub judice. The consent judgment

made in writing after the December 18, 2023 hearing is not a valid, enforceable

compromise agreement because neither party signed the agreement.1 Only the

1 It should be noted that if the original consent judgment was written and signed by both parties,

the presiding judge would not be able to amend the judgment without consent from both parties pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1951. La. C.C.P. art. 1951 states the following: On motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation. The judgment may be amended only after a hearing with notice to all parties, except that a hearing is not required if all parties consent or if the court or the party submitting the amended judgment certifies that it was provided to all parties at least five

7 judge’s signature appears on the consent judgment. The record reflects that the

parties agreed to Ms. Edet paying Mr. Bernadas $831 on December 22, 2023 by

2:00 p.m. and she would move out of Apartment 37 on January 5, 2024. That was

the entirety of the agreement. The record from the January 12, 2024 hearing shows

that Ms. Edet paid Mr. Bernadas $854 so that she would not be evicted from

Apartment 37 on December 22, 2023. The record from the January 12, 2024

hearing also reflects that the parties discussed a tentative agreement for her to stay

in Apartment 37 through the month of January. Whether the tentative agreement

made outside of court is enforceable and whether the $900 payments made to Mr.

Bernadas were for January rent is not properly before this court. We cannot

consider whether that agreement would supersede the compromise made in open

court on December 18, 2023. However, the parties having negotiated a January

2024 rent agreement showed that both parties, during the December 18, 2023

hearing, intended to have the compromise reflect a January 5, 2024 move out date.

Extrinsic evidence shows that the compromise agreement made in open court is

valid and enforceable.

Finding that the consent agreement entered on the record on December 18,

2023 is valid and enforceable, there was no need for the presiding judge to enter an

amended consent judgment to reflect the January 5, 2024 move out date. As such,

we find that the amended consent agreement should be vacated, as it is without

effect. Finding that the amended consent judgment should be vacated, Ms. Edet’s

second assignment of error is moot.

days before the amendment and that no opposition has been received. A final judgment may not be amended under this Article to change its substance.

8 DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the consent agreement made in open

court on December 18, 2023. We find that the consent agreement made in open

court on December 18, 2023 is binding and that Ms. Edet had a move out date of

January 5, 2024. Further, we vacate the amended written January 16, 2024 consent

judgment.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART