Barron v. Barron

594 A.2d 682, 406 Pa. Super. 401, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1836
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 15, 1991
Docket02511
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 594 A.2d 682 (Barron v. Barron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682, 406 Pa. Super. 401, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1836 (Pa. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

MONTEMURO, Judge:

Appellant, Margaret T. Barron, (“mother”) appeals from a custody order in this action brought by appellee, Joseph R. Barron (“father”) for custody of the parties’ daughter, Christine. We remand for further proceedings.

*403 The parties were married on July 3, 1971 and separated on June 13, 1990. Christine, their only child, was born on December 26, 1984. Following a hearing, the trial court granted joint legal custody in both parents. The order provides that father is to have primary physical custody of Christine during the school year; during this period, mother has partial physical custody every other weekend, from 9:00 a.m. Saturday until 8:00 p.m. Sunday, and every Wednesday evening from 6:00 to 8:00. During the summer, mother is to have primary physical custody of Christine from the time school lets out until August 1st, while father has partial custody every other weekend during this period. Each parent has an uninterrupted two-week period of vacation with Christine each year. The custody order also sets forth a holiday schedule by which each parent has Christine on three holidays per year; in addition, the parents alternate between Christmas Eve and Christmas day from year to year.

On appeal, mother argues that the factual findings of the trial court are unsupported by the record. Mother seeks a remand of the case for further development of the record, specifically for a determination of the extent of father’s “alleged drinking problem” and its effect on Christine, and for a determination of the effect of mother’s lesbian relationship on Christine.

Our primary concern in this case, as in all custody cases, is that the best interests of the child be served.

“(O)ur law has long recognized that the scope of review of an appellate court reviewing a custody matter is of the broadest type ... Thus, an appellate court is not bound by deductions or inferences made by a trial court from the facts found; ... nor must a reviewing court accept a finding which has no competent evidence to support it ... ******
However, we have also taken great care to stress:
*404 ‘... (T)his broader power of review was never intended to mean that an appellate court is free to nullify the factfinding function of the hearing judge ... ’ ******
(but, instead is to remain) within the proper bounds of its review and (base a decision) upon its own independent deductions and inferences from the facts as found by the hearing judge. (Citations omitted; emphasis added.).” ******
“ ‘(W)e have recognized that the trial judge is in a position to evaluate the attitude, sincerity, credibility, and demeanor of the witness. Because we are not in such a position, we have recognized that a trial judge’s determination of custody should be accorded great weight. Only where we are constrained to hold that there was a gross abuse of discretion should an appellate court interfere with the decisions of the hearing judge ...’ (Citation omitted; emphasis added.).”

Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Robinson, 505 Pa. 226, 236, 478 A.2d 800, 806 (1984), quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 295-96, 368 A.2d 635, 637 (1977). See also Lombardo v. Lombardo, 515 Pa. 139, 147, 527 A.2d 525, 529 (1987).

At trial, both parties presented testimony on their lifestyles, past and present, and their involvement with Christine. The parties had been married for nineteen years prior to their separation. Mother had moved out of the family home six weeks before the trial which was held on July 30, 1990. Between the initial date of separation and the time of trial, the parties had been sharing physical custody of Christine, with each having custody on alternate weeks.

Father lives in a working-class neighborhood in Levittown in the marital residence previously shared by the parties. N.T. July 30, 1990 at 3. For the past 15 years, he has worked as a painting supervisor at a firm located in Feasterville roughly seven miles from his home; his hours are 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and thus he is available during the *405 evenings and weekends to care for Christine. Id. at 4-5. As of the time of the hearing, Christine was scheduled to begin kindergarten in the upcoming fall of 1990. Father had arranged for a longtime friend of the family, Linda Crosby, to provide child care during the hours that father is working and Christine is not at school, including escorting the child to the dance classes in which Christine has been enrolled for three years. Id. at 9, 14. In the event Ms. Crosby is unavailable to baby-sit, Ms. Crosby’s husband Bob or sixteen-year-old daughter Bernadette will fill in for her. In fact, the Crosbys had already done some babysitting for father during those weeks before trial in which father had custody of Christine. Linda Crosby testified at the trial and concurred in father’s testimony as to the child care arrangement; Bob Crosby also testified and indicated that he was supportive of the arrangement.

Father shares numerous activities with Christine, including bike-riding, swimming, fishing, camping, and walks to the park. Id. at 11. Mother’s mother and siblings have homes near father’s neighborhood; father testified that he is very supportive of Christine continuing her relationship with her maternal relatives. Father characterized his relationship with Christine as “very close.” Id. at 13. He described the child as somewhat confused by mother and father’s recent separation.

On cross-examination, father testified that mother was the primary caretaker of the child prior to the separation.

Mother testified that six weeks before the trial she had moved out of the marital residence to a duplex in Clark, New Jersey, a residential suburb of Edison, New Jersey; her new home is approximately an hour drive away from Levittown. Mother shares her new home with her lesbian partner, Ms. Sally Bell, and Ms. Bell’s seven year old daughter, Meghan. Although Sally Bell had been living in the Clark area prior to mother’s moving there, mother stated that her primary reason for moving to Clark was the prospect of a good job, as she had formerly held a good-paying management position with a firm in that area before *406 she had given birth to Christine. Her former employer had expressed an interest in rehiring her when Christine starts first grade. In the meantime, mother works as a cashier at a foodstore during the evenings from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. As the store is located directly across the street from her home, mother comes home during her nine o’clock break to put Christine to bed. Mother’s partner, Sally, cares for Christine when mother is working, and mother cares for Christine and Sally’s child Meghan while Sally is at work during the day.

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Bluebook (online)
594 A.2d 682, 406 Pa. Super. 401, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1836, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barron-v-barron-pasuperct-1991.