Barrios v. Lambar, Inc.
This text of 991 So. 2d 464 (Barrios v. Lambar, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
George S. BARRIOS
v.
LAMBAR, INC. and Ohio Casualty Group.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
*465 Pete Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee, George Barrios.
Eric J. Waltner, Jacques P. Soileau, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellant, Lambar, Inc.
E. Scott Hackenburg, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Lambert Construction & Maintenance, Inc. and LIPCA, Inc.
Before WHIPPLE, GUIDRY, and HUGHES, JJ.
WHIPPLE, J.
Lambar, Inc. ("Lambar") and its insurer, Ohio Casualty Group, appeal from a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), which found that Lambert Construction and Maintenance, Inc. ("Lambert") and its insurer, LIPCA, Inc., ("LIPCA"), violated LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G) by failing to timely pay on a final judgment previously rendered. The judgment awarded Lambar legal interest and attorney's fees, but refused to award penalties. For the following reasons, we affirm, as amended, and remand with instructions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 12, 1999, George Barrios, a Lambert employee, suffered a work-related injury and filed a disputed claim for compensation benefits. On July 28, 2005, the OWC judge rendered judgment in his favor,[1] finding that at the time of the underlying accident, Barrios had been "loaned" to Lambar, Inc. by his general employer, Lambert, and that Barrios was performing work for Lambar at the time of his injury. Accordingly, the OWC concluded that because Barrios was the "borrowed employee" of Lambar, that Lambert, and its insurer, LIPCA, and Lambar, and its insurer, Ohio Casualty Group, were jointly and solidarity liable for the benefits due Barrios as a result of the accident. The judgment further ordered that Lambert and LIPCA pay Lambar and Ohio Casualty Group one-half of the benefits that had been paid through the date of trial, i.e., $193,323.80, and imposed ongoing liability for 50% of any further indemnity and/or medical benefits due Barrios. The judgment further cast the defendants for all underpayments to date ($32.15 per week) with interest on past-due weekly benefits as they became due, and for continued indemnity benefits at the rate of $320.16 per week. Lambert and LIPCA appealed the OWC judgment, challenging the determination that Barrios was a "borrowed employee" of Lambar and the amount and basis of benefits resulting from this finding. On review, in an opinion handed down on December 28, 2006, this court affirmed. See Barrios v. Lambar, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/06), 951 So.2d 323.
On March 16, 2007, however, Lambar and Ohio Casualty Group filed a "Motion for Penalties and Attorney Fees for Failure to Pay Judgment Under LSA-R.S. 23:1201G." Therein, Lambar contended that since this Court's notice of judgment *466 mailed on December 28, 2006, no payments had been made on the awards set forth in the judgment by Lambert or LIPCA. Thus, Lambar and Ohio Casualty Group sought statutory penalties, in the amount of 24% of the amounts awarded in the judgment, and attorney's fees pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G), based on Lambert and LIPCA's failure to pay the amounts due under the final judgment.
Lambert and LIPCA opposed the motion for penalties and attorney's fees, contending that any failure to pay was excusable, in that a "breakdown" for medical and indemnity was required in order to process the amounts awarded, as "LIPCA's system required that [the checks] be issued separately." As further justification, LIPCA alleged that "[a]pparently, [Ohio Casualty Group] was in no hurry to receive the funds and had decided not to cooperate any further with LIPCA" and that the failure to pay was excusable as Ohio Casualty Group purportedly did not provide them with a breakdown of medical and indemnity expenses. Nonetheless, after the filing of the motion for penalties and attorney's fees, LIPCA eventually tendered two checks to Ohio Casualty Group, totaling $193,323.80 and representing one-half of the benefits that had been paid through the date of trial, as awarded in the July 28, 2005 judgment.[2]
The motion for penalties and attorney's fees was argued before the OWC judge on April 13, 2007. On May 2, 2007, the OWC judge rendered judgment finding that Lambert and LIPCA were liable "as a matter of law" for legal interest on all amounts awarded by the judgment rendered on October 25, 2005, and that the amount of legal interest owed on the $193,323.80 sum through the date of payment on March 23, 2007 amounted to $21,752.90. The OWC judge further found Lambert and LIPCA liable to Ohio Casualty Group and Lambar for attorney's fees in the amount of $3,000.00 for their failure to timely pay the final judgment, pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G).
Lambar and Ohio Casualty now appeal the May 2, 2007 judgment in their favor, contending: (1) the OWC judge erred in failing to award penalties after finding a violation of LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G) had occurred; and (2) that they are entitled to and should be awarded additional attorney's fees for the work done on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Assignment of Error Number One
Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1201(G) governs the payment of a final nonappealable judgment under Louisiana Workers' Compensation Law and provides for penalties and attorney's fees as follows:
If any award payable under the terms of a final, nonappealable judgment is not paid within thirty days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such award an amount equal to twenty-four percent thereof or one hundred dollars per day together with reasonable attorney fees, for each calendar day after thirty days it remains unpaid, whichever is greater, which shall be paid at the same time as, and in addition to, such award, unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer had no control. No amount paid as a penalty under this Subsection shall be included in any formula utilized to establish premium *467 rates for workers' compensation insurance. The total one hundred dollar per calendar day penalty provided for in this Subsection shall not exceed three thousand dollars in the aggregate.
(Emphasis added.)
Awards of penalties and attorney fees in workers' compensation cases are essentially penal in nature, and are imposed to deter indifference and undesirable conduct by employers and their insurers toward injured workers. Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company United, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1096, 1108. While the benefits conferred by the Workers' Compensation Act are to be liberally construed, penal statutes are to be strictly construed. Trahan v. Coca Cola Bottling Company United, Inc., 894 So.2d at 1108. Thus, LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G) is a penal statute which must be strictly construed. Smith v. Quarles Drilling Company, XXXX-XXXX (La.10/29/04), 885 So.2d 562, 566. Notably, the application of LSA-R.S. 23:1201(G) concerns an employer's obligation, which arises neither because of a plaintiff's accident nor because of plaintiffs prior employment with an employer, but rather because of the employer's conduct after a final judgment. See McCoy v. KMB Transport, Inc., 98-1018 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/14/99), 734 So.2d 886, 890, writ denied, 99-2295 (La.11/24/99), 750 So.2d 986.
In the instant matter, notice of the judgment of this court, affirming the OWC's initial judgment, was mailed on December 28, 2006. See Barrios v. Lambar, Inc., XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/06), 951 So.2d 323.
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991 So. 2d 464, 2008 WL 1930525, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barrios-v-lambar-inc-lactapp-2008.