Barrientos v. Holder

374 F. App'x 51
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMay 11, 2010
Docket09-1474
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 374 F. App'x 51 (Barrientos v. Holder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barrientos v. Holder, 374 F. App'x 51 (1st Cir. 2010).

Opinion

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

An immigration judge (IJ) denied Consuelo Barrientos’ 1 application for asylum and withholding of removal and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal of that denial. The BIA also contemporaneously denied Barrientos’ motion to remand proceedings, a request based on a claim that Barrientos’ prior counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance amounted to a due process violation. On appeal to this court, Barrientos seeks review of both BIA determinations. After careful consideration, we deny Barrientos’ petition as to both issues.

I. Background

In 1992, Consuelo Barrientos entered the United States without inspection from Guatemala. She submitted three subsequent asylum applications, in 1992, 1998, and 2006. 2 In September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) for being present in the United States without having been previously admitted or paroled. Before *53 the IJ, Barrientos admitted the allegations in the NTA, conceded removability, and sought relief pursuant to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), asylum, withholding of removal, the Convention Against Torture, and voluntary departure.

The essence of Barrientos’ asylum claim was that she fled Guatemala in 1992 after being threatened by masked guerrillas who demanded she reveal the location of her now-deceased first husband, who had been a military commissioner in their town and who had fled Guatemala for the United States when the guerrillas threatened to Mil him. Given twelve days to tell the guerrillas where her husband was or face reprisals, Barrientos made provisions for her children in Guatemala and then fled alone to the United States. During her asylum hearing, she stated that she feared returning to Guatemala because there are “still a lot of groups in Guatemala” and “it’s still dangerous.” She also said she feared “groups that are going around killing people [and] committing terrorist acts.”

The IJ denied Barrientos’ NACARA application, finding that she did not meet the statutory requirement of a date of entry into the United States before October 1, 1990. Further, assuming the credibility of Barrientos’ written asylum application and oral testimony, the IJ denied asylum and withholding relief, concluding that her claim of persecution by the guerrillas did not meet the statutory requirements for past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ did grant Bar-rientos the limited remedy of voluntary departure.

The BIA dismissed Barrientos’ appeal of the IJ’s denial of asylum and withholding, concluding that she neither suffered past persecution nor had a well-founded fear of future persecution, and was thus ineligible for asylum and therefore also ineligible for the non-discretionary relief of withholding of removal.

As to Barrientos’ motion to remand proceedings based on her former counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance at the IJ hearing, the BIA concluded that there was no evidence of a denial of due process that would justify a remand:

The record indicates that prior counsel, the DHS attorney, and the Immigration Judge asked [Barrientos] questions relevant to the asylum application. [Bar-rientos] on appeal [has] not identified the facts or evidence that [she] was precluded from providing that were material to [her] application for relief from removal.

II. Discussion

A. Due Process Claim

We first address Barrientos’ appeal of the BIA’s denial of her due process claim. 3 Barrientos alleges that her counsel before the IJ provided ineffective assistance by asserting grounds for relief for which she was clearly ineligible, 4 failing to submit *54 proper documentation in support of those ineligible claims, and failing to prepare to present her asylum and withholding claims or background materials supporting those claims. Indeed, after the IJ determined that Barrientos was likely ineligible for relief under NACARA and cancellation of removal, he requested that counsel proceed by presenting Barrientos’ asylum claim, to which counsel replied, “I’m not prepared to go forward on that today, Judge.” The IJ replied:

Well, then you better be — get prepared because, you know, I, I, I put the case on so that we could get an idea as to whether or not there was some basis to the claim.

The IJ continued:

Well, you’re going to have to ask her about her asylum case. I mean, I’ve got an interpreter here, I set aside three hours. You can simply ask her why it is, if at all, she’s afraid to go back to Guatemala, if you’d like.

Counsel then proceeded to ask Barrientos why she fled Guatemala and whether she feared returning. Our review of the record shows that Barrientos cogently narrated the basis of her asylum and withholding claims, and that her oral account closely paralleled the one she gave in her written application as well as her recitation of the facts on appeal to the BIA and to this court. The record also shows that the IJ and counsel for the government had the opportunity to ask appropriate and probing questions of Barrientos regarding her claim of persecution.

“Ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir.1988) (internal quotation omitted); see also Guerrero-Santana v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir.2007); Betouche v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 147, 149 (1st Cir.2004). To succeed on such a due process claim, we have generally required the petitioner to show “a reasonable probability of prejudice” caused by former counsel’s performance. Saakian v. INS, 252 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2001); see also Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 (1st Cir.2007); Wang v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2004).

Though Barrientos styled her motion before the BIA as a motion to remand, “[a]s a procedural matter, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is typically raised through a motion to reopen, which can be brought before either the BIA or the IJ directly.” Saakian, 252 F.3d at 25. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Zeru, 503 F.3d at 71; Wang, 367 F.3d at 26-27.

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Bluebook (online)
374 F. App'x 51, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barrientos-v-holder-ca1-2010.