Barrie v. Garland

Opinion

20-1787 Barrie v. Garland BIA

A095 473 987

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand twenty- 5 three. 6 7 PRESENT: 8 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 10 EUNICE C. LEE, 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 AMADU M. BARRIE, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 20-1787 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 25 FOR PETITIONER: Justine A. Marous, Marous Law 26 Group, P.C., New York, NY.

2 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant 3 Attorney General; Paul Fiorino , 4 Senior Litigation Counsel; Kevin 5 J. Conway, Trial Attorney, Office 6 of Immigration Litigation, United 7 States Department of Justice, 8 Washington, DC.

9 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 10 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 11 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 12 is DENIED. 13 Petitioner Amadu M. Barrie, a native and citizen of 14 Sierra Leone, seeks review of a May 11, 2020, decision of the 15 BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to 16 pursue adjustment to lawful permanent resident status based 17 on a pending visa petition filed by his U.S. citizen wife. 18 In re Barrie, No. A095 473 987 (B.I.A. May 11, 2020). We 19 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 20 procedural history. 21 We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for 22 abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d 23 Cir. 2006). “An abuse of discretion may be found in those 24 circumstances where the Board’s decision provides no rational 25 explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies,

3

1 is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or 2 conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has 3 acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Kaur v. BIA, 4 413 F.3d 232, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks 5 omitted). 6 A noncitizen seeking to reopen removal proceedings 7 generally may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days 8 after the date on which the final administrative decision was 9 rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. 10 § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Barrie’s 2020 motion 11 to reopen was untimely because he filed it more than 12 years 12 after his 2007 removal order. 13 A movant who demonstrates ineffective assistance of 14 counsel may be entitled to equitable tolling of the deadline 15 for a motion to reopen. Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 16 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008). Barrie alleged that his prior 17 attorney was ineffective, principally for failing to file 18 documents in support of his appeal to the BIA or inform him 19 of the outcome of the appeal in time to petition this Court 20 for review. To qualify for tolling, a movant must — among 21 other things — demonstrate that he “exercised due diligence

4

1 during the entire period” to be tolled. Id. at 132; see also 2 Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2000). The movant 3 must demonstrate diligence during “both the period of time 4 before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should 5 have been discovered and the period from that point until the 6 motion to reopen is filed.” Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132; see 7 also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (movant 8 bears burden to establish diligence). Whether the movant 9 acted within a reasonable time depends on the circumstances 10 of each case, “namely, whether and when the ineffective 11 assistance was, or should have been, discovered by a 12 reasonable person in the situation.” Jian Hua Wang v. BIA, 13 508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and brackets 14 omitted). 15 The BIA did not err in concluding that Barrie failed to 16 exercise the diligence necessary for equitable tolling. 1 It 17 reasonably found, based on Barrie’s affirmation, that Barrie 18 learned that his former attorney failed to timely inform him

1 As Barrie’s untimely motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance does not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, , we do not reach the agency’s alternative finding that Barrie failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A.

1988).

1 of the BIA decision ordering his removal shortly after the 2 time to petition for review of that decision lapsed in 2007. 3 Barrie alleged that he sought the advice of other attorneys 4 beginning in 2011; but, even if those consultations 5 established a diligent pursuit of his rights between 2011 and 6 2020, Barrie offers no justification for his failure to act 7 between 2007 and 2011. We have found a lack of diligence 8 based on substantially shorter periods of inaction. See 9 Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132–33 (no diligence where petitioner 10 learned of BIA’s adverse decision, made one phone call to 11 counsel, and then waited 14 months to seek new counsel); Jian 12 Hua Wang, 508 F.3d at 715–16 (upholding denial of reopening 13 where petitioner waited eight months after discovering 14 ineffective assistance to file motion); Cekic, 435 F.3d at 15 171–72 (no diligence where petitioners waited two years after 16 discovering ineffective assistance and submitted no evidence 17 of actions taken); Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 134–35 (no diligence 18 where petitioner waited two years). 19 Absent equitable tolling, Barrie’s motion to reopen to 20 apply to adjust status was untimely. See Matter of Yauri, 21 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that

6

1 untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for 2 adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the 3 statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for 4 motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be 5 denied”); In re Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 6 (B.I.A. 2002) (listing timeliness as first requirement of 7 motion to reopen to adjust status). Accordingly, his motion 8 “could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua 9 sponte authority” to reopen despite the time limits. Mahmood 10 v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. 11 § 1003.2(a) (version in effect until Jan. 14, 2021). The BIA 12 invokes this authority only in “exceptional situations,” not 13 as a “general cure for filing defects or to otherwise 14 circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result 15 in hardship.” In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A. 16 1997). 17 The agency’s decision whether to exercise its sua sponte 18 reopening authority is “entirely discretionary” and not 19 subject to judicial review by this Court. Ali, 448 F.3d at 20 518. There is one exception: “where the [BIA] may have 21 declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it

7

1 misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, 2 that a reopening would necessarily fail, remand to the [BIA] 3 for reconsideration in view of the correct law is 4 appropriate.” Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469. Here, the agency 5 gave two reasons for denying sua sponte reopening: the absence 6 of exceptional circumstances, and Barrie’s failure to 7 demonstrate prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. 8 Barrie argues that the agency failed to adequately 9 consider evidence of hardship to his family, and it overlooked 10 or gave insufficient weight to evidence showing his 11 eligibility to adjust status, some of which had been filed in 12 support of a prior motion to reopen. As to hardship, the BIA 13 acknowledged Barrie’s contention that equities warranted a 14 favorable exercise of discretion, and “we presume that [the 15 agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before 16 [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.” 17 Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 18 (2d Cir. 2006). The BIA is not required to “expressly parse 19 or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of 20 evidence offered by the petitioner.” Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 21 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks

8

1 omitted). Additionally, the BIA’s sua sponte authority is 2 generally not a basis to relieve a petitioner of the hardship 3 of the filing limitations. See In re G-D-, 22 I. 4 & N. Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (B.I.A. 1999) (“As a general matter, 5 [the BIA] invoke[s] [its] sua sponte authority sparingly, 6 treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships created 7 by enforcement of the time and number limits in the 8 motions regulations, but as an extraordinary remedy reserved 9 for truly exceptional situations.”). 10 As to his eligibility for relief, Barrie provides no 11 authority for his implicit argument that the BIA was required 12 to consider evidence submitted in support of a prior motion 13 to reopen in adjudicating a later motion. Even taking that 14 evidence into account, the agency did not misperceive 15 Barrie’s eligibility to adjust to lawful permanent resident 16 status because there was no evidence that the visa petition 17 his wife had filed on his behalf had been approved. See 18 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (requiring an “immediately available” 19 immigrant visa for adjustment of status); see also Drax v. 20 Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2003).

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 3 stays VACATED.

4 FOR THE COURT: 5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 6 Clerk of Court