Barrie v. Costello

401 S.W.2d 707
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 30, 1966
Docket11379
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 401 S.W.2d 707 (Barrie v. Costello) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barrie v. Costello, 401 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

HUGHES, Justice.

This case, as it reaches us, is a contest over the custody of Carla Yvonne Lopez, born December 21, 1956, the daughter of appellant, Dolores Lopez Barrie, whose maternal grandmother is appellee, Ida Costello.

The custody issue was submitted to a jury which answered (1) Dolores Barrie is not a fit and proper person to have the custody and control of Carla (2) Ida Costello and her husband are fit and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of Carla (3) It is to the best interest of Carla that she be in the care, custody and control of Victor Costello, Jr. and Carla’s grandmother, Ida Costello (4) It is not to the best interest of Carla that she be in the care, custody and control of her mother, Dolores Barrie (5) Dolores Barrie did not voluntarily abandon and desert Carla for a period of two years prior to March 8, 1962 (6) the jury answered the following issue “she did.” “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that for a period of two years before March 8, 1962, Dolores Barrie did not contribute to the support of Carla Lopez” commensurate with her ability.

Upon this verdict, judgment was rendered awarding the care, custody and control of Carla to Mr. and Mrs. Costello.

Appellants’ first point is that the court erred in awarding custody and control of Carla to appellees because it was neither pleaded nor proved that Carla was a dependent and neglected child within the terms of Arts. 2330-2337, inc., Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Civ.St.

In support of this point appellants cite DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S.W.2d 687, Poss v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 726, Amarillo, writ ref., w. o. m., Oldfield v. Lester, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 722, Waco, n. w. h., and Daniel v. Watson, Tex.Civ.App., 249 S.W.2d 281, Waco, n. w. h.

We will not discuss these cases for the reason that it is obviously not the law that custody of minor children can only be litigated within the limitations of these statutes. To so hold would deny to all except residents of the county where the child was the authority to institute a suit for its custody. Art. 2331, supra. It would also have the effect of being in conflict with a multitude of custody cases where the issue of the child being dependent or neglected *709 was not present. Our experience is that parents who neglect their children and permit them to become dependent as defined in the above mentioned statutes usually do not fight for their custody. It is also our experience that in pure custody cases each party tries to show how much more he could do for the child than the other party could do. This is hut to say that in child custody cases it is the best interests of the child which is involved and litigated, and these cases may or not present issues of statutory neglect or dependency of the child. We quote from Davis v. Sears, 35 S.W.2d 99, Tex.Comm, of Appeals, a case which did not cite or discuss the above statutes, as follows:

“Under the common law, as well as the statute law of Texas the parents have the natural right to the custody and control of their child, and, in case of the death of one parent, the surviving parent has the right to its custody. Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.) 294 S.W. 525. But the parents’ right to the custody of their child, however, is not absolute, but is subject to judicial control, when the interest of the child demands it, and must yield, where the real and permanent interest of the child demands a different disposition.
* ⅜ * ⅝ ⅜ *
As a basis for the exercise of judicial control over the minor, in the absence of pleading and proof, that the parents are unfit to have the care and custody, of their child, as in this case, there must be pleading and proof, to the effect that the parents have voluntarily relinquished their natural and statutory right to have this care and custody.
* * ⅝ ⅝ ⅜ *
The authorities of this state, as well as those of other states, are almost uniform in holding that, in a contest for the custody of a minor, that person is entitled to such custody in whose custody the in= terest and welfare of the child will be best promoted.”

See Scozzari v. Curtis, Tex.Civ.App., 398 S.W.2d 819, Fort Worth, n. w. h.

Appellants’ first point is overruled.

Appellants’ second point is that there was no pleading or proof to sustain the findings of the jury that it was for the best interest of Carla that she be placed in the custody of appellees and not in the custody of appellants, and that the evidence in this respect was “insufficient.”

Appellants filed this suit which was in the nature of a habeas corpus proceeding but in which specific facts were alleged. Appellees denied these facts and alleged that appellants were unfit persons to have the custody of Carla and that, conversely, they, appellees, were fit persons to retain her custody and to be awarded her permanent custody. Facts supporting these allegations were alleged. Appellees also alleged that Mrs. Barrie had voluntarily relinquished permanent custody of Carla to Mrs. Costello. We find the pleadings sufficient.

The evidence in this case is very lengthy, repetitious and presents a sorry spectacle of bitterness and controversy between a mother and daughter over the custody of the granddaughter, Carla.

There is testimony that Mrs. Barrie was first married to a Robert Lopez, to which marriage Carla was born. This marriage was dissolved by divorce in 1957 in Albuquerque, N. M. The record does not disclose any further information about Mr. Lopez. After the divorce, Mrs. Barrie came to San Angelo, with the baby, and lived with her mother and Mr. Costello, where she attended business school for about two and one half months. She then went to Las Cruces, N. M. and stayed with her mother’s sister. She stayed there a short while and left her baby there and went to Los Angeles to look for work. In Los Angeles she stayed with her mother’s aunt. After three months she returned to Las Cruces for Carla and returned to Los Angeles. In 1958 Mrs. Barrie left Los *710 Angeles and went to Hot Springs (Truth or Consequences) N. M. where she stayed with her mother’s sister. She stayed in this town for about three months and then went to Alamogordo, N. M. where she and Carla stayed with her mother’s sister. This stay was for three weeks. She and Carla left Alamogordo for Miami, Florida with one Don Melton, with whom Mrs. Barrie lived without ceremonial marriage for the next three or four years. There is testimony that Don Melton, during this time, had a living wife.

Mrs. Barrie telephoned Mrs. Costello from Florida in 1958 and we quote Mrs. Costello’s testimony concerning this conversation and immediate subsequent events:

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