Barrett v. United States

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 24-5774
• Status: Published

Opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 24–5774. Argued October 7, 2025—Decided January 14, 2026 This case concerns the relationship between two provisions of 18 U. S. C. §924: subsection (c)(1)(A)(i), which criminalizes using, carrying, or pos- sessing a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, and subsection (j), which prescribes different penal- ties—including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment—when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death. The question presented is whether a single act that violates both provisions may yield two con- victions—one under each provision—or only one. The Second Circuit held that one such act may yield two convictions. The Second Circuit acknowledged that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) qualify as the same offense under the test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299. But it believed that, as construed in Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453, the two provisions are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative punishments. Because the Second Circuit’s decision deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, this Court granted certiorari. Held: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. The part of the Second Circuit’s judgment that held other- wise is reversed. Pp. 5–19. (a) When enacted, §924(c) “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry a firearm in connection with a predicate federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Abbott v. United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12. A §924(c) violation triggers a mandatory minimum sentence of at least five years. Congress later added §924(j) to provide a different penalty scheme for §924(c) violations that cause death. Section 924(j) has no 2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

mandatory minimums; it instead authorized significant maximum sentences, including the death penalty or life in prison when the un- derlying violation is murder. Pp. 5–8. (b) The question in this case is whether subsection (j) also increased the number of convictions (rather than just the maximum sentence) that can result from a fatal violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). The Court re- solves the question as a matter “of statutory construction,” because “whether punishments . . . are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 688. And the Court undertakes this exercise in statutory construction with a thumb on the scale in the form of the Blockburger presumption, which instructs that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. It is undisputed that §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the same offense per Blockburger. But the Court has said that the Blockburger presumption can yield to a plainly expressed contrary intent. This case therefore turns on whether Congress plainly expressed an intent to overcome the Block- burger presumption by authorizing multiple convictions for one act that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j). To ascertain such in- tent, the Court turns to statutory text, structure, and (for those who accept its help) legislative history. Pp. 8–10. (c) The text of §924 suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively, that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Congress included Block- burger-surmounting language twice within subsection (c) itself: It mandated that a §924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the pun- ishment provided for” the predicate, and it also mandated that a con- viction under §924(c)(5)—for using or carrying armor piercing ammu- nition—must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction under” §924. The Court has elsewhere called such “in addition to” language “crystal clear” evidence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger. But Congress used no similar lan- guage with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and sub- section (j). Pp. 10–14. (1) The argument that subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence man- date textually authorizes dual convictions misunderstands the in- quiry. Blockburger addresses the permissibility of multiple convic- tions, not just multiple sentences; the assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes, where punishment means a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sentence. Accordingly, §924(c)'s consecutive-sentence mandate simply speaks past the question in this case: whether one act may result in two con- victions. Before the consecutive-sentence mandate gains any Cite as: 607 U. S. ___ (2026) 3

relevance, a court must first determine whether two punishments (convictions) may be imposed at all. Only if two convictions may coex- ist does a court consult the consecutive-sentence mandate to arrange properly the resulting sentences. Pp. 11–13. (2) The argument that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) have dif- ferent focuses and thus target different wrongs that may be punished cumulatively is equally unavailing. The conduct (or result) that differ- entiates a greater offense from its lesser included offenses will often introduce some new focus, and that reality cannot do much to overcome the Blockburger presumption if the presumption is to retain its force. Pp. 13–14. (d) The statute’s operation and structure provide no indication Con- gress expressed any will to overcome Blockburger. Lora answers any concern that defendants convicted of and sentenced under subsection (j) will be rewarded with more lenient sentences than those convicted of the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. There the Court explained that subsection (j) eschews mandatory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility and reflects the seriousness of the offense using a different approach than subsection (c)’s mandatory minimum penalties—by au- thorizing the death penalty for murder and the same harsh punish- ment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaugh- ters. If prosecutors fear that a subsection (j) sentence will dip below what subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free to choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)’s low-end rigidity over subsection (j)’s high-end flexibility. Neither the physical separation in the U. S. Code between subsec- tion (c)(1) and subsection (j), nor the fact that subsection (j)’s sentenc- ing scheme operates without reference to subsection (c)’s, overcomes the Blockburger presumption. See Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856. If offenses share elements but have comprehensive, independently op- erating penalty schemes, that suggests Congress intended to place in front of prosecutors a menu, not a buffet. Any analogy to Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773, in which the Court found Blockburger overcome even without express statutory lan- guage disclaiming the presumption, is inapt. Garrett involved a con- tinuing criminal enterprise alleged to have spanned more than five years, and the continuing nature of the offense played a decisive role in the case. Garrett distinguished the facts there from what is involved here: the classic relation of the lesser included offense to the greater offense, wherein the very same conduct violates two statutes. Pp. 15– 19. 102 F. 4th 60, reversed in part and remanded. 4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and IV–B, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________

No. 24–5774 _________________

DWAYNE BARRETT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [January 14, 2026]

JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court, ex- cept as to Part IV–C.* This case concerns the relationship between two provi- sions of 18 U. S. C. §924. The first, §924(c)(1)(A)(i), crimi- nalizes using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in connec- tion with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. The second, §924(j), prescribes different penalties— including, in certain circumstances, capital punishment— when “a violation of subsection (c)” causes death. Every defendant subject to subsection (j) has also, neces- sarily, violated subsection (c). We consider here whether a defendant who commits a single act that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) may be convicted only under one provision or the other, or instead may suffer two convic- tions. All agree on the first step of the analysis: Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) define the same offense under the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). That consensus carries us most of the way to resolving this case, as we have long presumed that Con- gress intends to authorize only one conviction per offense. —————— *Part IV–C of this opinion is joined only by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN. 2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

We resolve the rest by concluding that this presumption holds true here: Congress intended subsection (j) as an al- ternative, not a supplement, to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i). At the very least, Congress did not clearly manifest a contrary intention, as it would have to do if it wished to authorize two convictions in these circumstances. We thus reverse in part the Second Circuit’s contrary judgment. I Dwayne Barrett committed a series of robberies between August 2011 and January 2012. During one, Barrett’s con- federate shot and killed Gamar Dafalla. Of the seven charges on which Barrett was convicted, three are relevant here. Count five charged Barrett with Hobbs Act robbery of Dafalla under 18 U. S. C. §1951. That count served as the predicate for two more: Count six charged Barrett with using a firearm during the commis- sion of a crime of violence in violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i),1 and count seven charged him with thereby causing death in violation of §924(j)(1).2 A jury found Barrett guilty on all seven counts, and the District Court sentenced Barrett to a total term of 90 years of imprisonment. Barrett has since been aided by two of our decisions. Af- ter we decided United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445 (2019), and vacated the Second Circuit’s disposition of Barrett’s

—————— 1 Count six of the indictment technically charged Barrett with violating

18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A)(iii), which applies when the firearm is dis- charged rather than simply used, carried, or possessed. See 102 F. 4th 60, 70, n. 8 (CA2 2024). But the jury was charged with finding only that Barrett possessed or used the firearm—a violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i), not (iii)—and the District Court sentenced him in line with §924(c)(1)(A)(i). Before us, all agree that Barrett’s count six conviction was for a violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). 2 In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Barrett sought review of

whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” such that it can serve as a predicate for a §924(c)(1) conviction. We did not grant certiorari on that question, and do not pass on it here. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

direct appeal in light of that decision, the Second Circuit vacated one of Barrett’s §924(c) convictions not at issue here. See 588 U. S. 918 (2019) (granting Barrett’s petition for a writ of certiorari, vacating the judgment, and remand- ing for further consideration in light of Davis); 937 F. 3d 126, 127–128 (2019) (vacating the conviction). The District Court then resentenced Barrett to 50 years in prison. Twenty of those years came from concurrent sentences on three Hobbs Act robbery counts, including, as relevant here, count five. Twenty-five years came from a consecutive term on count seven (the subsection (j) conviction), into which the District Court merged count six (the subsection (c) convic- tion).3 Then we decided Lora v. United States, 599 U. S. 453 (2023), which, like this case, addressed the relationship be- tween subsections (c) and (j). Lora held that subsection (j) does not incorporate subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate. That mandate requires a subsection (c) sentence to run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment im- posed on the person.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). It does not, we held in Lora, require the same of a subsection (j) sentence. Id., at 459. When the District Court sentenced Barrett in this case, it had been under the opposite impression. So Barrett appealed again, and, bound by Lora, the Second Circuit va- cated Barrett’s sentence and remanded for another resen- tencing. 102 F. 4th 60, 85–88 (2024). In doing so, the Court of Appeals also passed upon the question that now comes before us. The District Court, re- call, had declined to sentence Barrett separately on counts six (under subsection (c)) and seven (under subsection (j)), both of which had as their predicate the same fatal Dafalla robbery charged in count five. The Court of Appeals re- jected Barrett’s argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause —————— 3 The remaining five years, not relevant here, came from a consecutive

mandatory minimum sentence on a different §924(c) count. 4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

required the District Court to stay that course when the case returned for resentencing. The Court of Appeals did acknowledge that the Government regularly concedes that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) overlap and may not be punished cumulatively—a proposition with which the other circuits regularly agree. Id., at 91, and n. 29 (collecting cases). And it recognized that the two provisions qualify as the same offense under the governing test laid out in Block- burger. 102 F. 4th, at 89–90. But it believed that, “[a]s con- strued in Lora,” the two provisions “are separate offenses for which Congress has clearly authorized cumulative pun- ishments.” Id., at 89. Textually, the court pointed to §924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s mandate that a subsection (c) sentence must run consecutively to any other sentence—including, the court reasoned, to one under subsection (j). Id., at 90–91. Practically, the court high- lighted that a contrary ruling would permit defendants who commit especially serious subsection (c) offenses—ones re- sulting in death—to escape subsection (c)’s mandatory min- imums, despite “Congress’s intent for every defendant con- victed under that statute . . . to be incarcerated for no less than the stated minimum term.” Id., at 90; see also id., at 93–94. And, turning to precedent, the court perceived our statement in Lora that subsection (j) evinced a “ ‘different approach to punishment’ ” than subsection (c) to establish that the two provisions define different offenses raising no double jeopardy concerns. 102 F. 4th, at 92–93 (quoting 599 U. S., at 462). The Court of Appeals therefore instructed the District Court to impose separate convictions and sen- tences on counts six and seven. Because the Second Circuit’s decision deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, we granted certiorari. 604 U. S. ___ (2025).4 And because the Government agrees with —————— 4 The Second Circuit’s decision aligned with United States v. Julian,

633 F. 3d 1250, 1256–1257 (CA11 2011). It diverged from most appellate Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

Barrett, we appointed an amicus curiae to defend the Sec- ond Circuit’s judgment.5 We now reverse the Second Cir- cuit’s judgment in relevant part. II A When Congress passed 18 U. S. C. §924(c) in 1968, the new subsection “made it a discrete offense” to use or carry a firearm in connection with a federal crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, known as predicates. Abbott v. United States, 562 U. S. 8, 12 (2010).6 The original statute left open two questions relevant to today’s case. It did not specify whether a subsection (c) conviction could coexist with, or instead must displace, a conviction for the under- lying predicate. And assuming two convictions could coex- ist, it did not specify whether the two resulting sentences should run concurrently or consecutively. Congress answered both questions in 1971. On the first, Congress made clear that a subsection (c) conviction must be “ ‘in addition to the punishment provided for the commis- sion of ’ ” the predicate; that is, a violation of subsection (c) ought to result in two convictions, one for subsection (c) and one for the predicate. §13, 84 Stat. 1890. On the second, Congress mandated that the two resulting sentences run —————— courts that have considered the question. See United States v. Ortiz- Orellana, 90 F. 4th 689, 705 (CA4 2024) (“[A] sentencing court may not impose cumulative punishments for §924(c) and §924(j) if those viola- tions are based on the same conduct” (citing United States v. Palacios, 982 F. 3d 920, 924–925 (CA4 2020)); United States v. Gonzales, 841 F. 3d 339, 358 (CA5 2016) (similar); United States v. García-Ortiz, 657 F. 3d 25, 28–29 (CA1 2011) (similar). 5 We appointed Charles L. McCloud to brief and argue the case in sup-

port of the judgment below. 604 U. S. ___ (2025). Mr. McCloud has ably discharged his responsibilities. 6 In response to our decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137

(1995), Congress later added “possession” to the list of subsection (c)’s proscriptions, alongside use and carry. See United States v. O’Brien, 560 U. S. 218, 232–233 (2010). 6 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

consecutively, not concurrently: “ ‘[T]he term of imprison- ment imposed under this subsection [shall not] run concur- rently with any term of imprisonment imposed for’ ” the predicate. Ibid. Congress later extended this second feature—the consec- utive-sentence mandate—beyond the relationship between subsection (c)’s sentence and the predicate’s sentence, so that the consecutive-sentence mandate applies as between a subsection (c) sentence and “any other term of imprison- ment.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii); see United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5 (1997). Congress did not, however, expand the double-conviction mandate. That mandate still instructs only that a subsection (c)(1) conviction shall be “in addition to the punishment provided for [the underlying] crime of vi- olence or drug trafficking crime”—that is, the predicate. §924(c)(1)(A). Subsection (c) can be violated in several ways but all trig- ger mandatory minimum sentences. Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of five years; other provisions within subsection (c)(1) impose mandatory minimums up to life in prison, depending on the use and type of weapon and the defendant’s recidivist history. See §924(c)(1).7 So if the predicate offense carries a mandatory minimum sentence of its own, then a defendant will face “ ‘two consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for the single use of a single firearm.’ ” Abbott, 562 U. S., at 20. This case asks whether a different subsection of §924, subsection (j), piles yet another layer of punishment atop— resulting in three stacked convictions and sentences—or in- stead provides an alternative to subsection (c)(1)(A)(i).

—————— 7 This too has changed over the years. Subsection (c) originally em-

ployed mandatory sentences—exactly 5 years, exactly 10, and so on. See O’Brien, 560 U. S., at 229. The statute traded its mandatory sentences for mandatory minimums—with no maximums—in 1998. Ibid. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 7

B Subsection (j) arrived “decades after subsection (c).” Lora, 599 U. S., at 457. Congress added it in 1994, in a pro- vision entitled “Death Penalty for Gun Murders During Federal Crimes of Violence and Drug Trafficking Crimes.” §60013, 108 Stat. 1973. The new subsection supplied a dif- ferent penalty scheme for subsection (c) violations that cause death. Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) did not impose mandatory minimums. Instead, it authorized sig- nificant maximum sentences—including, true to the new provision’s name, the death penalty if the underlying viola- tion is a murder: “A person who, in the course of a violation of subsec- tion (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall— “(1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111), be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and “(2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in sec- tion 1112), be punished as provided in that section.” §924(j). The references to §1111 and §1112 relate to the pre-exist- ing murder and manslaughter statutes, respectively. Sec- tion 1111 sets a maximum penalty of death or life impris- onment for murder. 18 U. S. C. §1111(b). And §1112 sets a maximum penalty of 15 years for voluntary manslaughter and 8 years for involuntary manslaughter. §1112(b). Subsection (j) gave federal prosecutors tools they lacked both in the pre-existing subsection (c) and in the pre-exist- ing murder and manslaughter statutes. Subsection (c) does not authorize the death penalty, for example. Subsection (j) thus raised the ceiling of punishments §924 authorized, and, in doing so, offered prosecutors flexibility of another sort: time. See §3281 (“An indictment for any offense pun- ishable by death may be found at any time without 8 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

limitation”). Section 1111—the general federal murder statute—did already authorize the death penalty. But its jurisdictional reach, as well as that of the manslaughter statute (§1112), is limited to “the special maritime and ter- ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.” §§1111(b), 1112(b).8 The new subsection (j) had no such geographical limitation; it borrowed instead subsection (c)’s broader ju- risdictional hook. So subsection (j) expanded federal juris- diction over more killings and authorized the death penalty for those amounting to murder. III This case asks whether subsection (j) also increased the number of convictions—rather than simply the maximum sentence—that can result from a fatal violation of §924(c)(1)(A)(i). Barrett says it did not, and for support he turns to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. But while his argument arrives in constitutional garb, it “cannot be separated entirely from a resolution of the ques- tion of statutory construction.” Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 688 (1980). That is because “the question whether punishments . . . are unconstitutionally multiple cannot be resolved without determining what punishments the Legislative Branch has authorized.” Ibid. It is that question of congressional authorization that we answer to- day.9

—————— 8 The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States” covers, among other things, “lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdic- tion thereof.” 18 U. S. C. §7(3). It also pertains to locations like certain “island[s], rock[s], or key[s] containing deposits of guano,” §7(4), and spaceships “while . . . in flight.” §7(6). 9 Because we conclude that Congress did not authorize two convictions

in this context, we need not revisit whether Congress could do so con- sistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause. See post, at 4 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part). Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 9

We undertake this exercise in statutory interpretation with a thumb on the scale, in the form of the Blockburger presumption. Named for Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, the presumption instructs “that Congress ordi- narily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.” Whalen, 445 U. S., at 691–692. The first step in the inquiry, then, is to determine whether §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the “same of- fense.” To make that determination, Blockburger requires us to compare the provisions in question and ask whether “each . . . requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” 284 U. S., at 304. If the answer is yes, then the offenses prescribed by each statute are different and the inquiry generally ends. If the answer is no, then the statutes define the same offense, and the Blockburger presumption is trig- gered. But because we have treated Blockburger as “a rule of statutory construction to help determine legislative intent,” we have said that its presumption can yield to a “plainly expressed” intent to abandon it. Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773, 778–779 (1985); see also Whalen, 445 U. S., at 692 (requiring “a clear indication of contrary legislative intent”). Accordingly, the second step of today’s analysis requires us to search for a clear manifestation of Congress’s intent to authorize more than one punishment. All involved in this case share common ground as to the first step of the analysis. The Court of Appeals, Barrett, the Government, and Court-appointed amicus agree that §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j) define the same offense.10 After all, the relationship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and —————— 10 We express no view as to whether the same is true as to other ver-

sions of the §924(c) offense, as Barrett was convicted under §924(c)(1)(A)(i). Put differently, while we recognize that §924(c) can be violated in a number of ways, this case involves only the base offense found at §924(c)(1)(A)(i). Our holding therefore applies only to that clause. 10 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

subsection (j) is “the classic relation of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense,” wherein “[t]he very same conduct” violates two statutes, one which is fully subsumed within the other. Garrett, 471 U. S., at 787. And all lesser included offenses are the “same” as their greater cousins under Blockburger. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 231 (1998) (“[T]he federal courts have [long] presumed that Congress does not intend for a defend- ant to be cumulatively punished for two crimes where one crime is a lesser included offense of the other”). This case therefore turns on the analysis’s second step: discerning whether Congress clearly intended to authorize multiple convictions for one act that violates both §924(c)(1)(A)(i) and §924(j). To ascertain such intent, we turn to statutory text, structure, and (for those who accept its help) legislative history. See Garrett, 471 U. S., at 779; United States v. Woodward, 469 U. S. 105, 109 (1985) (per curiam) (consulting “[a]ll guides to legislative intent”). Only if those tools leave us certain that Congress intended to break from its normal practice and authorize multiple convictions for the same offense will we shed the presump- tion. IV A We begin with the text. Textual clues are critical because “Congress [i]s aware of the Blockburger rule and legislate[s] with it in mind.” Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 342 (1981). So Congress typically includes Blockburger- surmounting language when it wishes to authorize dual convictions for the same offense. See Brief for Petitioner 28, n. 3 (listing examples). 1 The text of §924 suggests strongly, perhaps conclusively, that Congress did not disavow Blockburger here. Not for Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 11

lack of know-how: Congress twice wrote Blockburger-sur- mounting language into subsection (c) itself. Congress mandated that a §924(c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate, and it also mandated that a §924(c)(5) conviction—for using or carry- ing “armor piercing ammunition”—must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction under” §924. See §§924(c)(1)(A), (c)(5). We have elsewhere called such “in addition to” language “crystal clear” evi- dence of a legislature’s intent to overcome Blockburger. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 362, 368 (1983).11 In short, “[w]hen Congress has the will” to authorize dual convictions for the same offense, Congress “has no difficulty in expressing it.” Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83 (1955). But Congress used no similar language with respect to the interplay between subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j). Its silence on the topic speaks volumes. See Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 341–342. 2 Like the Court of Appeals, see 102 F. 4th, at 90–93, ami- cus challenges the premise of this assessment: He insists that Congress has textually authorized dual convictions un- der subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j). For proof, he points to subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate. It reads: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law . . . no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence

—————— 11 Significant too is the fact that Congress added the “ ‘in addition to’ ”

language to §924(c)(1) in 1971, see §13, 84 Stat. 1890, and passed §924(c)(5) in 2005, see §6(b), 119 Stat. 2102. Congress thus demon- strated its ability to overcome Blockburger in subsection (c) both before and after it passed subsection (j) in 1994. 12 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

or drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). As amicus would have it, this instruction permits—actu- ally, requires—a subsection (c)(1) conviction to add on to any other conviction, including one under subsection (j). This deployment of the consecutive-sentence mandate misunderstands today’s inquiry. The argument attempts to make Blockburger purely about sentences—so that an in- struction to run sentences consecutively rather than con- currently makes clear Congress’s intent to overcome the presumption. But Blockburger addresses the permissibility of multiple convictions, not just multiple sentences. “The assumption underlying the Blockburger rule is that Con- gress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes,” where “punishment” means “a criminal conviction and not simply the imposition of sen- tence.” Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856, 861 (1985). It is for this reason that running sentences concurrently does not avoid the problem; an unauthorized “ ‘second conviction, even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.’ ” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. 292, 302 (1996) (quoting Ball, 470 U. S., at 865). Accordingly, §924(c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate simply speaks past the question in this case: whether one act may result in two convictions. To that question it is no answer to say, as the consecutive-sentence mandate does, that a “term of imprisonment imposed” for a conviction shall run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment imposed.” §924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Before the consecutive-sen- tence mandate gains any relevance, a court must first de- termine whether two punishments (convictions) may be im- posed at all. Only if two convictions may coexist does a court consult the consecutive-sentence mandate, to arrange properly the resulting sentences. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 13

This description is not merely the law as it exists; it is the law as Congress understands it. When Congress amended subsection (c) in 1971, it added two distinct instructions, as recited above. The first—that a subsection (c)(1) conviction must be “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate—answers the threshold question: May one act spawn two convictions, one for subsection (c)(1) and one for the predicate? The second—the consecutive-sentence man- date—answers the follow-on question: Presuming the exist- ence of two convictions, should their resulting sentences run concurrently or consecutively? Cf. Dean v. United States, 581 U. S. 62, 69–70 (2017) (describing these provi- sions as “two” distinct “limitations”). Amicus would have the second instruction answer the first question. But Con- gress has already addressed it: A subsection (c)(1) convic- tion adds to the predicate conviction. See §924(c)(1)(A). No- where does the statute prescribe the same in relation to a subsection (j) conviction.12 3 Amicus’s second textual argument is equally unavailing. Turning away from the concrete and toward the abstract, amicus tells us that subsection (c)(1) and subsection (j) have different focuses. Subsection (c)(1), he points out, calibrates its punishments to “the use of the firearm, the type of fire- arm, and recidivism.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 10. By contrast, subsection (j) focuses on something —————— 12 Section 924(c) is not unique in this way. Congress frequently gives

these two distinct instructions, understanding that one speaks to the dual-conviction question and the other to the sentence-arrangement is- sue. See, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §§1028A(a)(2) (instructing that a conviction for using false identification during and in relation to certain predicate fel- onies shall be “in addition to the punishment provided for such felony”), and (b)(2) (requiring in certain circumstances that the resulting addi- tional sentence run consecutively to “any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person under any other provision of law, including any term of imprisonment imposed for the [predicate] felony”). 14 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

“irrelevant” to subsection (c)(1): the harm (namely, death) inflicted. Ibid. From this amicus urges us to conclude that the two subsections “target different wrongs” and thus may be punished cumulatively. Ibid.; see also id., at 17–18. In our search for congressional intent, we might in some circumstances think that when two provisions focus on en- tirely “different interests,” that suggests Congress intended them to accumulate rather than swap out. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 724 (1993) (White, J., con- curring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 343 (observing that the Court’s con- clusion about the permissibility of dual convictions was “re- inforced by the fact that the two . . . statutes are directed to separate evils”). Whatever those circumstances, this is not one. Amicus stretches to find a common thread running throughout subsection (c)(1)—he bundles firearm use, fire- arm type, and recidivism and places them in opposition to harm. But it is not obvious that those three features form a theme of any significance such that they can create the contrast amicus wants to glean from them. In any event, the conduct (or result) that differentiates a greater offense from its lesser included offenses will often introduce some new “focus.” That reality cannot do much to overcome the Blockburger presumption if the presump- tion is to retain its force. See, e.g., Whalen, 445 U. S., at 691, n. 6, 693–694 (Blockburger not overcome, despite some contrary statutory language, for convictions on charges of (1) rape and (2) killing in the course of rape); Illinois v. Vi- tale, 447 U. S. 410, 420–421 (1980) (Blockburger not over- come as between felony and felony murder); Harris v. Ok- lahoma, 433 U. S. 682, 682–683 (1977) (per curiam) (same). In sum, if Congress expressed any will to overcome Block- burger in this scenario, it must be found somewhere other than the statutory text. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 15

B Failing textual support, amicus turns to the statute’s op- eration and structure. But this ground proves only slightly more fertile. Primarily, amicus fears that defendants con- victed of and sentenced under subsection (j) will be re- warded with more lenient sentences than those convicted of the less serious subsection (c)(1) offense. He points out that subsection (c)(1) imposes mandatory minimums while sub- section (j) speaks in terms of maximums. And he insists that, rather than let subsection (j) offenders out from under subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory minimums, Congress must have intended to authorize subsection (c)(1)’s mandatory minimums plus any punishment doled out under subsec- tion (j). Cf. Abbott, 562 U. S., at 21 (rejecting construction of §924(c) under which “the worst offenders would often se- cure the shortest sentences”). Lora answers this concern without breaking a sweat. There, we explained that subsection (j)—along with several other provisions enacted simultaneously—“eschews man- datory penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility.” 599 U. S., at 462. It was not lost on us in Lora, nor is it now, that subsection (j) defines an especially serious offense. Subsection (j) simply “reflects th[at] seriousness . . . using a different approach than subsection (c)’s mandatory penal- ties”: by authorizing the death penalty for murder and “the same harsh punishment that the Federal Criminal Code prescribes for other manslaughters.” Id., at 463. It is for this reason, among others, that Lora—anticipating the question this case presents—explained that our conclusion in that case “aligns with” the mutually exclusive relation- ship between subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) and subsection (j) that we endorse today. Id., at 461. Just as subsection (j)’s seriousness is not lost on us, we are confident—as Congress apparently was—that it will not be lost on sentencing judges. Bound by 18 U. S. C. §3553(a) to craft a sentence that, among other considerations, 16 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

reflects “the seriousness of the offense” and avoids “unwar- ranted sentence disparities” among similarly situated de- fendants, sentencing judges will doubtless recognize the relevance of a victim’s death when sentencing under sub- section (j). Amicus’s worry thus strikes us as more theoret- ical than realistic. But if it threatens to manifest, it is not without remedy: If, in a given case, prosecutors fear that a subsection (j) sentence will dip below what subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) would otherwise guarantee, they are free to choose subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)’s low-end rigidity over subsec- tion (j)’s high-end flexibility. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 860– 861, nn. 7–8.13 There is a textual answer to this concern, too, and here (again) §924(c)(5) plays the foil. That provision, which per- tains to the use of armor-piercing ammunition, states that, “in addition to the punishment provided for” the predicate “or conviction under this section,” a defendant shall face a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years “and,” if death results, shall be sentenced in accordance with a scheme that mirrors subsection (j)’s. (Emphasis added.) This illus- trates that, when Congress wished to preserve a mandatory minimum it feared might otherwise disappear, it so speci- fied. But subsection (j), we explained in Lora, is “cast from a different mold.” 599 U. S., at 461. Next, amicus highlights the physical separation in the U. S. Code between subsections (c)(1) and (j). And he un- derscores their independent operation, emphasizing that

—————— 13 Amicus molds this same basic argument into many forms, sketching

situations in which the maximum sentence under subsection (j) could, at times, dip below the minimum sentence under subsection (c)(1) (though not under subsection (c)(1)(A)(i)). See, e.g., Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 47, n. 8. But the most this line of attack shows is that Congress could rationally have designed subsection (j) to supplement ra- ther than provide an alternative to subsection (c)(1). It does not come close to showing that Congress actually intended to do so, much less that it has clearly indicated such intent. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 17

subsection (j)’s sentencing scheme operates without refer- ence to subsection (c)’s. We have not bought such arguments before. Consider, for instance, the statutes at issue in Ball—statutes whose elements overlapped but whose sentencing schemes di- verged. Those provisions, which were then located at 18 U. S. C. §§922(h) and 1202(a), prohibited certain categories of people from, respectively, receiving and possessing cer- tain firearms. The provisions occupied parts of the Code much farther apart than the subsections of §924 at issue here. And in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114 (1979), we explained that each statute, “in conjunction with its own sentencing provision, operate[d] independently of the other,” such that the statutes were “each fully enforce- able on [their] own terms.” Id., at 118–121. We therefore concluded that the provisions did not incorporate each other’s penalties. Id., at 119. Yet, six years later (in Ball), we concluded that the two independent provisions were also mutually exclusive under Blockburger. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 861–864. What Batchelder is to Ball, Lora is to this case. Subsec- tion (j) shares subsection (c)’s elements but not its sentenc- ing scheme. See Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459. “Instead, sub- section (j) supplies its own comprehensive set of penalties that apply instead of subsection (c)’s.” Id., at 460. And as in Ball, this dynamic magnifies (rather than eliminates) the likelihood that the Blockburger presumption holds true. Af- ter all, if offenses that share elements—as they must to sat- isfy Blockburger—have penalties that operate on their own rather than by reference to each other, see Batchelder, 442 U. S., at 118–121; Lora, 599 U. S., at 458–459, that sug- gests Congress intended to place in front of prosecutors a menu, not a buffet. Accord, Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 156–157 (1977) (plurality opinion) (one provi- sion’s “comprehensive penalty structure” indicated that it 18 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

was not intended to supplement a lesser included provi- sion). Finally, amicus analogizes this case to Garrett, in which we found Blockburger overcome even without express stat- utory language disclaiming the presumption. Garrett ex- amined the relationship between the continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute and its constituent offenses. See 471 U. S., at 779–781. The distinctions from Garrett are legion, because the jus- tifications we offered for that decision are legion. But, most straightforwardly, Garrett distinguished “the classic rela- tion of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense,” wherein “[t]he very same conduct” violates two statutes. Id., at 787 (contrasting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (1977), which involved joyriding and auto theft—both of which were violated by driving a stolen car). In Garrett, by con- trast, “the continuing criminal enterprise was alleged to have spanned more than five years.” 471 U. S., at 788. The Court did not believe that Congress wished to require the Government to choose between prosecuting the defendant for early predicates and forfeiting a later CCE charge, on the one hand, and allowing him to go on breaking the law to preserve the possibility of a CCE charge, on the other. Id., at 788–790. The continuing nature of the offense played a decisive role in the case: “One who insists that the music stop and the piper be paid at a particular point,” we reasoned, “must at least have stopped dancing himself be- fore he may seek such an accounting.” Id., at 790.14

—————— 14 We have also explained that Garrett “merely adhered to our under-

standing that legislatures have traditionally perceived a qualitative dif- ference between conspiracy-like crimes and the substantive offenses upon which they are predicated.” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. 292, 300–301, n. 12 (1996). The case before us now does not implicate that dynamic. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 19

Opinion of JACKSON, J.

Today’s circumstances are markedly different. Here, we have nothing more than “the classic relation of the ‘lesser included offense’ to the greater offense.” Id., at 787. C Amicus turns finally to legislative history. We have said that legislative history may “fortif[y]” a conclusion that Congress intends to overcome Blockburger. See Garrett, 471 U. S., at 782. But the legislative history amicus offers pertains to double convicting for subsection (c) and its pred- icates—a practice Congress expressly authorized in the text. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 26–28. For obvious reasons, this is unhelpful data for interpreting the relationship between subsections (c) and (j). If any- thing, it illuminates the sort of discussion that character- izes congressional deliberation over legislation that does in- tend to authorize cumulative punishment—and thus highlights the notable absence of any similar deliberation over subsection (j). See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 5–10. Rather, the only legislative history that is relevant to to- day’s inquiry accords with Barrett’s understanding of sub- section (j). That legislative history suggests that, rather than stacking punishment or creating a brand “[n]ew . . . offens[e],” subsection (j) (at the time styled subsection (i)) “made” a “capital offens[e]” out of a “[p]re-existing crim[e]”—the one at subsection (c). Cong. Research Serv., C. Doyle, Crime Control Act of 1994: Capital Punishment Provisions Summarized, pp. 3–4 (94–721 S, 1994); see also 140 Cong. Rec. 11158 (1994) (Sen. Biden remarking that the new provision “says if you are guilty of committing a crime that results in the death of an individual through the use of a gun, you are eligible for the death penalty, assuming it is a Federal crime”). Like its silence in the statutory text, Congress’s debate- floor silence says a lot. The Blockburger presumption is 20 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

“long-settled,” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 710 (2019), muscular, and fundamental to our law. We think it highly unlikely that the “ ‘lawyer’s body’ ” that is Congress, Albernaz, 450 U. S., at 341 (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U. S. 587, 594 (1961)), discarded Blockburger without comment here. * * * Congress has not authorized convictions under both 18 U. S. C. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for one act that violates both provisions. The part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that held otherwise is reversed, and the case is re- manded for further proceedings consistent with this opin- ion. It is so ordered. Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 1

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part

DWAYNE BARRETT, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT [January 14, 2026]

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in part. On the morning of December 12, 2011, Dwayne Barrett participated in an armed robbery that left a man dead. For this, Mr. Barrett was convicted twice in federal court. Once for using a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). And once for causing a death during a §924(c) violation in violation of §924(j). 102 F. 4th 60, 67 (CA2 2024). For his two convictions, the Second Circuit or- dered two separate punishments: a prison term for his §924(c)(1)(A) violation, plus another, consecutive prison term for his §924(j) violation. All of which raises the ques- tion: If Mr. Barrett is convicted and punished for both crimes, has he been “twice put in jeopardy” for “the same offence” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause? U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. There is no doubt how we would answer that question if the government had prosecuted Mr. Barrett under §924(c)(1)(A) and §924(j) in two successive proceedings. The analysis would begin and end with Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932). Under Blockburger, two provisions create the same offense for double jeopardy purposes unless each provision has an element the other lacks. Id., at 304. Here, all agree that §924(c)(1)(A) has no element that §924(j) lacks. So the two provisions create the same offense, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would bar 2 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

the second prosecution. United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696 (1993). What happens, though, where (as here) the government brings two charges for the same offense concurrently in the same proceeding rather than successively in two separate ones? That question does not appear to have arisen much in our Nation’s early years. Maybe it didn’t in part because criminal codes were considerably thinner then, affording prosecutors fewer opportunities to bring overlapping charges. Maybe it didn’t in part, too, because of the tradi- tional maxim that “an indictment should not include more than one felony,” which left multiple-count indictments vul- nerable to being quashed by trial judges. Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 403 (1894). But if the question didn’t arise much in the past, it is of obvious relevance in our times. These days, federal and state criminal codes have exploded, with scores of repetitive offenses on the books. Frequently, also, today’s prosecutors bring as many over- lapping felony charges as they can in a single case to see what will stick, and courts often tolerate the practice. The litigants before us proceed on the unexamined prem- ise that Blockburger works differently in concurrent prose- cutions than it does in successive ones. In concurrent pros- ecutions, they assume, Blockburger operates as a mere “presumption” for ascertaining congressional “inten[t].” E.g., Brief for Petitioner 2 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). Because §924(c)(1)(A) and §924(j) create the same of- fense under Blockburger, they say, we should presume that just one of Mr. Barrett’s convictions can stand unless Con- gress has clearly directed otherwise. The only question that divides the litigants is whether, in fact, Congress included clear directions in §924 authorizing both convictions. See Brief for Petitioner 18–26; Brief for United States 15–23; Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae 15–28. Addressing the case as the litigants have framed it, the Court today holds that nothing in §924 overcomes the Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3

“Blockburger presumption,” so only one of Mr. Barrett’s con- victions can stand. Ante, at 1–2, 9. I agree with that as far as it goes. But it’s also hard not to wonder where the liti- gants’ presumptive version of Blockburger comes from. If the Constitution always prohibits the government from se- curing two convictions for the same offense in successive prosecutions, why would it sometimes tolerate a different result in concurrent prosecutions? One thing here is certain. The litigants framed this case the way they did because our cases speak confusingly about the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in concurrent pros- ecutions. This Court has sometimes said that the Clause “ ‘protects against multiple punishments for the same of- fense.’ ” Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 717 (1969)). And we have held that multiple convictions for the same of- fense—even when secured in a single proceeding—count as multiple punishments. Ball v. United States, 470 U. S. 856, 865 (1985). From this, it would seem to follow that Con- gress cannot authorize multiple convictions for the same of- fense in concurrent prosecutions. But this Court has also sometimes said that, in the concurrent-prosecution context, the Clause merely directs courts to ascertain statutory meaning accurately. “ ‘The question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible,’” we once wrote, “‘is no dif- ferent from the question of what punishments the Legisla- tive Branch intended to be imposed.’ ” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U. S. 359, 368 (1983) (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U. S. 333, 344 (1981); emphasis added; altera- tion omitted); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U. S. 773, 778 (1985). Someday, we will need to resolve the tension in our case law. And when we do, I see two likely solutions. One would be to say out loud what some of our cases imply: that the constitutional phrase “the same offence,” Amdt. 5, means different things in different contexts. In the successive- 4 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

prosecution context, two charges amount to the same of- fense if they fail the Blockburger test. But in the concur- rent-prosecution context, two charges amount to the same offense only if they fail the Blockburger test and Congress has not clearly intended punishment under both. That so- lution, though, would be a curious one indeed. Not only would it allow Congress to permit in the concurrent-prose- cution context what we have long held the Constitution for- bids in the successive-prosecution context. Really, it is a little “embarrassing to assert that the single term ‘same of- fence’ ” in the Double Jeopardy Clause “has two different meanings.” Dixon, 509 U. S., at 704. A second solution would be to recognize, as others of our cases imply, that two charges amount to the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause if they fail the Block- burger test—full stop. So a defendant cannot be prosecuted for both charges in successive proceedings. Nor may he be convicted twice (much less sentenced twice) for both charges just because they happen to be brought concur- rently. True, this approach would require us to admit that Blockburger is not, after all, a mere presumption in the con- current-prosecution context. But saying that much would give the constitutional phrase “the same offence” a con- sistent meaning and treat like cases alike. Nor would taking that step represent some giant leap. Our cases discussing Blockburger as a mere presumption in the concurrent-prosecution context were decided during a relatively brief period when this Court didn’t take Block- burger very seriously in any context, even when it came to successive prosecutions. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U. S. 508, 510 (1990) (finding a double jeopardy violation based on a same-transaction test, divorced from Blockburger). Since then, however, we have expressly renounced that ap- proach, reaffirming that Blockburger’s “long-settled rule” controls what counts as “an ‘offence’ for double jeopardy purposes” in successive prosecutions. Gamble v. United Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 5

States, 587 U. S. 678, 710 (2019); see also Dixon, 509 U. S., at 696, 704 (overruling Grady). Tellingly, too, in all the years since Dixon, we have not found a single case in which the “Blockburger presumption” against concurrent prosecu- tions for the same offense was, in fact, overcome by a clear congressional command. Cf. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U. S. 292, 303 (1996) (rejecting the government’s argument that “the presumption against allowing multiple punish- ments for the same crime” was “overcome”). In short, the analytical foundations of the presumptive version of Block- burger have been gravely undermined by subsequent devel- opments. Perhaps some might worry about the consequences of this second solution. Today, after all, prosecutors routinely bring concurrent charges for greater offenses and their lesser included variants, giving juries several degrees of culpability to choose from. One might wonder whether af- fording the Double Jeopardy Clause the same meaning in the concurrent-prosecution context that it already enjoys in the successive-prosecution context would render this prac- tice illegal. It would not. A jury could reach a guilty verdict on two charges that constitute the same offense, but no dou- ble jeopardy problem would arise so long as the court does not enter judgments of conviction on both. It may not be clear at a trial’s outset which charge (if any) will yield a conviction. But it will be certain all along that, when judg- ment day comes, the defendant will be convicted and pun- ished only once for any given offense. See Ball, 470 U. S., at 865. Today, to be sure, the Court has no occasion to tangle with any of this. The parties have not asked us to address the tension in our case law. Nor does anything here turn on its resolution, given the Court’s holding that one of Mr. Barrett’s convictions must go even under the merely pre- sumptive version of Blockburger. All this, the Court rightly takes care to acknowledge. See ante, at 8, n. 10 (“Because 6 BARRETT v. UNITED STATES

we conclude that Congress did not authorize two convic- tions in this context, we need not revisit whether Congress could do so consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause”). On that understanding, I join all but Part IV–C of JUSTICE JACKSON’s opinion. But while today’s decision is correct as far as it goes, sooner or later we will have to clear up the confusion—and to my eyes, this case serves as a poster child for how that confusion should be resolved. Mr. Barrett really was charged twice for one offense. He really was convicted twice. Before our intervention, he really was set to be criminally punished twice. And whatever Con- gress might or might not intend, that is double jeopardy.