Barrett v. Butler

184 S.E. 433, 52 Ga. App. 704, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 229
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 27, 1936
Docket24736
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 184 S.E. 433 (Barrett v. Butler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barrett v. Butler, 184 S.E. 433, 52 Ga. App. 704, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

Broyles, C. J.

E. M. Barrett brought suit, in three counts, against Butler & Keen, a partnership, for an alleged cause of action growing out of certain cotton transactions on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. The first count is a suit on account. The second alleges that the defendants are members of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and, as such, the plaintiff made certain deposits of money with them and certain contracts with them for buying and selling cotton, which finally resulted in a profit to the plaintiff; that “in all of the foregoing transactions herein described in this count the defendants were represented by one E. O. Sherman, as defendant’s agent and representative, at Atlanta, Ga., in the county aforesaid.” Count 3 is substantially the same as count 2 except it alleges that the petitioner is advised that the defendants did not execute one of the contracts given to Sherman as agent and representative of the defendants, and that if the defendants did hot execute it they are liable to the plaintiff in damages for their failure to execute it, the measure of damages being the profit that would have accrued to the plaintiff had the contract been executed. The total amount claimed, as set out in each count, is $1219.12, less an admitted error of $35.

Sam B. Keen, a member of the defendant company, answered for himself, and admitted that Butler & Keen had handled some transactions for the plaintiff, but denied all the allegations of indebtedness. He “ expressly denied that E. O. Sherman was ever the agent or representative of defendant;” and alleged “that every order for the purchase or sale of cotton futures for the account of the petitioner has been handled exactly in keeping with instructions given by the petitioner himself or his representative E. O. Sherman. Defendant shows that E. O. Sherman was himself a member of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange in his own name, and that he was not the agent or the representative of defendant in the transactions alleged, but that he was the agent and representative of petitioner E. M. Barrett; that the said E. O. Sherman could solicit business from customers like the petitioner in this ease, and that he could place such business with any active clearing firm on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange as he might desire to give the business. This defendant shows that the petitioner gave orders to the said E. O. Sherman to execute for him, and that they were acted upon in good faith by this defendant and confirmation made [706]*706in every instance to either the petitioner or to E. O. Sherman, his representative, according as the orders were received, and that every such transaction was clear and unequivocal both for orders and for transfer of funds.” After the introduction of evidence and the charge of the court, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff’s motion for new trial was overruled, and on this judgment he assigns error.

The controlling issue is whether E. O. Sherman was acting as the agent of the plaintiff or of the defendants. This was an issue of fact which the jury determined in favor of the defendants in the light of evidence, which, while conflicting, was sufficient to authorize their finding. So far as the record discloses, the defendants did not know until after the plaintiff’s loss that the plaintiff ever claimed that Sherman was their agent. For instance, after the plaintiff sustained his loss he began to write the defendants in reference to “your Mr. Sherman.” Though the plaintiff and the defendants had considerable correspondence, the defendants at no time stated or intimated that Sherman was their agent. On the contrary, they wrote to the plaintiff that Sherman was not their agent. The evidence strongly tended to show the relation of principal and'agent between the plaintiff and Sherman. For example, an item of $300, which the plaintiff claimed to have sent the defendants and which the defendants denied receiving, was turned over to Sherman by the plaintiff, and was receipted for, not by “Butler & Keen,” or by “Butler & Keen by E. O. Sherman,” or by “E. O. Sherman for Butler & Keen,” but by “E. O. Sherman.” The personal relationship between the plaintiff and Sherman was such that Sherman addressed the plaintiff as “E. W.” and “Ed.” In his business correspondence with the plaintiff, Sherman did not sign the name of the defendants “by Sherman,” but signed his individual name, addressed the plaintiff as “Dear Ed.,” and referred to the defendants, not as “we,” but as “they.” The evidence shows that the plaintiff gave Sherman orders as to selling and buying cotton contracts, and that Sherman argued with him about the wisdom of closing out a contract. The plaintiff testified: “Every dollar I ever sent them [defendants] went through this man’s [Sherman’s] hands. . . As to whether or not I ever had any direct dealings with Butler & Keen myself with reference to any of these transactions — no, he acted as their agent all the while [707]*707with me. I dealt with Sherman as their agent. The $300 I claim I deposited with these defendants on July 1, 1931, I don’t know where that money was deposited. . . I told Mr. Sherman to purchase that cotton for me. . . I don’t know whether he executed these orders according to the instructions I had given him or not. . . I didn’t have any independent trade with Butler & Keen previous to that time. I didn’t know there was any such people until he told me. . . I haven’t got the orders and instructions that I gave Mr. Sherman, I'would just tell him how to transfer it, what months. . . He called me ‘E. W.’; he would-say ‘E. W., the market is breaking, and they are calling on us for more money.’” (Italics ours.)

Sam B. Keen testified that he was a member of the firm of Butler & Keen, which had been operating at least ten years; that he had never seen the plaintiff before that morning; that “during the time of the trading and the contracts which I have listed in the name of E. W. Barrett, or E. M. Barrett, Mr. Sherman was a member of the exchange. As to what connection I had, if any, with E. O. Sherman, with reference to these alleged contracts for the purchase and sale of cotton on account of E. M. Barrett — well, he was merely a member of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. He sent orders to any firm he might give it to, who handled his transactions, for which he received and kept a commission. He was not the agent of any broker. The book which you exhibit to me is a copy of the official rules of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, a certified copy of the rules. During the transactions referred to in this suit Mr- Sherman was not our agent, and he has never been an agent of ours since our connection with the cotton exchange. I never at any time employed Mr. Sherman to act as our agent in the solicitation of any contracts for the purchase and sale of jobs on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange for the account of Mr. Barrett or any other customer.” Also, that “every One of these contracts is under the supervision of the United States government, . . in accordance with the rules of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, and subject to the United States cotton-futures act; that is printed on all the documents that go out. Mr. Sherman did have an account with us for Mr. Barrett. . . He also had accounts with other brokers; he did business with various brokers on the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. . . In this particular trans[708]*708action this particular account [of Barrett] was charged on our books to E. O. Sherman, and Mr. Sherman was solely responsible for losses incurred, and we were to charge them to Mr. Sherman’s account. Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
184 S.E. 433, 52 Ga. App. 704, 1936 Ga. App. LEXIS 229, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barrett-v-butler-gactapp-1936.