Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co.

116 So. 563, 165 La. 1075, 58 A.L.R. 261, 1928 La. LEXIS 1824
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 12, 1928
DocketNo. 26883.
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 116 So. 563 (Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barret v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse Co., 116 So. 563, 165 La. 1075, 58 A.L.R. 261, 1928 La. LEXIS 1824 (La. 1928).

Opinion

LAND, J.

Plaintiffs sue defendant company for the sum of $2,201.66, alleged to be due as damages for injury done to their building by a truck of defendant company.

From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for the amount claimed, defendant company has appealed.

*1077 Plaintiffs are the,owners of a building located at 618-620 Louisiana street in the city of Shreveport. In going south on Louisiana street from Milam street, plaintiffs’ building is on the right-hand side near the center of the- block and borders on the north, or Milam street side, on an alley which runs at right angles into Louisiana street. The corner of the building at the intersection of the alley with Louisiana street is squared, so as to provide an entrance at that point. This corner, with its superstructure, is supported at the entrance by an iron post, 10 or 12 inches in diameter. There is considerable incline in Louisiana street, beginning at or near Milam street and extending a distance of nearly a half block, until the approach to the alley is reached.

On January 30, 1923, in the daytime, a truck belonging to defendant company was driven by one of its employees down Louisiana street from Milam street, on its way to the warehouse of defendant company which is located on the alley about 75 feet from its entrance into Louisiana street. In attempting to turn to the right out of Louisiana street into the alley, the truck skidded upon and across the sidewalk, and against the iron post supporting the alley corner of plaintiffs’ building. The impact was so violent that the iron post was dislocated and knocked down, and the entire squared comer of plaintiffs’ three-story brick building, from ground floor to roof, collapsed and toppled to the sidewalk. The driver of the truck was buried in the debris and instantly killed.

There is no dispute, either as to the quantum of damages claimed, or as to the fact that the damages resulted from the collision of defendant company’s truck with the building of plaintiffs.

The sole defense to the suit is that the accident was not caused by any fault or negligence on the part of defendant company’s employee but resulted from the unavoidable skidding of the truck, due to the slippery eon- , dition of the pavement at the point where the accident occurred.

Plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case and, in the alternative, that the specific negligence of defendant company has been sufficiently proved.

It is settled that the mere fact that an automobile skidded is not evidence of negligence. Berry on Automobiles, § 156; Huddy on Automobiles, § 336; Cyc. on Automobile Law, p. 269.

As is well said in Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis. 20, 177 N. W. 909, 12 A. L. R. 665:

“Skidding may occur without fault, and when it does occur it may likewise continue without fault for a considerable space and time. It means partial or complete loss of control of the ear under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. Hence plaintiff’s claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present situation is not well founded. In order to make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be held that skidding itself implies negligence. This it does not do. It is a well-known physical fact that ears may skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault either on account of the manner of handling the car or on account of its being there.”

If, in the present case, the plaintiffs relied solely upon the faet of the skidding of the truck and the resultant injury to their building, their demand for damages would have to be rejected and their ease dismissed.

However, plaintiffs charge that the employee of defendant company, in attempting to turn out of Louisiana street into the alley, operated the truck “so negligently, wrongfully, and mecop&rtly” that the machine left the roadway “and ran, or shidded,” over the curb, and crashed into the iron post which supported the building at its corner on the alley.

Plaintiffs allege also that because of the wet condition of Louisiana street at the time of the accident, and the dotonward grade of the street for more than 100 feet in advance ,of the point where the employee of defend *1079 ant company attempted to turn into the alley, a higher than ordinary standard of care was required to insure the safe operation of the truck.

That the street was slippery (Mid the grade downward are admitted facts. In addition to this, there is positive evidence in the record that the employee of defendant company operated this truck down grade and upon a slippery pavement at a rate of speed of 8 tp 10 miles per how, and slowed down but a trifle in his attempt to make the turn from the street into the alley, when the machine skidded and crashed headlong into the building. The accident was sudden and was accompanied by terrific force, as is shown by the nature and extent of the damage resulting to plaintiffs’ building.

Defendant company has attempted to minimize the serious damage done to plaintiffs’ building by the impact of the truck by an averment that the iron post was not properly fastened or secured at its base or at its top, but we fail to find any evidence in the record sufficient to sustain this contention.

To operate' a heavy truck at a speed of 8 to 10 miles an hour upon a paved street with a sloping grade, and with a surface admittedly slippery, is an act of negligence: but for the driver of a heavy truck to turn from a paved street into an alley at right angles, under such dangerous conditions and at such rate of speed, is nothing short of an act of recklessness. Skidding and loss of control of the machine would be almost certain, and a condition which the truck driver could have reasonably foreseen, as the accident occurred in broad daylight.

The greater the danger the greater the degree of care required is a universal rule in the law of negligence.

If the truck had been driven by the employee of defendant company at the rate of 4 miles an hour at the time it made the turn in the middle of the street to go into the alley, as is contended by counsel for defendant company, it is inconceivable that a machine moving so slowly, even had it skidded, should have gained such momentum in making a turn near the bottom of the incline as to have vaulted upon and across the sidewalk and to have battered down an iron post supporting the corner of a three-story brick building.

Under the circumstances of the case, in arriving at this conclusion as to the dangerous rate of speed at which the truck was operated, we are not invoking by any means the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. But we are directing attention specifically to the results of the accident as a corroboration of the two witnesses of plaintiffs, who testified that the truck of defendant company was driven at a speed of 8 to 10 miles an hour in going down the grade of Louisiana street from Milam street, and that the turn from the street to the alley was made practically at the same rate of speed.

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Bluebook (online)
116 So. 563, 165 La. 1075, 58 A.L.R. 261, 1928 La. LEXIS 1824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barret-v-caddo-transfer-warehouse-co-la-1928.