Barrera v. Prima Frutta Packaging, Inc

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:21-cv-01454
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 IRMA BARRERA, BARTOLA No. 2:21-cv-01454-TLN-AC CISNEROS, ARTEMIZA ROSAS, NELI 12 SERRANO, LETICIA CASTILLO, ORDER VERONICA TORRES, RAQUEL 13 SALAZAR, MARIA ELENA LOPEZ, and BEATRIZ SALAZAR on behalf of 14 themselves and those similarly situated, 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 PRIMA FRUTTA PACKING, INC., PRIMA NOCE PACKING, INC., and 18 DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 19 Defendants. 20 21 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Prima Noce Packing, Inc.’s (“Noce”) Motion 22 for Summary Judgment.1 (ECF No. 40-1.) Plaintiffs Irma Barrera (“Barrera”), Bartola Cisneros 23 (“Cisneros”), Artemiza Rosas (“Rosas”), Neli Serrano (“Serrano”), Leticia Castillo (“Castillo”), 24 Veronica Torres (“Torres”), Raquel Salazar (“R. Salazar”), Maria Elena Lopez (“Lopez”) and 25 26 1 On April 5, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing A. Sambado & Son, Inc., 27 Primavera Marketing, Inc., and Timothy Sambado (“Sambado”) from this action. (ECF No. 38.) Defendant Prima Frutta Packing, Inc. (“Frutta”) is still a named defendant in this action but does 28 not join in Noce’s motion. 1 Beatriz Salazar (“B. Salazar”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed an opposition.2 (ECF No. 41.) 2 Noce filed a reply. (ECF No. 43.) For the reasons set forth below, Noce’s motion is DENIED. 3 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 4 The instant action arises from alleged wrongful conduct relating to Plaintiffs’ employment 5 with Frutta and Noce. (See generally ECF No. 26.) Frutta operates a cherry and apple picking 6 facility in Linden, California, and Noce operates a walnut packing facility in Linden, California. 7 (ECF No. 41-26 at 2–5.) Plaintiffs Barrera, Castillo, Cisneros, Lopez, Rosas, and Serrano 8 (“Frutta Plaintiffs”) are, or were, packing and sorting employees of Frutta. (Id. at 6–7.) Plaintiffs 9 B. Salazar, R. Salazar, and Torres (“Noce Plaintiffs”) were employees of Noce. (Id. at 7–8.) 10 Sambado co-owns Frutta and Noce and serves as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial 11 Officer for Noce. (Id. at 2, 4.) Frutta does not maintain an ownership interest in Noce, maintains 12 separate business records from Noce, and does not commingle funds with Noce. (Id. at 2–3.) 13 Prior to filing suit, Plaintiffs Barrera, Castino, Cisneros, Rosas, Serrano, B. Salazar, R. 14 Salazar, and Torres filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 15 Commission (“EEOC”) and the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). (ECF 16 No. 26 ¶ 28.) The Frutta Plaintiffs, with the exception of Lopez, filed charges on July 5, 2019 17 which did not identify Noce as an employer. (ECF No. 41-26 at 18–21.) Noce Plaintiffs filed 18 charges on October 31, 2019 or May 21, 2020 which did not name Noce as an employer. (Id.) 19 On August 13, 2021, Plaintiffs, not including Lopez and B. Salazar, filed this action 20 alleging claims for: (1) sex-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 21 of 1964; (2) sex-based discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act 22 (“FEHA”); (3) national origin-based discrimination (hostile work environment) in violation of 23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (4) age discrimination in violation of the Age 24 Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to 25

2 On May 25, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation dismissing Patricia Avalos from this 26 action. (ECF No. 20.) 27 3 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. (ECF No. 41-26). 28 1 prevent discrimination in violation of FEHA; and (7) unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. 2 & Prof. Code § 17200. (See generally ECF No. 1.) 3 On November 11, 2022, Cisneros filed a second charge of discrimination which identified 4 Noce as an employer. (ECF No. 41-26 at 18.) On that same day, Lopez filed a charge of 5 discrimination that identified Noce as an employer. (Id. at 20–21.) 6 On June 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint which named Lopez and B. 7 Salazar for the first time as plaintiffs. (ECF No. 26.) In addition to the aforementioned causes of 8 action, Plaintiffs allege: (1) national origin-based discrimination (hostile work environment) in 9 violation of FEHA; (2) age discrimination in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of 10 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (4) retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 11 98.6; and (5) tortious termination in violation of California public policy. (See generally id.) 12 On April 11, 2024, Noce filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 40- 13 1.) 14 II. STANDARD OF LAW 15 Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates no genuine issue 16 of any material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 56(a); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Under summary 18 judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 19 district court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of “the pleadings, 20 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any,” 21 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. 22 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof 23 at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance 24 solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.” Id. at 25 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, summary judgment should be entered against a 26 party who does not make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 27 that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 28 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 1 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 2 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. 3 Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, 4 the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings but is required to tender 5 evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in 6 support of its contention that the dispute exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must 7 demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the 8 suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that 9 the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 10 the nonmoving party. Id. at 251–52. 11 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 12 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual 13 dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at 14 trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 288–89. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is 15 to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 16 trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Rule 56(e) advisory committee’s 17 note on 1963 amendments). 18 In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions, 19 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any applicable affidavits. Fed. 20 R. Civ. P. 56(c); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1982). The evidence 21 of the opposing party is to be believed and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 22 facts pleaded before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. 23 at 255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 24 obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. 25 Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244–45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 26 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue that necessitates a jury trial, the opposing party 27 “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” 28 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead 1 a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 2 587. 3 III. ANALYSIS 4 Noce moves for summary judgment on all claims against it on two grounds. First, Noce 5 argues Frutta Plaintiffs cannot subject Noce to suit, because Noce never employed Frutta 6 Plaintiffs. Second, Noce contends Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.4 7 (ECF No. 40-1 at 6.) The Court will consider each argument in turn. 8 A. Whether Noce was Frutta Plaintiffs’ Employer 9 In cases defining an “employer” under Title VII and FEHA, there is a presumption that 10 separate corporate entities are not co-employers. Huse v. Auburn Honda, No. Civ.S-04- 11 0227DFL/JFM, 2005 WL 1398521, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). This presumption may be 12 overcome if entities are considered a “single employer” or “integrated enterprise.” Id. The Ninth 13 Circuit follows the majority approach for determining “whether businesses should be treated as a 14 single employer for title VII purposes, and applies the four-part test promulgated by the National 15 Labor Relations Board.” Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1989). 16 The Ninth Circuit treats two entities as one if they have: (1) interrelated operations; (2) 17 common management; (3) centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership or 18 financial control. Id. When deciding whether entities are an integrated enterprise, courts will 19 consider all four of these factors together, but centralized control of labor is often considered the 20 most important factor. Huse, 2005 WL 1398521, at *3 n.3. Under the centralized control of 21 labor factor, the key issue is which entity had the ultimate authority over employment decisions 22 concerning the individual alleging discrimination. See Morgan, 884 F.2d at 1214 (concluding an 23 entity exercised no control over another entity’s personnel decisions) 24 Without discussing each factor separately, Plaintiffs state in a conclusory fashion that the

25 4 Noce also argues it and Frutta are not alter egos of each other or joint employers of Frutta 26 Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 40-1 at 6.) In opposition, Plaintiffs do not respond to Noce’s argument and thereby concede the issues. Sylvester v. Sacramento County Sheriff’s Dept., No. 2:20-cv-01797- 27 TLN-CKD, 2023 WL 1823486, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023); see Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff abandoned claims by not raising them in 28 opposition to a motion for summary judgment). 1 factors “are easily met here” and point to the following facts: Noce and Frutta share office space; 2 Frutta employees supervise Noce employees; Noce produced a Frutta employee as its person most 3 knowledgeable to discuss its employment policies and practices; Noce does not have its own 4 Human Resources department and instead, complaints are investigated by a Frutta Human 5 Resources manager; Frutta manages Noce’s employees through a management agreement 6 between the two companies; a single payroll office staffed by Frutta employees serves Frutta and 7 Noce and the Frutta employees set Noce employees’ schedule and hours; Sambado co-owns Noce 8 and Frutta and co-owns Noce with a Frutta employee; Sambado is also on the board of both Noce 9 and Frutta; and Frutta and Noce share employees. (ECF No. 41 at 16-17.) 10 In reply, Noce neither fully addresses Plaintiffs’ arguments nor provides the Court with 11 authority that the facts Plaintiffs asserts are insufficient to create a dispute of material fact as to 12 whether Frutta and Noce are not a single integrated enterprise. (ECF No. 43 at 6–7.) Instead, 13 Noce highlights that it maintains separate business records from Frutta, does not commingle 14 funds, and the common management contract between them, alone, does not establish a single 15 integrated enterprise. (Id.) 16 The Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Noce 17 and Frutta are a single integrated enterprise. More specifically, Plaintiffs’ cited evidence 18 illustrates the possibility that Frutta had at least some control over Noce’s employees. Cf. 19 Morgan, 884 F.2d at 1214 (finding summary judgment was warranted when the plaintiff 20 presented no evidence disputing Safeway had no control over SAFCU’s personnel decisions). 21 First, Plaintiffs emphasize that Frutta employees supervise Noce employees and Frutta 22 manages Noce’s employees under a management agreement. (ECF No. 41 at 16.) Noce disputes 23 these facts, arguing Frutta employees may manage and supervise Noce employees on occasion. 24 (ECF No. 43-1 at 3–4.) Importantly, neither party cites clarifying evidence regarding the extent 25 and frequency of Frutta’s control over Noce employees. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the 26 difference between occasional management and supervision, as opposed to regular management 27 and supervision, does not rule out the possibility that Frutta exercise some control over Noce’s 28 workforce. See Morgan, 884 F.2d at 1214. For that reason, Noce’s characterization of the 1 evidence, without more, is insufficient to refute the possibility that a single integrated enterprise 2 exists. See id. 3 Further, Plaintiffs contend Noce and Frutta share employees. (ECF No. 41 at 17.) Noce 4 disputes this fact, arguing Noce employees may elect to work on Frutta’s production lines if 5 Noce’s production lines shut down early. (ECF No. 43-1 at 1–2.) The Court finds this creates a 6 genuine dispute of material fact as to Frutta’s alleged control over Noce’s employees, particularly 7 since it is unclear whether Noce employees are still under contract with Noce when they elect to 8 work on Frutta’s production lines. (See id.) 9 Finally, Plaintiff asserts a Frutta-staffed payroll office sets Noce employees’ hours and 10 schedules and therefore, Frutta controls Noce’s employees’ working conditions. (ECF No. 41 at 11 16–17.) Noce disputes this fact, arguing the payroll office is merely a singular office building 12 that serves both Noce and Frutta employees. (ECF No. 43-1 at 5.) The Court finds Plaintiffs 13 create a genuine issue of material fact as to Frutta’s control over Noce’s employees because it is 14 unclear whether a payroll office staffed by Frutta employees constitutes a Frutta payroll office or 15 a “singular office building that serves both Prima Frutta and Prima Noce.” (Id.) Viewing the 16 evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, reasonable minds could infer that a payroll 17 office staffed entirely by Frutta employees constitutes a Frutta payroll office. 18 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Noce’s motion for summary judgment as a genuine 19 dispute of fact exists as to whether Noce and Frutta are a single integrated enterprise and thus, 20 whether Noce is Frutta Plaintiffs’ employer. 21 B. Whether Plaintiffs Failed to Exhaust Their Administrative Remedies 22 Having concluded a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Noce is Frutta 23 Plaintiffs’ employer under the single enterprise theory, the Court is unable to determine whether 24 Frutta Plaintiffs have adequately exhausted their administrative remedies. That is, without 25 knowing whether Noce and Frutta can be considered a single joint enterprise, the Court cannot 26 decide as a matter of law as to whether the Frutta Plaintiffs adequately named their employer and 27 exhausted their administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court only considers whether Noce 28 Plaintiffs have exhausted their administrative remedies. 1 Noce argues the Noce Plaintiffs failed to name it as their employer in their discrimination 2 charges, thereby failing to exhaust their administrative remedies.5 (ECF 40-1 at 18–19.) In 3 opposition, Noce Plaintiffs argue: (1) Noce failed to timely raise its administrative exhaustion 4 argument and has therefore waived it and (2) Noce should have anticipated becoming a party to 5 the instant lawsuit because Noce Plaintiffs worked for Noce. (ECF No. 41 at 11–14, 17–18.) 6 To bring a Title VII claim in federal court, 6 a plaintiff must exhaust administrative 7 remedies by “filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate state agency,” which 8 allows the agency “an opportunity to investigate the charge” and “serves the important purposes 9 of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication 10 and decision.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002). Title 11 VII’s charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional, and so long as a party raises an 12 administrative exhaustion argument in responsive pleadings, the issue is not waived. Fort Bend 13 County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 552 (2019); Machuca v. Brennan, PE:17-CV-00046-DC- 14 DF, 2020 WL 13610162, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2020) (finding that a defendant properly 15 asserted an administrative exhaustion defense by raising it in the answer). Similarly, if a plaintiff 16 fails to name or reference an individual defendant in her administrative charge, he or she is 17 deemed to have failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedy and thus cannot later bring a 18 civil suit under FEHA against that individual. See Noel, 2007 WL 3034815, at *6. For that 19 reason, when Title VII and FEHA claims overlap, the EEOC and DFEH are each the agent of the 20 other for purpose of receiving charges, and thus a filing with one agency is a constructive filing

21 5 Noce also argues the Noce Plaintiffs cannot cure their failure to exhaust administrative remedies by “piggybacking” on later-filed charges under the single-filing rule. (Id. at 25.) 22 However, because the Court concludes that Noce Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative 23 remedies, the Court need not and does not address whether Noce Plaintiffs can “piggyback” on later-filed charges. 24 6 The Court undertakes the same administrative exhaustion analysis for both Title VII and 25 FEHA because they impose identical requirements and equitable exceptions. Noel v. City of Oroville, No. 2:07-CV-00728-WBS-EFB, 2007 WL 3034815, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007) 26 (“[U]nder California law, failure to list the individual defendants in the administrative complaint 27 precludes a civil action against those individual defendants.”); Rago v. Select Comfort Retail Corp., No. ED CV 19-2291 FMO (SPx), 2021 WL 5861556, at *4 (applying Title VII equitable 28 exceptions in the FEHA context). 1 with another. See e.g., EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 2000). 2 However, a charge of discrimination should be construed “with the utmost liberality.” 3 EEOC v. FarmerBros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Chung v. Pomona Valley 4 Cmty. Hosp., 667 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1982). District courts may preside over suits that either 5 “[fall] within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC investigation which can 6 reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” FarmerBros. Co., 31 F.3d 7 at 899. To that end, Title VII and FEHA charges can still be brought against a person not named 8 in an EEOC charge “as long as they were involved in the acts giving rise to the EEOC claims.” 9 Thompson v. DeLallo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1204 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing 10 Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosp., 726 F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, a court has 11 jurisdiction over defendants not named in an EEOC complaint when the EEOC or the defendants 12 themselves “should have anticipated the claimant would name those defendants in a Title VII [or 13 FEHA] suit.” Thompson, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1204 (citing Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1458 14 (9th Cir. 1990)). 15 As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that Noce waived its 16 administrative exhaustion defense. Plaintiffs attempt to support their argument by relying on the 17 Supreme Court’s opinion in Fort Bend, but Fort Bend stands for the proposition that Title VII’s 18 charge-filing requirement is non-jurisdictional. 587 U.S. at 552. In making its determination, the 19 Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, which stated that a defendant failed to timely 20 raise its administrative exhaustion defense by allowing five years and an entire round of appeals 21 to pass before asserting it. Id. at 547. To the extent Plaintiffs seek to rely upon Fort Bend’s 22 discussion of Fifth Circuit precedent, federal district courts in the Fifth Circuit have recognized 23 that raising an administrative exhaustion defense in a responsive pleading is sufficient to preserve 24 the issue and forego waiver. Machuca, 2020 WL 13610162, at *5. Moreover, this Court has 25 made a similar finding in an instance where a defendant raised an administrative exhaustion 26 argument in its answer. Thompson, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1203 (finding Defendants had not waived 27 their exhaustion argument because “Defendant mentioned in the Answer that the named 28 defendant in the complaint was not actually Plaintiff’s employer”). To that end, since Noce 1 specifically raised its administrative exhaustion defense in an answer to Plaintiffs’ first amended 2 complaint, the Court concludes Noce has sufficiently preserved this issue and did not waive its 3 defense. (ECF No. 29 at ¶ 28.) 4 However, the Court finds Noce’s administrative exhaustion defense as it relates to the 5 Noce Plaintiffs unavailing. Although it is undisputed that the Noce Plaintiffs failed to name Noce 6 in their charges of discrimination, it is also undisputed that Noce Plaintiffs worked for Noce. 7 (ECF No. 41-26 at 6–8, 18–20.) In Thompson, the plaintiff named DeLallo’s Italian Foods, Inc. 8 (“DIF”) as a defendant in his first amended complaint without initially identifying DIF in his 9 charges of discrimination. 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. Since the plaintiff was DIF’s employee, the 10 Court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations of wrongful and/or illegal employment practices 11 involved DIF and/or DIF’s work environment. Id. For that reason, the Court held that the 12 plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies because DIF should have anticipated being named 13 as a party in the plaintiff’s Title VII suit. Id. at 1204 (citing Sosa, 920 F.2d at 1458). Similarly, 14 like the plaintiff in Thompson, Noce Plaintiffs allege wrongful conduct and/or illegal employment 15 practices in their charges of discrimination, which necessitates that their claims involved Noce 16 and/or Noce’s work environment. See id. Thus, Noce should have anticipated Noce Plaintiffs 17 would name it in a Title VII or FEHA suit. Thompson, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1204; see Sosa, 920 18 F.2d at 1458. 19 For these reasons, the Court concludes Noce Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative 20 remedies as Title VII and FEHA claimants. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Noce’s motion for 21 summary judgment as to the Noce Plaintiffs. 22 VI. CONCLUSION 23 For the foregoing reasons, Noce’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED. 24 (ECF No. 40-1.) The Court hereby ORDERS the parties to file a Joint Notice of Trial Readiness 25 within thirty (30) days of the electronic filing date of this Order indicating their readiness to 26 proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s claims. 27 // 28 // 1 IT IS SO ORDERED. 2 || Date: March 27, 2025 3 : Lol ° TROY L. NUNLEY 6 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11