1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARIO F. BARRAILLIER, Case No. 19-cv-08330-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF SERVICE;
v. DEFENDANTS TO FILE A 14 WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al., DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH Defendants. 15 MOTION;
18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Mario Barraillier alleges that Salinas Valley prison guards used excessive 20 force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint 21 containing these allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915A(a).1 23 Barraillier has stated claims against prison guards J. Alvarez, R. Ramirez, A. 24 Virrueta, K. Bock, J. Lopez, and E. Sanchez. All other claims and defendants are 25 DISMISSED. I direct defendants to file a dispositive motion in response to the complaint, 26
27 1 The operative complaint is Dkt. No. 13, which plaintiff asks me to regard as a 1 or a notice regarding such motion, on or before November 16, 2020. 3 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 4 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 5 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 6 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 7 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 8 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 9 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 10 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 11 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 12 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 13 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 14 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 16 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 17 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 18 (9th Cir. 1994). 19 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 20 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 21 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 22 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 24 Barraillier alleges that on March 8, 2018 at Salinas Valley State Prison, while he 25 was in the medical unit, prison guards J. Alvarez and R. Ramirez used excessive force on 26 him. (Dkt. No. 13 at 10-11.) He further alleges prison guards A. Virrueta, K. Bock, J. 27 Lopez, and E. Sanchez failed to intervene to stop the attack. (Id.) When liberally 1 Alvarez and Ramirez, and (ii) Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against 2 Virrueta, Bock, Lopez, and Sanchez. Barraillier also has stated state tort claims of battery, 3 negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a claim under California Civil 4 Code § 52.1 (The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act) against these same defendants. (Id. at 14- 5 16.) 6 All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED. Barraillier names the warden 7 William Muniz as a defendant, but states no facts directly linking him to the acts of the 8 prison guards. Defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 9 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct.” Keates v. 10 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior 11 liability under § 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). It is not enough 12 that the supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the plaintiff 13 must show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 14 violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. Nothing in the allegations shows Muniz 15 participated in, directed, or otherwise was integral to, the alleged violations. All claims 16 against Muniz are DISMISSED. 17 Barraillier also names as defendants the medical staff who were present at the time 18 of the alleged attack but did not intervene: Giraccia, a nurse; M. Hunter, a nurse; H. 19 Ibrahimi, a doctor; Preetranjan K. Sahota, a doctor; and Baldonado, a nurse. While 20 medical staff have a constitutional obligation to provide constitutionally adequate medical 21 care, there is no obligation that they intervene in a physical attack on a prisoner by a guard. 22 All claims against Giraccia, Hunter, Ibrahimi, Preetranjan K. Sahota, and Baldonado are 24 Barraillier’s claims against Salinas Valley State Prison on grounds of municipal 25 liability are also DISMISSED. He alleges that official policy makers knew or should have 26 known that their employees would use excessive force and would fail to protect him. (Dkt. 27 No. 13 at 7-9.) Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1 Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); however, a municipality may not be held 2 vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of 3 respondeat superior, see Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); 4 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of 5 constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional 6 right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that the 7 policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) 8 that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. 9 School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 10 Even if Salinas Valley State Prison could be considered a municipality, Barraillier’s 11 allegations fail to show that there was a written or unwritten policy that tolerated, urged, 12 encouraged, supported or ratified the alleged failures of the employees. Mere supposition 13 and speculation that there are such policies are insufficient. 14 Barraillier mentions Lieutenant D.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARIO F. BARRAILLIER, Case No. 19-cv-08330-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff, 12 ORDER OF SERVICE;
v. DEFENDANTS TO FILE A 14 WILLIAM MUNIZ, et al., DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH Defendants. 15 MOTION;
18 INTRODUCTION 19 Plaintiff Mario Barraillier alleges that Salinas Valley prison guards used excessive 20 force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint 21 containing these allegations is now before me for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 22 1915A(a).1 23 Barraillier has stated claims against prison guards J. Alvarez, R. Ramirez, A. 24 Virrueta, K. Bock, J. Lopez, and E. Sanchez. All other claims and defendants are 25 DISMISSED. I direct defendants to file a dispositive motion in response to the complaint, 26
27 1 The operative complaint is Dkt. No. 13, which plaintiff asks me to regard as a 1 or a notice regarding such motion, on or before November 16, 2020. 3 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 4 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 5 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 6 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 7 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 8 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 9 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 10 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 11 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 12 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 13 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 14 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 16 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 17 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754–55 18 (9th Cir. 1994). 19 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 20 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 21 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 22 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 24 Barraillier alleges that on March 8, 2018 at Salinas Valley State Prison, while he 25 was in the medical unit, prison guards J. Alvarez and R. Ramirez used excessive force on 26 him. (Dkt. No. 13 at 10-11.) He further alleges prison guards A. Virrueta, K. Bock, J. 27 Lopez, and E. Sanchez failed to intervene to stop the attack. (Id.) When liberally 1 Alvarez and Ramirez, and (ii) Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against 2 Virrueta, Bock, Lopez, and Sanchez. Barraillier also has stated state tort claims of battery, 3 negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a claim under California Civil 4 Code § 52.1 (The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act) against these same defendants. (Id. at 14- 5 16.) 6 All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED. Barraillier names the warden 7 William Muniz as a defendant, but states no facts directly linking him to the acts of the 8 prison guards. Defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 9 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct.” Keates v. 10 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior 11 liability under § 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). It is not enough 12 that the supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the plaintiff 13 must show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the 14 violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. Nothing in the allegations shows Muniz 15 participated in, directed, or otherwise was integral to, the alleged violations. All claims 16 against Muniz are DISMISSED. 17 Barraillier also names as defendants the medical staff who were present at the time 18 of the alleged attack but did not intervene: Giraccia, a nurse; M. Hunter, a nurse; H. 19 Ibrahimi, a doctor; Preetranjan K. Sahota, a doctor; and Baldonado, a nurse. While 20 medical staff have a constitutional obligation to provide constitutionally adequate medical 21 care, there is no obligation that they intervene in a physical attack on a prisoner by a guard. 22 All claims against Giraccia, Hunter, Ibrahimi, Preetranjan K. Sahota, and Baldonado are 24 Barraillier’s claims against Salinas Valley State Prison on grounds of municipal 25 liability are also DISMISSED. He alleges that official policy makers knew or should have 26 known that their employees would use excessive force and would fail to protect him. (Dkt. 27 No. 13 at 7-9.) Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1 Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); however, a municipality may not be held 2 vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees under the theory of 3 respondeat superior, see Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); 4 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of 5 constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional 6 right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that the 7 policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) 8 that the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Plumeau v. 9 School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 10 Even if Salinas Valley State Prison could be considered a municipality, Barraillier’s 11 allegations fail to show that there was a written or unwritten policy that tolerated, urged, 12 encouraged, supported or ratified the alleged failures of the employees. Mere supposition 13 and speculation that there are such policies are insufficient. 14 Barraillier mentions Lieutenant D. Meredith, but does not list him as a defendant in 15 the caption and alleges no specific allegations against this person. (Dkt. No. 13 at 5.) 16 Accordingly, all claims against Meredith are DISMISSED. 18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 19 1. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal 20 shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint in this matter (Dkt. 21 No. 13), all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order upon Salinas Valley prison guards 22 J. Alvarez, R. Ramirez, A. Virrueta, K. Bock, J. Lopez, and E. Sanchez. The Clerk shall 23 also mail courtesy copies of the complaint (Dkt. No. 13) and this order to the California 24 Attorney General’s Office. 25 2. On or before November 16, 2020, defendants shall file a motion for 26 summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claim(s) in the 27 complaint found to be cognizable above. 1 failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. 2 § 1997e(a), defendants shall do so in a motion for summary judgment, as required by 3 Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 4 b. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate 5 factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 6 Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor 7 qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the 8 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the 9 Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 10 3. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 11 and served on defendants no later than forty-five (45) days from the date defendants’ 12 motion is filed. 13 4. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after 14 plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 15 5. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 16 No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 17 6. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on 18 defendants, or defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true 19 copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel. 20 7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 21 Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local 22 Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 23 Plaintiff is reminded that state prisoners inmates may review all non-confidential 24 material in their medical and central files, pursuant to In re Olson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 783 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); 15 California Code of Regulations § 3370; and the CDCR’s 26 Department Operations Manual §§ 13030.4, 13030.16, 13030.16.1-13030.16.3, 13030.21, 27 and 71010.11.1. Requests to review these files or for copies of materials in them must be 1 2 Plaintiff may also use any applicable jail procedures to request copies of (or the 3 opportunity to review) any reports, medical records, or other records maintained by jail 4 officials that are relevant to the claims found cognizable in this order. Such requests must 5 be made directly to jail officials, not to the court. 6 8. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be 7 extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 8 9. A decision from the Ninth Circuit requires that pro se prisoner-plaintiffs be 9 given “notice of what is required of them in order to oppose” summary judgment motions 10 at the time of filing of the motions, rather than when the court orders service of process or 11 otherwise before the motions are filed. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 12 2012). Defendants shall provide the following notice to plaintiff when they file and serve 13 any motion for summary judgment:
14 The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which they 15 seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. 16 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary 17 judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no 18 genuine issue of material fact — that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary 19 judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 20 When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot 21 simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated 22 documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the 23 defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, 24 summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary 25 judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.
26 Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 27 10. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 1 |} timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to 2 || prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 3 11. The Clerk shall TERMINATE William Muniz, Giraccia, M. Hunter, H. 4 || Ibrahimi, Preetranjan K. Sahota, and Baldonado as defendants. All claims against them 5 are DISMISSED. . 7 Dated: August 10, 2020 8 WILLIAMH. ORRICK 9 United States District Judge 10 11 a 12
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