Barr v. Grissom

2021 IL App (5th) 200122-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 28, 2021
• Docket: 5-20-0122
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2021 IL App (5th) 200122-U NOTICE Decision filed 10/28/21. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0122 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1).

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________

LAMARK T. BARR, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Johnson County. ) v. ) No. 19-MR-81 ) TERRY GRISSOM, Warden of Vienna ) Correctional Center, ) Honorable ) James R. Williamson, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Wharton and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for mandamus.

¶2 The plaintiff, Lamark T. Barr, appeals pro se the dismissal of his complaint for

mandamus relief wherein he alleged that the defendant has incorrectly calculated his term

of incarceration. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 On October 22, 2002, the plaintiff pled guilty to aggravated criminal sexual assault

(720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(4) (West 2002)) and was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.

1 ¶5 On October 23, 2019, the plaintiff filed a petition for mandamus arguing that the

defendant was improperly requiring him to serve 85% of his sentence rather than 50%. The

plaintiff maintained that according to his plea agreement and the truth-in-sentencing statute

in effect at the time of sentencing, he was eligible for day-for-day sentence credit.

¶6 On December 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed a request for default judgment, alleging

that the defendant had failed to file an answer. The plaintiff sought to be released, arguing

that he had served 50% of his 25-year sentence.

¶7 On January 23, 2020, the defendant filed a response to the request for default

judgment and a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)). Regarding the request for default judgment, the

defendant argued that default judgments are not favored, that the defendant had responded

promptly and in good faith as soon he became aware of the plaintiff’s complaint, and that

the plaintiff’s request for a default judgment had not been filed as a last resort. In his motion

to dismiss and accompanying memorandum, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had

failed to state a cause of action for mandamus relief because he was required by statute to

serve 85% of his sentence.

¶8 The court agreed with the defendant, denied the request for default judgment, and

granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appeals.

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request for

default judgment and dismissing his mandamus complaint, that its order(s) should be

vacated, and that he should be released immediately. We do not agree. 2 ¶ 11 We begin by noting our standard of review on a motion to dismiss. “The grant of a

motion to dismiss for a failure to state a cause of action filed pursuant to section 2-615 or

a motion for an involuntary dismissal based on defects or defenses in the pleadings

pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West

2014)) is subject to de novo review.” Rodriguez v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 376 Ill.

App. 3d 429, 433 (2007) (citing White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282

(2006)). “Where the dismissal was proper as a matter of law, we may affirm the circuit

court’s decision on any basis appearing in the record.” Id. (citing MKL Pre-Press

Electronics/MKL Computer Media Supplies, Inc. v. La Crosse Litho Supply, LLC, 361 Ill.

App. 3d 872, 877 (2005)).

¶ 12 “Mandamus is an extraordinary civil remedy that will be granted to enforce, as a

matter of right, the performance of official nondiscretionary duties by a public officer.” Id.

(citing Lee v. Findley, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1130, 1133 (2005)). “A mandamus action is not an

appropriate means for seeking judicial review of an administrative proceeding.” Id. (citing

Newsome v. Prison Review Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920 (2002)). “Mandamus will

issue only where the plaintiff has fulfilled his burden (see Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App.

3d 834, 840 *** (2002)) to set forth every material fact needed to demonstrate that (1) he

has a clear right to the relief requested, (2) there is a clear duty on the part of the defendant

to act, and (3) clear authority exists in the defendant to comply with an order granting

mandamus relief.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 433-34 (citing Baldacchino v. Thompson,

289 Ill. App. 3d 104, 109 (1997)). “Because Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, a

plaintiff is required to set forth a legally recognized claim and plead facts in support of 3 each element that bring the claim within the cause of action alleged.” Id. at 434 (citing

Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill. 2d 363, 369 (2003)). “To survive a motion to dismiss for the

failure to state a cause of action, a complaint must be both legally and factually sufficient.”

Id. “A writ of mandamus is appropriate when used to compel compliance with mandatory

legal standards but not when the act in question involves the exercise of a public officer’s

discretion.” McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL 113676, ¶ 17.

¶ 13 In this case, the plaintiff argues that he should have received a day-for-day good-

conduct credit (50% time) on his sentence.

¶ 14 At the time of sentencing, section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections provided

in pertinent part:

“a prisoner serving a sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder, solicitation of murder, solicitation of murder for hire, intentional homicide of an unborn child, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated battery with a firearm, heinous battery, aggravated battery of a senior citizen, or aggravated battery of a child shall receive no more than 4.5 days of good conduct credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2002).

¶ 15 Because the plaintiff’s argument is refuted by the clear language of the statute in

place at the time of his arrest, conviction, and sentencing, it fails. Therefore, the defendant’s

motion to dismiss was properly granted.

¶ 16 In response to the plaintiff’s request for default judgment, a circuit court’s decision

whether to grant or deny a motion for default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Dupree v. Hardy, 2011 IL App (4th) 100351, ¶ 51 (citing Jackson v. Bailey, 384

Ill. App. 3d 546, 548 (2008)). “A trial court abuses its discretion ‘when it acts arbitrarily

4 without the employment of conscientious judgment or if its decision exceeds the bounds

of reason and ignores principles of law such that substantial prejudice has resulted.’ Mann

v. Upjohn Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 *** (2001) (citing Marren Builders, Inc. v.

Lampert, 307 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941 *** (1999)).” Id. “A trial court should deny a motion

for default judgment when it results in the denial of substantial justice.” Id. ¶ 57 (citing

Rockford Housing Authority v. Donahue, 337 Ill. App. 3d 571, 574 (2003)).

¶ 17 In this case, the court found reasonable the defendant’s explanation of delay—an

admitted oversight on his part to forward the paperwork to the Attorney General.

Additionally, to hold otherwise would have been against that which is statutorily

required—the plaintiff serving 85% of his sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault.

Because his claim was in opposition to statute, and not a nondiscretionary task as required

by mandamus, it was not a valid claim.

¶ 18 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting

dismissal of the plaintiff’s mandamus complaint.

¶ 19 CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Johnson County is

affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.