Barnum v. Bode

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMay 1, 2025
Docket8:25-cv-00210
StatusUnknown

This text of Barnum v. Bode (Barnum v. Bode) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnum v. Bode, (D. Neb. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

ANTONIA LACHELE BARNUM,

Plaintiff, 8:25CV210

vs. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER T. BODE, Officer, Ralston police Department;

Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Antonia Lachele Barnum’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Filing No. 2. Upon review of Plaintiff’s Motions, the Court finds that Plaintiff is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court also conducts an initial review of Plaintiff’s claims to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT The basis for Plaintiff’s Complaint is not stated. Plaintiff indicates that she brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, and as the specific federal statute, treaty, or provision of the Constitution at issue, Plaintiff states “American Indian/Public Ministry.” Filing No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant forced Plaintiff to sign a ticket and provide a phone number because a judge may need to contact her. Filing No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff refused and recorded a thirty-minute video of the incident. Id. Construed liberally, she alleges she was coerced into being arrested for running a stop sign in her private vehicle. Id. Construed liberally, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for “Domestic Terrorism,” “False Statement,” and “Threats of Kidnapping.” Id. She alleges Defendant used Plaintiff’s “Identity being placed under false statement in a All Caps Name” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed “domestic terrorism” when he threatened “taking [Plaintiff’s] body” if she did not comply with his demands. Id. Plaintiff does not state the relief she seeks. II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” or “their complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). “The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party ‘fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.’” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, “[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.” Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). III. DISCUSSION The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint, keeping in mind that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). “Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused

from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984). Additionally, “[t]hough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); see also Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded”); Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law.”). A complaint must state enough to “‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff’s Complaint, even construed liberally, does not state a claim for relief because it does not comply with the general rules of pleading. In assessing whether a complaint contains sufficient facts, the Court may disregard legal conclusions that are stated as factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Further, even though pro se complaints are construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims asserted. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s allegations, as best the Court can discern, are predominantly legal conclusions about her interaction with Defendant during a traffic stop. She supplies few facts to support her claims or describe why Defendant’s actions violated federal law. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fall far short of giving notice of the grounds for her claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations are not entitled to an assumption of truth and the Complaint is subject to dismissal.

IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. Thus, no claim is stated upon which relief may be granted. Consequently, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court on its own motion will give Plaintiff an opportunity to allege sufficient facts to state an actionable claim for relief. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Filing No. 2, is granted.

2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Memorandum and Order.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Samvel Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
760 F.3d 843 (Eighth Circuit, 2014)
Tommy Hopkins v. John Saunders
199 F.3d 968 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)
Burgs v. Sissel
745 F.2d 526 (Eighth Circuit, 1984)
Dunn v. White
880 F.2d 1188 (Tenth Circuit, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Barnum v. Bode, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnum-v-bode-ned-2025.