Barnhill v. State

56 Fla. 16
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJune 15, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 56 Fla. 16 (Barnhill v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnhill v. State, 56 Fla. 16 (Fla. 1908).

Opinions

Parkhill, J.

The plaintiff in error was indicted for, tried and convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court for Wakulla County; and seeks relief here by writ of error, from, the sentence of death imposed upon him.

The first assignment of error is: “The court erred in not excluding from the jury one J. Edgar Pig'ott, who was challenged for cause to-wit; upon the ground that he the said juror was a second cousin and 'the brother-in-law of the deceased.”

The record shows that one Edgar Pigott was a mem[19]*19ber of the jury that tried and convicted the defendant; but it does not appear anywhere, except in the motion for a new trial, that the defendant objected to or challenged the said juror upon -the ground stated. Although the said objection to the juror is made a ground of the motion for a new trial, it is not sustained by affidavit or otherwise. A fact asserted in a motion for new trial is not self-substantiative before this court, but it must be authenticated otherwise in the transcript of record. Oliver v. State, 54 Fla. 93, 44 South. Rep. 712; Horne v. Carter, 20 Fla. 45. Therefore this assignment fails.

The fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error are based upon the refusal of the court to give the following instructions requested by the defendant: “First. - If you believe at the time when Noah Pelt left the defendant and went over to Gwaltney’s store immediately after the fight between the defendant and himself and that the defendant Barnhill had reasonable ground to apprehend or conclude that by Noah Pelt going into' said store, knowing- that there was a Winchester rifle in said store that Noah Pelt would do him some great personal injury, and that the defendant Barnhill believed that he was in imminent danger that such design would be done by Pelt’s entering Gwaltney’s store, you should find a verdict of not guilty.”

“Second. If you find that the defendant Miley Barnhill sought an interview or left his store, believing that Noah Pelt had cursed his wife saying, “come out there you damn bitch,” in order to ask the deceased what he meant by abusing his wife and that he left his store with no hostile intention but solely to have the deceased explain his language so used and a wordy altercation ensued, and Noah Pelt,, the deceased, became angry, and during which time the deceased assaulted Miley Barnhill, the defendant, with a deadly weapon, a [20]*20pocket knife, in such a manner as to create in the defendant’s mind a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury, and that after an infliction on the defendant by the deadly weapon a pocket knife in the hands of the accused, that he went into Gwaltney’s store immediately afterwards saying that he was going after a gun to kill the Miley Barnhill, the defendant, and Miley Barnhill acting' under a reasonable apprehension of death or some bodily harm, you should And your verdict not guilty.”

“Third. If you believe that Noah Pelt, the deceased, beat Miley Barnhill on the head with a pocket knife, and the defendant received wounds from the beating and reasonably appeared to the defendant, that the fight between Noah Pelt and the defendant was not over and that though Noah Pelt had left him going into Gwaltney’s store, that he would soon return and that he would receive additional bodily injury from- the Noah Ptelt, and Noah Pelt had the ability to inflict the injury, and that the danger was threatening and imminent, and under such circumstances, and so believing, the defendant shot and killed Noah Pelt, that he was justifiable upon the ground of his necessary self-defense, and you should find him not guilty.”

The court ruled correctly when he refused to give all these instructions. We will not attempt to point out all the defects in them. Their inaccuracies will more fully appear when we come to discuss the evidence and the law applicable thereto. Suffice it to say, they do not limit the jury to the evidence in determining whether the facts enumerated in the instructions are true, but they instruct the jury to find a verdict of not guilty if they believe certain facts, without requiring the jury to believe these facts from the evidence. Care should always be taken to instruct the jury that they must base their [21]*21verdict upon the evidence adduced before them. Doggett v. Jordan, 2 Fla. 541. In the cited case, the court said: “There are few points upon which jurors are most apt to mistake, than in supposing that they may find their verdict upon their own knowledge of the case, acquired before they took their seats in the jury box.” Even if charges given require the jury to make their finding only on the evidence, that will not perfect the requested instructions.

The first of these instructions is erroneous in calling for a verdict of not guilty if “the defendant Barnhill believed that he was in imminent danger that such design would be done by Pelt’s entering Gwaltney’s store.” The instruction should have been so framed as to inform the jury that the defendant could not justify the killing unless he had reason to believe and did believe that it was necessary to save his own life or to save himself from great personal injury.

The second of these instructions is erroneous in basing the innocence of the defendant upon his acting under a reasonable apprehension of death or some bodily harm. The danger must be imminent. Section 3203 of the General Statutes of 1906; Alvarez v. State, 41 Fla. 532, 27 South. Rep. 40; Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, 35 South. Rep. 142; Gladden v. State, 12 Fla. 562.

The third instruction is erroneous in several respects. If the defendant believed or had reason to believe that he would receive “additional injury” from Pelt and that the danger (of receiving “additional injury”) was threatening and imminent he would not be justified in taking Pelt’s life. As this instruction, is framed, the defendant would be justified in killing Pelt, if the additional injury were only a blow with the open 'hand. The reasonable appearance of additional injury to the defendant from Pelt, and the defendant’s belief that such [22]*22danger is threatening and! imminent will not alone justify the defendant in taking Pelt’s life, he must have had reason to believe and believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that it ivas necessary for him to so take the life 'of Pelt in order to save his own life. The facts do not warrant the third instruction, and the facts postulated therein do not warrant a verdict of not guilty. Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 South. Rep. 692.

The second, .third! and seventh assignments of error may be considered together: That the verdict is contrary to the law, the charge of the court and the evidence.

The substance of the evidence is as follows: C. B. Stephenson for the State testified that he knew the defendant though he was not personally acquainted with him; that lie did not know the deceased. I was standing on the corner of the depot platform on the day of the tragedy and saw two men come up- with a wagon and team which they hitched to a tree in a southeast direction from the defendant’s store. Otoe of these men I afterwards learned was the deceased Noah Pelt. They then went to Gwaltney’s store. A little while afterwards I saw the deceased coming from Gwaltney’s store going in the direction of his wagon and passing in front of the defendant’s store.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
56 Fla. 16, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnhill-v-state-fla-1908.