Barney v. Bell

Virginia Beach County Circuit Court

Barney v. Bell

3 Va. Cir. 93, 1983 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89

CourtVirginia Beach County Circuit Court

DecidedMay 5, 1983

DocketCase No. (Law) 11,844-A

StatusPublished

This text of 3 Va. Cir. 93 (Barney v. Bell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Virginia Beach County Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Barney v. Bell, 3 Va. Cir. 93, 1983 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89 (Va. Super. Ct. 1983).

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Opinion

By JUDGE BERNARD G. BARROW

This matter was heard on April 29, 1983, on the defendant’s Demurrer. The parties agreed that this proceeding was initiated more than one year from the time the cause of action arose and less than five years from that date. The defendant asserts that it is therefore barred by the one year Statute of Limitations contained in § 8.01-248 of the Virginia Code.

The Amended Motion for Judgment contends that the defendant owned a parcel of real property which he agreed to sell to the plaintiffs. It is contended that he failed to do so but instead sold it to third parties. Count II of the Amended Motion for Judgment alleges that the defendant acted intentionally and with a "motive to defraud plaintiffs," and Count III seeks the recovery of punitive damages.

I am of the opinion that the cause of action based on fraud in this case is barred by the Statute of Limitations contained in Va. Code § 8.01-248. Compare Vance v. Maytag Sales Corp., 159 Va. 373 (1932), with Westover Court Corp. v. Eley, 185 Va. 718 (1946), and Progressive Realty Corp. v. Meador, 197 Va. 807 (1956). Therefore, the Demurrer should be sustained as to Counts II and III of the Amended Motion for Judgment.

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By JUDGE BERNARD G. BARROW

This matter was heard on April 29, 1983, on the defendant’s Demurrer. The parties agreed that this proceeding was initiated more than one year from the time the cause of action arose and less than five years from that date. The defendant asserts that it is therefore barred by the one year Statute of Limitations contained in § 8.01-248 of the Virginia Code.

The Amended Motion for Judgment contends that the defendant owned a parcel of real property which he agreed to sell to the plaintiffs. It is contended that he failed to do so but instead sold it to third parties. Count II of the Amended Motion for Judgment alleges that the defendant acted intentionally and with a "motive to defraud plaintiffs," and Count III seeks the recovery of punitive damages.

I am of the opinion that the cause of action based on fraud in this case is barred by the Statute of Limitations contained in Va. Code § 8.01-248. Compare Vance v. Maytag Sales Corp., 159 Va. 373 (1932), with Westover Court Corp. v. Eley, 185 Va. 718 (1946), and Progressive Realty Corp. v. Meador, 197 Va. 807 (1956). Therefore, the Demurrer should be sustained as to Counts II and III of the Amended Motion for Judgment.

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Bluebook (online)

3 Va. Cir. 93, 1983 Va. Cir. LEXIS 89, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barney-v-bell-vaccvabeach-1983.

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