Barnett v. United States

District of Columbia

Barnett v. United States

987 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2013 WL 5832646, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155748

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia

DecidedOctober 25, 2013

DocketCivil Action No. 2013-1648

StatusPublished

This text of 987 F. Supp. 2d 62 (Barnett v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Barnett v. United States, 987 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2013 WL 5832646, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155748 (D.D.C. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ketanji Brown Jackson, United States District Judge

This matter is before, the Court on review of plaintiffs pro se complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss an action “at any time” it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is wanting).

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner suing the United States “concerning improper conduct of the trial judge to meet its burden ....” Compl. at 7. Plaintiff appears to challenge an order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued on September 3, 1999, finding him in violation of a “stay-away order” that allegedly had “ended” on May 14, 1999. Id.; see also id. at 14. That finding seems to have had some bearing on a charge of murder brought against plaintiff “ten years later.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages for false arrest, false imprisonment and constitutional violations. Id. at 20-21.

Plaintiff appears to have the mistaken impression that the United States and D.C. Superior Court are one entity. See Compl. at 4 (listing the United States as the sole defendant and “Superior Court of D.C.” as its place of employment). Regardless, subject matter jurisdiction is wanting because thé United States has not consented to be sued for constitutional torts, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), and plaintiff cannot otherwise maintain a tort claim against the United States without first exhausting his administrative remedies by “first presenting] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency----” 28 U.S.C. § 2675. By his own admission, plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative. remedies under the FTCA, see Compl. at 3, and the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 917-20 (D.C.Cir.1987); Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C.Cir.1984); Stokes v. U.S. Postal Service, 937 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1996). Therefore, this case will be dismissed. See Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed.Appx. 445, 445 (D.C.Cir.2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTCA claim] for lack of subject *64 matter jurisdiction.”). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ketanji Brown Jackson, United States District Judge

This matter is before, the Court on review of plaintiffs pro se complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and will dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss an action “at any time” it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is wanting).

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner suing the United States “concerning improper conduct of the trial judge to meet its burden ....” Compl. at 7. Plaintiff appears to challenge an order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued on September 3, 1999, finding him in violation of a “stay-away order” that allegedly had “ended” on May 14, 1999. Id.; see also id. at 14. That finding seems to have had some bearing on a charge of murder brought against plaintiff “ten years later.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages for false arrest, false imprisonment and constitutional violations. Id. at 20-21.

Plaintiff appears to have the mistaken impression that the United States and D.C. Superior Court are one entity. See Compl. at 4 (listing the United States as the sole defendant and “Superior Court of D.C.” as its place of employment). Regardless, subject matter jurisdiction is wanting because thé United States has not consented to be sued for constitutional torts, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), and plaintiff cannot otherwise maintain a tort claim against the United States without first exhausting his administrative remedies by “first presenting] the claim to the appropriate Federal agency----” 28 U.S.C. § 2675. By his own admission, plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative. remedies under the FTCA, see Compl. at 3, and the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. See GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 917-20 (D.C.Cir.1987); Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C.Cir.1984); Stokes v. U.S. Postal Service, 937 F.Supp. 11, 14 (D.D.C.1996). Therefore, this case will be dismissed. See Abdurrahman v. Engstrom, 168 Fed.Appx. 445, 445 (D.C.Cir.2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court properly dismissed case [based on unexhausted FTCA claim] for lack of subject *64 matter jurisdiction.”). A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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987 F. Supp. 2d 62, 2013 WL 5832646, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155748, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnett-v-united-states-dcd-2013.

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