Barnes v. United States

170 Ct. Cl. 639, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1965 WL 8265
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 14, 1965
DocketNo. 335-61
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 170 Ct. Cl. 639 (Barnes v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnes v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 639, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1965 WL 8265 (cc 1965).

Opinion

CoweN, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this suit, plaintiffs seek to recover back salaries allegedly owed to them as a result of demotions and separations made through reduction-in-force procedures by the Department of the Navy at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, California (hereinafter referred to as Mare Island). Seven of the nineteen plaintiffs are veteran preference eligi-bles. Plaintiffs contend that the work they were performing at Mare Island was transferred to the Oakland Naval Supply Center (hereinafter referred to as Oakland), and, therefore, there was a transfer of functions within the meaning of 5 TJ.S.C. § 861 (1958 Ed.) (Section 12 of the Veterans’ Preference Act), applicable Civil Service Regulations, and pertinent Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions. Plaintiffs’ basic position is that, instead of being demoted and separated by a reduction in force at Mare Island, they should have been transferred with their functions to Oakland. Plaintiffs’ [641]*641claim is not founded on procedural errors but goes to the correctness of the agency determination on its merits.

The actions complained of came about as the result of the Navy Department’s reorganization of its supply system to remedy the critical storage problem created by the excess material procured during World War II and the Korean conflict and the return of material from the Pacific Ocean areas. The supply system was categorized by the Navy by various types of materials and distinguished by various alphabetical designations used with the word “cognizance” or “cog”. Sometime in late 1958, the Navy began a program to define and re-position the supply materials or stocks at its installations in the San Francisco Bay area as a part of the reorganization plan. The program affected Mare Island, the San Francisco Naval Shipyard, and Oakland, as well as San Diego, Pearl Harbor, and other installations within the continental United States. At the completion of the program in 1960, both Mare Island and San Francisco showed a net decline in the stock of various cog items, while Oakland showed a net gam, though-it had lost some items also. The net gains and losses were not caused entirely by a shift of cogs from Mare Island to Oakland, but were due in part to the introduction of new items of supply materials to the shipyard stocks and to the fact that many items were declared excess or obsolete and were either donated to various welfare activities, sold as surplus, or scrapped.

As a result of the losses of various cogs and materials at Mare Island and the institution of cheaper and more efficient methods of packaging and storing the various cogs, there was a general decrease in the volume of supply work being performed both at Mare Island and Oakland. Both installations were required to effect reduction-in-force actions during 1959 and 1960 to eliminate personnel considered to be in excess of the continued need of the installations.

Plaintiffs were the subjects of adverse employee actions, after which they took the necessary steps to appeal their cases to the Twelfth Civil Service Kegion of the Civil 'Service Commission. The demotion actions affecting plaintiffs Blood and Schell were sustained, and the decision was affirmed by the Commission’s Board of Appeals and Keview. [642]*642The appeals of all other plaintiffs were sustained by the Region in a decision dated April 25, 1960, on the indicated ground that the transfer of certain materials constituted a transfer of functions and, therefore, that 17 of the plaintiffs should have been allowed to transfer to Oakland. The Region based its decision on an interpretation of Section 170.9-4b (3) of the Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions, which provided that “when it is not possible to differentiate between personnel working on that portion of the work subject to reduction in force due to cancellation of work and that portion being transferred, the entire action will be handled as a transfer of function”.

The Mare Island Commander appealed the Region’s decision and it was reversed by the Civil Service Commission’s Board of Appeals and Review, after consideration of the administrative record and the supplemental briefs filed by the parties.1 The Board affirmed and amplified its previous decision in a letter dated March 23, 1961, after a review of the case at plaintiffs’ request. In these opinions, the Board found that the above-quoted Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions Section l70.9-4b(3), which the Region relied upon as the basis for its decision, was not consistent with Civil Service Regulation § 20.8 (a), 5 C.F.R. § 20.8 (a) (1959 Ed.), which requires that:

Before any reduction in force is made in connection with the transfer of any or all of the functions of an agency to another continuing ’agency, all competing employees in positions identified with such function or functions shall be transferred to such continuing agency without change in tenure of appointment. [Emphasis added.]

The Board held that, although work had been transferred from Mare Island, there was no transfer of functions within the meaning of the regulations but merely a reorganization of the character of the functions being performed at Mare Island. As the principal basis for its decision, the Board stated that “the decisive factor in these cases is that the affected employees of the Supply Department at Mare Island [643]*643Naval Shipyard cannot be specifically identified with any function being transferred to Oakland Navy Supply Center * * * nor can these employees be specifically identified with the processing of any single supply material cognizance handled at Mare Island”.

We need not decide whether there was in fact a transfer of functions, for we agree with the Board that none of the plaintiffs was sufficiently identified, under the statutory and regulatory criteria, with the work and materials which were transferred to Oakland.

Our Trial Commissioner found that the ultimate findings and conclusions of the Civil Service Commission are supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner further found that “the work performed by plaintiffs herein could not be sufficiently identified with any particular function so as to entitle plaintiffs to transfer to Oakland”.

In addition, the Commissioner found that “there is no evidence in the record to establish that plaintiffs spent more than half of their time working on materials that were transferred to Oakland”. This finding is consonant with that part of the Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions Section 170.9-4, which provides, in essence, that an employee is identified with a function if he spends all or a major part of his time on the items or work being transferred, or, if in the case of a service or support position such as a laborer-cleaner, more than half of his duties are devoted to the organization being transferred.

Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the burden of sustaining their exceptions to the Commissioner’s findings. Indeed, plaintiffs’ exceptions to his findings may be disregarded because the exceptions fail to comply with our Rule 58(c), in that no references are made in the exceptions to the parts of the record relied upon by the plaintiffs in support thereof.

On the basis of the Commissioner’s findings and the presumption of their correctness in the absence of a strong affirmative showing to the contrary, Robert E. Davis et al.

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Related

Michael G. Heffron v. The United States
405 F.2d 1307 (Court of Claims, 1969)
Dargo v. United States
176 Ct. Cl. 1193 (Court of Claims, 1966)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
170 Ct. Cl. 639, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1965 WL 8265, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnes-v-united-states-cc-1965.