Barnes v. State

634 So. 2d 230, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 2665, 1994 WL 91918
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 24, 1994
DocketNo. 92-3026
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 634 So. 2d 230 (Barnes v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnes v. State, 634 So. 2d 230, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 2665, 1994 WL 91918 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

ERVIN, Judge.

We affirm the convictions of appellant, Carey Barnes, but remand for correction of the judgment to reflect that he was convicted in Count II of battery on a law enforcement officer, a third-degree felony, rather than aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, a first-degree felony.

We also affirm Barnes’ sentence as a habitual offender under section 775.084(l)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1989).1 Although it is undisputed that Barnes committed the instant offense within five years of two previous offenses, Barnes claims the statute precludes his habitualization, because he had not been released from prison when he committed the instant battery, and the statute requires the court to apply whichever circumstance is later when calculating the five-year period. He contends that in Jeffries v. State, 610 So.2d 440 (Fla.1992), the supreme court held that Jeffries could not be habitualized because he had been in prison more than five years and had never been released. We disagree.

Jeffries had been convicted in 1980 of burglary and was still in prison serving his sentence when he attempted to escape in 1989. He thus could not be habitualized, because, under the terms of the statute, he had not either committed the later offense within five years of his 1980 conviction or been released from prison for the prior offense.

In contrast, Barnes’ case fits within the first alternative: he committed the instant offense within fívé years of his convictions for the prior offenses. The alternative circumstance, that he commit the instant offense within five years of release from prison, does not apply when there has been no release from prison. The language, “whichever is later,” would apply only if both circumstances existed, whereupon the court would be required to use the date of the more recent circumstance.

REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF JUDGMENT.

MICKLE and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
634 So. 2d 230, 1994 Fla. App. LEXIS 2665, 1994 WL 91918, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnes-v-state-fladistctapp-1994.