Barnes v. Napa State Hospital

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedAugust 13, 2025
Docket5:25-cv-03731
StatusUnknown

This text of Barnes v. Napa State Hospital (Barnes v. Napa State Hospital) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnes v. Napa State Hospital, (N.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 ANTOINE BARNES, Case No. 25-cv-03731-VKD

9 Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT 10 v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND 11 NAPA STATE HOSPITAL, et al.,

Defendants. 12

13 14 Pro se plaintiff Antoine Barnes, a civil detainee at the Napa State Hospital (“NSH”), filed a 15 complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the NSH and “Derek O Nurse.” Dkt. No. 9 at 2. This 16 matter was transferred to this Court from the Eastern District of California. Dkt. No. 4. Mr. 17 Barnes’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis was granted in a separate order. Dkt. No. 18 12. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The following facts are based on the allegations in Mr. Barnes’ complaint. 21 Mr. Barnes alleges that NHS has denied his rights under the Eighth Amendment, First 22 Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. No. 9 at 1. He alleges that he was physically 23 and sexually assaulted during April 2025. Id. at 3. He seeks damages and to be released. Id. He 24 also states that he is “challenging the penal code 2900.5 in custody credits for time served at Napa 25 State Hospital.” Id. He attaches copies of formal complaints he filed at NSH in which he asserts 26 that he is “competent to go home free” and “to be released to the streets, per 1st Amendment 27 rights.” Id. at 6-9. 1 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). A court must dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it 5 determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief 6 may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 7 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In conducting its review, the court must identify any 8 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon 9 which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 10 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, 11 particularly in civil rights cases. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 12 Cir. 1988); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 757 (9th Cir. 2003). 13 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 14 that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 15 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 16 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 17 Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 18 plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 19 deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 20 726 F.3d 1062, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). A 21 person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an 22 affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is 23 legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. See Leer, 844 24 F.2d at 633. 25 III. DISCUSSION 26 “Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate 27 treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are 1 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, civilly committed persons retain substantive liberty 2 interests, which include at least the right to basic necessities such as adequate food, shelter, 3 clothing and medical care; safe conditions of confinement; and freedom from unnecessary bodily 4 restraint. Id. at 315-16. 5 Mr. Barnes raises serious allegations of physical and sexual assault. However, his current 6 allegations are insufficient to establish a Fourteenth Amendment claim against any named 7 defendant. Specifically, he fails to state facts sufficient to describe each alleged assault or to show 8 how each named defendant was involved in the assault(s) to support his claim that each such 9 defendant is liable. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. The complaint also fails to describe any injuries 10 Mr. Barnes sustained from the alleged assaults to support a claim for damages. Lastly, even 11 liberally construing the complaint, the Court can discern no First Amendment claim, which may 12 involve the violation of the following rights: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of 13 religion, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition the government. U.S. Const. amend. I. 14 Mr. Barnes shall be granted leave to amend to attempt to correct these deficiencies and state a 15 cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment. 16 If Mr. Barnes wishes to pursue a claim against NSH (in addition to the individual 17 defendants), he may only do so by stating a municipality claim. Local government entities are 18 “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where an official policy or custom causes a 19 constitutional tort. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).1 To state such 20 a claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was 21 deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 22 indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 23 behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 24 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (internal 25 quotation marks omitted); see Plumeau v. School Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 26 (9th Cir. 1997). The complaint states no facts that could support a plausible Monell claim against 27 1 the NSH or any other county entity. Mr. Barnes shall also be granted leave to amend to correct 2 this deficiency. 3 On the other hand, Mr.

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