Barnes v. Irving Trust Company

290 F. Supp. 116, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 25, 1968
DocketCiv. A. 67-B-83
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 290 F. Supp. 116 (Barnes v. Irving Trust Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnes v. Irving Trust Company, 290 F. Supp. 116, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326 (S.D. Tex. 1968).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GARZA, District Judge.

This case arises out of an alleged breach of contract in the purchase and sale of some Iranian Pistachio nuts.

The Plaintiff is a Texas resident. Defendant Irving Trust Company (hereinafter called “Irving”) is a New York State corporation. Defendant Iran Pistachio Export Co. (hereinafter called “Iran”) is an Iranian company that has an office in the State of New York.

Both Defendants have filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cause of action as required by Rule 8(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to be liberally construed, and I find that the Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently conforms to that rule.

The Defendants’ motions to dismiss are, therefore, denied.

Both Defendants also seek a change of venue to the Southern District of New York.

After looking at all the prospective witnesses in this case and their location, and what they must testify to, I find that the arguments for a situs of the forum to try the case are pretty equally balanced; and I must therefore, give weight to the situs of the forum chosen by the Plaintiff; and this motion is also denied. The Defendant Irving Trust Company is, therefore, certainly before this Court and will remain here.

With regard to the Defendant Iran, it has filed a motion to quash the service and to dismiss the complaint because it claims that it has not had the “minimum contacts” with the State of Texas to justify substituted service to obtain in personam jurisdiction in accordance with the constitutional requirements.

Its motion to quash the service is based on the failure of the Plaintiff to set forth the required basis for substituted service as required by Article 2031b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.

To obtain valid service through the) Secretary of State on a nonresident pursuant to Art. 2031b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, it is mandatory to show that:

(1) The nonresident has no legal place of business in the State; or
(2) The nonresident has no authorized agent upon whom service can be made.

McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.S.Ct.).

The Plaintiff has requested leave of the Court to amend the pleading to comply with these requirements; and such request is hereby granted. It would be a waste of motion to quash the service and order the Plaintiff to again serve the Defendant Iran. Iran has notice of the suit and is not prejudiced by a failure of the Plaintiff to comply with these requirements of the Texas law.

Iran’s motion to quash service is, therefore, denied.

The question of whether or not Iran has had sufficient contacts with the State of Texas to allow service by the Texas “long arm” statute is the matter which has given this Court some concern.

There is no longer any serious question that the scope of Art. 2031b of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes is as broad as the constitutional standard of “minimum contacts” will allow. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5 Cir. 1961); Amco Transworld, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F.Supp. 215 (D.C.1966); Trinity Steel Co., Inc. v. Modern Gas Sales & Service Co., 392 S.W.2d 861 (1965), err. ref. N.R.E.

*118 On deciding the question of the constitutional standard of “minimum contacts”, each case has to be viewed on its own facts. The facts that we must examine are those that are before the Court by the pleadings, affidavits and the deposition of the Plaintiff.

An examination of these facts shows that the pistachio nuts made the subject of the contract in question were originally sold by Iran to a Mexican corporation, Fomento Mexicano de Exportaciones e Importaciones, S.A. (which will hereinafter be called “Fomento”).

The nuts in question were sent by Iran to Houston, Texas, where they were brought into the United States in. bond for entry into Mexico, and were shipped in care of the Plaintiff, who is a Customs house broker and who was acting for Fomento.

The record shows that the Defendant Iran Pistachio Export Co. is a corporation duly organized under the laws of Iran. Its home office and principal place of business is Teheran, Iran. The officers and shareholders are citizens and residents of Iran. The company has only one office in the United States and that is in New York, N. Y. It has no license to transact business in any State of these United States. It has never had an agent in Texas; has never maintained an office, established a bank account, or had any subsidiary doing business in Texas. It has never owned any real or personal property in Texas, nor has it solicited any business in Texas. Its dealings with the nuts in question are the only contacts that it has had with Texas.

As stated before, Iran shipped the nuts in question to Houston, where they were transferred in bond to Hidalgo, Texas.

Difficulty was encountered in getting the nuts into Mexico, so they were stored, first in a Customs bonded warehouse in Hidalgo. Apparently Fomento not only had difficulty getting the nuts into Mexico, but was having financial difficulties of its own.

Apparently there was a Texas corporation called Fomex, Inc., which was acting as a purchasing agent for Fomento, the Mexican corporation. Two Morgan brothers were involved with both the Texas and Mexican corporations. These corporations owed the Plaintiff Barnes, the Customs house broker, some money.

It appears that one of the Morgan Brothers called Iran’s office in New York City and had them issue an invoice for the nuts in question to Fomex, Inc., so that it could, in turn, get the nuts out of bond and into commerce in the United States. This apparently was done at their request by Iran.

The nuts were taken out of bond and imported into United States commerce after the payment of duties, and the nuts were allegedly taken to McAllen, Texas, to be put in cold storage.

From the affidavit of the representative of Iran, it seems that one of the Morgan boys, by telephone, sold the nuts in question to Iran, but this contract was allegedly never complied with.

As stated before, Plaintiff Barnes was owed moneys by both the Mexican and American corporations, and his claim is that he was given title to the nuts in question so that he could sell them and apply the proceeds to the accounts of Fomento and Fomex.

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290 F. Supp. 116, 1968 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnes-v-irving-trust-company-txsd-1968.