Barna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
This text of 541 A.2d 838 (Barna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion by
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Barna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel) (Barna II), 513 Pa. 518, 522 A.2d 22 (1987), reversed this courts decision in Barna v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation) (Barna I), 88 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 83, 488 A.2d 651 (1985), and remanded the case to us for review of the issues not previously addressed. We vacate and remand.
The circumstances of this case were detailed in Barna I and Barna II. Therefore only a brief recitation of facts, in addition to the history of the case, will be given. Joseph R. Barna, Sr. (Claimant) injured his back while working for Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (Employer) on either July 18 or 20, 1977. Claimant reported the injury to Employer on July 22, 1977. In August, 1977, Claimant, complaining of acute pain in his back, was admitted to the hospital and spent approximately 18 days there. Claimants discharge summary listed eleven diagnoses. Critical in the ultimate resolution of this case are the first two listed: 1) lumbosacral strain with radiculitis and 2) latent lues [syphilis] with probable neurolues [neurosyphilis].1
[282]*282Employer, on October 10, 1977, executed a notice of compensation payable which indicated that Claimant had sustained acute lumbosacral strain as a result of a work injury and was entitled to compensation for a total [283]*283disability beginning July 23, 1977. On December 10, 1978, Employer filed a petition for review pursuant to section 771 of The Pennsylvania Workmens Compensation Act (Act),2 alleging a change in the nature and character of Claimants disability. The evidence which Employer presented was not directed to showing that Claimants disability had changed but to proving that the disabling back injury had never been related to the work injury suffered in July, 1977.
In support of its petition, Employer presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Anas A. El Attar, Employers plant physician. Dr. El Attar testified that he informed Employer on October 13, 1977, after reviewing Claimants hospital records, that he felt Claimants disability was not related to his job. El Attar deposition at 13-14. Dr. El Attar opined that Claimants disability was the result of tertiary (late) syphilis3 and not the [284]*284work injury. Id. at 17, 19. Dr. El Attars opinion was based, in large part, on Claimants hospital records.4 Id. at 23-38. Dr. El Attar equated the discharge diagnosis of latent lues with late syphilis, id. at 37, and probable neurosyphilis with Claimant not having 100% of his nervous system involved. Id. at 38.
Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Schor, who opined that Claimants disability was caused by a myofacial (muscular) injury to his back as a result of the July, 1977 work injury. Schor deposition at 9. Dr. Schor defined latent lues as “third stage syphilis which is not active at the time.” Id. at 8.
The referee, in an opinion issued May 19, 1982, concluded that, as of December 4, 1978, Claimants disability was not work related and terminated his workmens compensation as of that date. Referees conclusions of law 8, 9. The Workmens Compensation Appeal Board (Board), on October 20, 1983, affirmed. Claimant appealed to this court. In an opinion issued March 4, 1985, this court reversed on the basis of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Beissel v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (John Wanamaker, Inc.), 502 Pa. 178, 465 A.2d 969 (1983).
[285]*285In Beissel, the employer filed a termination petition,5 two years after filing a notice of compensation payable, alleging that the claimants disability was unrelated to her admitted work injury. The referee granted the termination petition. The Board and this court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
[Employer] may not- now, under the guise of a termination petition, come into court and . . . contradict precisely that which it admitted in its notice of compensation payable, namely that [claimants] disability at the time the notice of compensation payable, . . . was related to her 1975 fall at work.
Beissel, 502 Pa. at 183, 465 A.2d at 971-72.
This court concluded that the situation in Barna 1 was identical to that in Beissel: Employer was alleging, more than one year after executing notice of compensation payable, that Claimants disability had never been related to his July 1977 work injury. The Supreme Court, however, found the situation distinguishable from Beissel, concluding in Barna II:
The instant case is distinguishable from Beissel because the record does not show that J & L actually investigated claimants condition prior to the notice of compensation payable. . . . Commonwealth Court also based its decision upon a perceived potential for abuse if employers are [286]*286permitted to repeatedly challenge the cause of a claimants disability. This observation is certainly consistent with the spirit of our decision in Beissel. . . . Repeated litigation of the cause of a claimants injury is wasteful and, thus, to be avoided. However, there is no hint on this record that J & L is guilty of such abuse.
Id. at 522, 522 A.2d at 24. The case was remanded to this court to review the issues raised by Claimant which were not previously considered.
Claimant raised two issues, in addition to that considered in Barna I and Barna II, in his original appeal to this court:6 (1) whether the medical evidence of Dr. El Attar may be considered as substantial evidence to support the referees finding that Claimants disability was not related to his work injury; and (2) whether there is any legal and/or factual basis for the date selected by the referee for the termination of Claimants benefits. Unfortunately, it is impossible for this court to address these issues on the record before us for the reason which follows.
The referees finding of fact number 29 states: We have carefully reviewed the record, including the hospital records and the testimony of the physicians, and conclude that the claimants disability was not and is not work related, and, in view of the above, we make said findings to apply to that period beginning December 4, 1978.
Claimant contends that the only evidence which could support such a conclusion was the medical testimony of [287]*287Dr. El Attar. Claimant further argues that Dr. El Attars testimony does not provide substantial evidence for this conclusion. Claimant alleges Dr. El Attars testimony is premised on a misinterpretation of Claimants hospital records, making Dr. El Attars medical opinion incompetent. Employer, in addition to defending the competency of Dr. El Attars testimony, points out portions of the medical records and Dr.
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541 A.2d 838, 116 Pa. Commw. 280, 1988 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barna-v-workmens-compensation-appeal-board-pacommwct-1988.