Barlow v. Barnard

51 N.J. Eq. 620
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided November 15, 1893·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Abbett, J.

This is an appeal from a decree of the chancellor on a bill filed for the construction of the will of Thomas Barnard, deceased, and for directions as to the execution of its provisions.

The will is dated January 17th, I860. The testator died October 7th, 1877. When the will was made he had a wife, four daughters and two sons: Emily, aged twenty-six, and then married; Charlotte Ellen, aged twenty-two, then and still unmarried : Mary Letitia, aged twenty years, then married; Alice Isabel, aged ten years, married in 1876, and who died before her mother, leaving two children, Lucy and Nellie Haring; Alfred Thomas, aged eighteen, and Arthur Clay, aged fourteen. Charlotte, the widow of deceased and his sole executrix, died January 5th, 1890. The following members of the family were [621] then living, viz., the two sons; the grandchildren, Lucy and Nellie Haring; Emily Barlow, widow of John 8. Barlow, who has one child, Ida G. Cockshaw; Mary L. Treadwell, wife of William A. Treadwell, who has one child, Grace, wife of George A. Treadwell; and Charlotte.E. Barnard, still unmarried.

When Thomas Barnard died all his children were of full age, the youngest being over twenty-seven. When he made his will two of his children, both daughters, were over age; one was married and the other unmarried. His third child, a daughter, was nearly of age and married, and the other three children, two sons and a daughter, were minors.

The will, after giving to his wife, for her life, all the real and personal estate of which he should die possessed, proceeds:

“I wish and will at my death that all property of whatever kind of which I may die possessed may as soon as practicable, be realized and settled securely on her in some safe investment, the interest of which I trust in God will comfortably support her, the principal to be untouched, unless the interest of that left be too small for her support, at her death I will it to be kept in the same shape or form, for the support of the children, not of age or married ; on the marriage of my four daughters, I will it to be equally divided between the said four girls and the share settled on each of them for their lifetime; all and except one dollar each to my two sons, trusting that they will follow my example of industry to gain what they may require.”

The learned vice-chancellor, in construing this will, held that,, after the life provision for the widow, the provision for support was intended to embrace both minor daughters and sons, and likewise unmarried adult daughters, but not unmarried adult sons, and that, under this construction, the unmarried daughter is entitled to the benefit of the provision for support; that she has a right to be supported, so long as she remains single, out of the income of the testator’s estate, but not to- its whole income unless it is only sufficient to give her a proper support according to her rank and condition in life. He held that there was no gift of the income, either directly or by implication, and holds that there is not the least indication that the testator-meant, as the class (his children) diminished in number, the survivors should take the whole. He further says: My conclu[622] sion therefore is that the unmarried daughter has a right to be supported out of the testator’s estate until she marries, and to that end she has a right to have so much of his estate kept invested as will produce an annual income sufficient for that purpose; the residue of his estate must be divided into four equal shares, and one share settled on each daughter for her life.”

He then says: “The more difficult and pez’plexing question is, who takes the remainder ? In other words, what provision shall be made in the settlements as to who shall take the remainders on the death of the life tenants? The will gives no direct answer to this question.” He also says: “No gift of the remainder is made unless it is znade by implication.” We agree with the learned vice-chancellor in the conclusions reached by him up to this point.

He then says: “But at this point we ezzter the region of doubt. One of two constructions must, however, be adopted, namely, either that the testator died intestate as to the remainder or that there is a gift of it, by implication, to the issue of his daughters.” He adopts the latter construction. It is a case where there must be much hesitation in adopting any construction as to the remainder of the estate. The rizle is correctly laid down by the vice-chancellor, that to justify a gift by implication, the gift must rest on a probability of azi intention so strong that an intention contrary to that which is thus imputed to the testator cannot be supposed to have existed in his znind. Applying this test, we cannot come to the conclusion reached by him.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Barlow v. Barnard, 51 N.J. Eq. 620 (N.J. 1893).

51 N.J. Eq. 620 (Barlow v. Barnard) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Daly v. Rogers
27 A.2d 885 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1942)
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Noll
2 A.2d 328 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1938)
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Hentz
152 A. 331 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1930)