Barlev v. Bethpage Physical Therapy Associates, P.C.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Barlev v. Bethpage Physical Therapy Associates, P.C.

122 A.D.3d 784, 995 N.Y.S.2d 514

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 19, 2014

Docket2013-11169

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 122 A.D.3d 784 (Barlev v. Bethpage Physical Therapy Associates, P.C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Barlev v. Bethpage Physical Therapy Associates, P.C., 122 A.D.3d 784, 995 N.Y.S.2d 514 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (J. Golia, J.), entered September 6, 2013, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In a medical malpractice action, a defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing, prima facie, either the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see Wall v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 78 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2010]). Here, the defendant, on its motion, failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not depart from good and accepted standards of medical care, and also failed to address the issue of causation. Instead, the defendant’s expert merely recounted the treatment rendered and opined in a conclusory manner that such treatment did not represent a departure from good and accepted medical practice (see Yaegel v Ciuffo, 95 AD3d 1110 [2012]; Couch v County of Suffolk, 296 AD2d 194 [2002]). In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; LaVecchia v Bilello, 76 AD3d 548 [2010]).

Skelos, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendant appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (J. Golia, J.), entered September 6, 2013, as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In a medical malpractice action, a defendant moving for summary judgment has the burden of establishing, prima facie, either the absence of any departure from good and accepted medical practice, or that any departure was not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries (see Wall v Flushing Hosp. Med. Ctr., 78 AD3d 1043, 1044 [2010]). Here, the defendant, on its motion, failed to establish, prima facie, that it did not depart from good and accepted standards of medical care, and also failed to address the issue of causation. Instead, the defendant’s expert merely recounted the treatment rendered and opined in a conclusory manner that such treatment did not represent a departure from good and accepted medical practice (see Yaegel v Ciuffo, 95 AD3d 1110 [2012]; Couch v County of Suffolk, 296 AD2d 194 [2002]). In light of this determination, it is unnecessary to review the sufficiency of the plaintiffs opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; LaVecchia v Bilello, 76 AD3d 548 [2010]).

Skelos, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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122 A.D.3d 784, 995 N.Y.S.2d 514, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barlev-v-bethpage-physical-therapy-associates-pc-nyappdiv-2014.

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