Barker v. Retail Credit Co.

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Barker v. Retail Credit Co.

100 N.W.2d 391, 8 Wis. 2d 664, 1960 Wisc. LEXIS 280

CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

DecidedJanuary 5, 1960

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 100 N.W.2d 391 (Barker v. Retail Credit Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 100 N.W.2d 391, 8 Wis. 2d 664, 1960 Wisc. LEXIS 280 (Wis. 1960).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Mr, Justice Fairchild, Mr. Justice Hallows, and Mr. Justice Dieterich are of the opinion that the order should be reversed because they deem the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish that the report transmitted to the insurance company is conditionally privileged. This is because there is no allegation that the insurance company had requested the defendant to furnish it with such report. Mr. Justice Broadfoot, Mr. Justice Brown, and Mr. Justice Currie are of the opinion that the complaint does sufficiently allege facts to establish the existence of conditional privilege, and would affirm the order. The court being equally divided, under the applicable rule of the court, the order is affirmed.

The court deems it advisable to state that there is no division of opinion that a report of the nature alleged in the complaint, made by a mercantile agency to an insurance company at the latter’s request, is conditionally privileged. 36 Am. Jur., Mercantile Agencies, p. 184, sec. 11, and annotation entitled, “Libel and slander: Report of mercantile agency as privileged,” 30 A. L. R. (2d) 776, 777.

Martin, C. J., took no part.

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Per Curiam.

Mr, Justice Fairchild, Mr. Justice Hallows, and Mr. Justice Dieterich are of the opinion that the order should be reversed because they deem the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to establish that the report transmitted to the insurance company is conditionally privileged. This is because there is no allegation that the insurance company had requested the defendant to furnish it with such report. Mr. Justice Broadfoot, Mr. Justice Brown, and Mr. Justice Currie are of the opinion that the complaint does sufficiently allege facts to establish the existence of conditional privilege, and would affirm the order. The court being equally divided, under the applicable rule of the court, the order is affirmed.

The court deems it advisable to state that there is no division of opinion that a report of the nature alleged in the complaint, made by a mercantile agency to an insurance company at the latter’s request, is conditionally privileged. 36 Am. Jur., Mercantile Agencies, p. 184, sec. 11, and annotation entitled, “Libel and slander: Report of mercantile agency as privileged,” 30 A. L. R. (2d) 776, 777.

Martin, C. J., took no part.

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Bluebook (online)

100 N.W.2d 391, 8 Wis. 2d 664, 1960 Wisc. LEXIS 280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barker-v-retail-credit-co-wis-1960.

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