Barker v. Life Insurance Co. of North America

265 F.R.D. 389, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123490, 2009 WL 5191441
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedDecember 28, 2009
DocketNo. 1:09-cv-0369-LJM-DML
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 265 F.R.D. 389 (Barker v. Life Insurance Co. of North America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Barker v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 265 F.R.D. 389, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123490, 2009 WL 5191441 (S.D. Ind. 2009).

Opinion

Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel (Dkt.50) and Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena to a Nonparty (Dkt.23)

DEBRA McVICKER LYNCH, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Beverly Barker’s motion to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production directed to Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) (Dkt.50). Defendants LINA and SAIC Employee Health and Welfare Benefits Plan1 have also filed a motion to quash the subpoena Barker served on nonparty Intracorp for the production of documents under Fed. R.Civ.P. 34(c) (Dkt.23). The court held oral argument on these motions.

Barker is seeking judicial review of LINA’s decision that she does not qualify for long-term disability benefits under her SAIC employee welfare benefits plan (“Plan”) that LINA administers and insures. Barker argues that Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008), allows discovery to examine the alleged conflict that arises from LINA’s dual roles as an evaluator of claims and a payor of those claims. LINA responds generally that Glenn does not permit discovery; it also makes specific objections to particular requests. The court finds that the Supreme Court’s holding in Glenn does contemplate the production of evidence relevant to LINA’s alleged conflicts in making disability determinations. Certain requests for production, however, are not relevant to whether a conflict exists or would require the production of third parties’ private medical information. The motion to compel and the motion to quash are therefore GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Barker alleges that she qualified for long-term disability benefits in July 2007 and that her treating physicians reported to LINA that she was totally disabled. Despite the evidence of her disability, LINA denied her claim for disability benefits based on an evaluation of her medical condition by doctors paid by Intracorp.

LINA contracted with Intracorp to review files to determine eligibility for benefits. One of Intracorp’s medical reviewers, Dr. Westerband, reviewed Barker’s file and determined she was able to perform certain types of work and was not disabled. LINA describes Intracorp as a “third party,” although Barker alleges that Intracorp and LINA are both owned by the same parent company. (Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena Directed to Intracorp or, Alternatively, for a Protective Order (“Defendants’ Motion to Quash”), at 2; Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, at 2 n. 1.)

A. Motion to Compel

Barker served interrogatories and requests for production of documents on LINA [393]*393on May 28, 2009. LINA responded on August 3, 2009, by asserting (1) that ease law prohibits discovery on the benefits denial decision absent specific showings of misconduct and (2) that the particular discovery requests were not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. LINA asserts the same general arguments in support of its motion to quash as it does in response to the motion to compel.

B. Motion to Quash

On May 27, 2009, Barker served nonparty Intracorp with a nonparty subpoena duces tecum for documents in Intracorp’s possession related to (1) its review of Barker’s disability claim and (2) its relationship with LINA. LINA, acting for Intracorp, moved to quash the subpoena.

II. Analysis

In response to the motion to compel and in support of the motion to quash the subpoena, LINA makes two arguments: (1) discovery into claims denial decisions generally is not permitted, and (2) that even if such discovery were allowed, Barker’s discovery requests exceed the permitted scope. In response, Barker argues that Glenn changed existing law that had previously disallowed discovery about the claims review process and that the specific discovery requests are proper to prove the extent to which bias or financial motive influenced the denial decision.

A. Whether Discovery of the Benefits Denial Decision is Permitted

LINA asserts that the requested discovery is not permitted because Seventh Circuit precedent requires two showings before a plaintiff is entitled to discovery outside the administrative record: (1) a showing of a specific conflict or instance of misconduct on behalf of LINA, and (2) a prima facie showing of good cause to believe that limited discovery would reveal a procedural defect. {Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, at 15.) Barker maintains that Glenn supersedes the existing Seventh Circuit precedent so that the requested discovery is permitted to prove the extent to which bias influenced the denial decision.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for liberal discovery by requiring disclosure of any relevant matter. Hughes v. CUNA Mutual Group, 257 F.R.D. 176, 177 (S.D.Ind.2009). “Relevant” matter, in the discovery context, extends beyond information properly admissible at trial to include anything that “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); see Hughes, 257 F.R.D. at 177. Here, this court must determine what is “relevant” in cases where a plaintiff challenges a denial of benefits under an ERISA plan.

The court’s standard of review applicable to the administrator’s decision affects the relevancy determination. See id. Barker concedes that under Raybourne v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of New York, 576 F.3d 444 (7th Cir.2009), the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. When the deferential standard applies, discovery is usually limited to reviewing the administrative record before the plan administrator when it denied benefits. Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir.1999).

Until recently, the law in this Circuit was clear that a claimant who wanted to discover information about a conflict of interest that possibly influenced the claims decision had to satisfy two elements beyond the usual relevancy standard of Fed.R.Civ.P, 26. First, the claimant had to “identify a specific conflict of interest or misconduct.” Semien v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 436 F.3d 805, 815 (7th Cir.2006). Second, the claimant had to “make a prima facie showing that there is good cause to believe limited discovery will reveal a procedural defect in the plan administrator’s determination.” Id. This standard permits conflicts discovery in only the most “exceptional” cases. Id.

Barker argues that Semien’s strict limitations governing conflicts discovery have been abrogated by Glenn,

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265 F.R.D. 389, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123490, 2009 WL 5191441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barker-v-life-insurance-co-of-north-america-insd-2009.