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Barker v. City of Kansas

70 P.2d 5, 146 Kan. 347, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 153
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJuly 10, 1937
DocketNo. 33,457
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 70 P.2d 5 (Barker v. City of Kansas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barker v. City of Kansas, 70 P.2d 5, 146 Kan. 347, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 153 (kan 1937).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, J.:

Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the city of Kansas City and of the benefit district sought to be created, brought this action No[349]*349vember 12, 1936, under G. S. 1935, 13-1403 and 60-1121, to enjoin the city and its officials in their attempt to exercise the power of eminent domain to establish parking areas in certain blocks of the city and to levy certain assessments upon the property of plaintiffs to pay the costs thereof. After an answer and reply had been filed defendants moved the court, pursuant to G. S. 1935, 60-2904, to try the issues of law in advance of the trial of issues of fact. This was done by three district judges sitting in banc. After considering the pleadings and exhibits and the arguments of counsel the court made sixteen findings and conclusions of law. Twelve of these were adverse to the contentions of defendants, and from these they have appealed; four were adverse to the contentions of plaintiffs, and from these they have cross-appealed. It will be well to summarize the pleadings.

Plaintiffs allege that they are citizens and residents of Kansas City and own property therein, and are taxpayers; that the. city of Kansas City is a municipal corporation, with a population exceeding 120,000, and the names of its officers are given; that Minnesota avenue is an east-and-west business thoroughfare of the city, and State avenue is the first street north of it, and that each of these streets previously had been designated and established as a main arterial trafficway under the laws of the state; that Armstrong avenue is the first and Ann avenue is the second east-and-west street south of Minnesota avenue, and that these streets are not main arterial trafficways; that the defendant city has been operating for many years under the planning commission law, and Minnesota and State avenues are zoned for commercial business by the planning commission and by the governing body of the city; that some of the business men on Minnesota avenue had complained to the governing body of the city of the lack or insufficiency of space for parking automobiles, which situation interfered with their business, causing customers to patronize outlying mercantile stores, especially such as had provided private parking space in connection with their business; that defendants, without a report or consideration by the planning commission, or any special commission or committee, determined to create five parking places, three on the south side of State avenue and two on the north side of Armstrong avenue; that to carry out that purpose the city enacted an ordinance, No. 28427, published July 16, 1936, entitled:

“An ordinance, condemning land for public use to provide facilities for the [350]*350general public use in connection with the use of streets and trafficways of the city, as a place to stop and store vehicles in the district described herein, zoned and used for commercial purposes and light industry; providing and describing a benefit district therefor; and directing the city attorney to institute proceedings as provided by law to acquire the land in this ordinance described by condemnation proceedings.”

Section 1, in part, reads:

“That the following described land is hereby condemned and appropriated for the use of the city of Kansas City, Kansas, in providing facilities for the general public to use in connection with the use of the streets and trafficways of the city as a place to stop and store vehicles in the district herein described, zoned and used for commercial purposes and light industry, within said city of Kansas City, Kansas, to wit:”

Here follows the description of the property to be taken by eminent domain, described by lots and blocks. Section 2, in part, reads:

“It is found that all of the property within the following-described boundaries in Kansas City, Kansas, will be specially benefited by reason of the acquirement of said land, and proposed improvement, and all of the land within the following-described boundaries is constituted the benefit district, as provided by law, to wit:”

Here follows the description of the property constituting the benefit district described by metes and bounds.

“Except, the publicly owned property known as the post-office site, the old courthouse site, and the old county jail site, more definitely described as follows, to wit:”

Here follows the description, by lots and blocks, of the publicly owned property. Section 3 reads:

“The city attorney of the city of Kansas City, Kansas, is hereby ordered and directed to prepare and present in the name of the board of commissioners of the city of Kansas City, Kansas, a written application to the judge of the district court of Wyandotte county, Kansas, praying for an order appointing commissioners to make appraisement and assessment of damages arising from the taking and condemnation of said above-described real estate, and to do and perform all things in and about the procuring and recording of said order of appointment as required by law.”

The accompanying plat shows the boundaries of the benefit district, the publicly owned land therein excepted, the location of the five proposed parking places, together with streets mentioned, which may help to visualize the plan of the project.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants had no power or authority to institute the proceeding, to condemn the property, or otherwise make changes in the district, by reason of the fact that no planning com[352]*352mission, or special committee or commission, had considered, acted upon, or recommended the change; that it was generally understood, and published interviews stated, the cost of the parking stations was to be borne by merchants and commercial firms and not-to be a tax upon property; that ordinance No.

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Related

Isley v. Bogart
338 F.2d 33 (Tenth Circuit, 1964)
City of Menlo Park v. Artino
311 P.2d 135 (California Court of Appeal, 1957)
State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes
156 Ohio St. (N.S.) 81 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1951)
Barker v. City of Kansas City
88 P.2d 1071 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1939)
Smith v. City of Kansas City
80 P.2d 1068 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1938)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
70 P.2d 5, 146 Kan. 347, 1937 Kan. LEXIS 153, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barker-v-city-of-kansas-kan-1937.