Barker v. Bateman Foundry & Machine Co.

578 S.W.2d 867, 1979 Tex. App. LEXIS 3307
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 1, 1979
DocketNo. 5180
StatusPublished

This text of 578 S.W.2d 867 (Barker v. Bateman Foundry & Machine Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barker v. Bateman Foundry & Machine Co., 578 S.W.2d 867, 1979 Tex. App. LEXIS 3307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979).

Opinions

DICKENSON, Justice.

The question presented is whether the jury answered enough of the special issues to support the judgment which was entered on the verdict. Plaintiffs, Preston 0. Barker, Jr., and his minor son, David Keith Barker, sued defendant, Bateman Foundry & Machine Company, Inc., for the boy’s personal injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that Bateman Foundry manufactured an ice crushing machine which injured the three-year old boy by crushing his right hand, forearm and elbow, resulting in their surgical amputation. Plaintiffs alleged negligence, breach of implied warranty and strict liability. Bateman Foundry denied any liability and pleaded that its product, an ice crusher, was not unreasonably dangerous when used properly and in the manner in which it was intended to be used. Bateman Foundry also denied that the machine was in the same condition at the time of this accident on September 13,1972, as it was when it was originally manufactured and sold, sometime between 1946 and 1952. The jury returned a partial verdict which is summarized as follows:

SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
The ice grinder was not defectively designed or manufactured.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2
No answer was required in view of the negative answer to 1.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3
The failure of Bateman Foundry to provide the ice grinder with a slip clutch or similar device was not negligence.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 4
No answer was required in view of the negative answer to 3.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 5
The jury failed to answer the question: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the failure of Bateman Foundry & Machine Company, Inc. to provide the ice grinder with an ‘on-off’ switch was negligence?”
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6
The jury failed to answer the question: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?”
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7
The failure of Bateman Foundry to provide the ice grinder with a one-way door, flap or screen was not negligence.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 8
No answer was required in view of the negative answer to 7.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 9
The jury answered “none” for past medical, hospital care and prosthetic devices.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 10
The jury answered “none” for future prosthetic devices.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 11
The jury failed to answer the damage issue concerning past and future physical pain and mental anguish and for loss of future earning capacity and disfigurement.

[869]*869Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial. Bateman Foundry moved for judgment on the verdict. The trial court rendered judgment that plaintiffs recover nothing. Plaintiffs’ amended motion for new trial asserts among other grounds that the court erred in accepting a defective and incomplete verdict from the jury and in permitting Bate-man Foundry to prove that the medical, hospital and prosthetic expenses had been furnished by the State of Texas at no cost to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appeal from the Order overruling their Amended Motion for New Trial. The judgment will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded.

Plaintiffs’ first two points of error were that the trial court erred in (1) accepting a defective and incomplete verdict from the jury and in (2) basing its judgment upon a defective and incomplete verdict. We agree that the trial court erred in accepting an incomplete verdict and entering judgment thereon.

Tex.R.Civ.P. 279 provides in part that: “When the court submits a case upon special issues, he shall submit the controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the evidence . . .

Tex.R.Civ.P. 290 provides in part that: “A verdict is a written declaration by a jury of its decision, comprehending the whole or all the issues submitted to the jury . . .” (emphasis added)

Tex.R.Civ.P. 301 provides in part that: “The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the nature of the case proved and the verdict . . . .”

3 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice (1970) § 15.03.01 states that:

When a cause has been submitted on special issues, every material issue must be answered by the jury and the court cannot, under any circumstances, supply findings upon unanswered or incompletely answered material issues. When it develops that a tendered verdict contains material issues which have not been answered responsively, the court should decline to accept it and should, with proper written instructions pointing out the defect, retire the jury for further deliberations. If, after such deliberations, the jurors still are unable to answer one or more material issues, a mistrial results. . . .

See also, Allied Finance Company v. Gammill, 440 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

Blanton v. E. & L. Transport Co., 146 Tex. 377, 207 S.W.2d 368 (1948), states the rule as follows:

If a fair trial requires the submission of all issues raised by the testimony although a finding on some may negative a favorable finding on others, it necessarily follows that a finding on some of the submitted issues does not defeat a litigant’s right to have other submitted issues answered, merely because such answers may be conflicting. Otherwise, the verdict would not comprehend, “the whole or all the issues submitted,” as required by Rule 290, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Special Issues 5, 6 and 11 are material, and the evidence requires that they be submitted to the jury. Burke Wiley, Inc. v. Lenderman, 545 S.W.2d 226 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston (1st Dist.) 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.).

H. A. Lehman, President of Bateman Foundry, testified in part as follows:

Q Did Bateman manufacture that machine (the one involved in the incident)?
A It did.
Q . the reason that Bateman did not furnish on-off switches on its machines, even today, is because the electrical codes, of say Mineral Wells, are different from the electrical codes, of say New York City?
A That is correct.
Q How is it, sir, that the people who make these edgers get away with furnishing electrical cords and on-off switches for both New York City and Mineral Wells?
A I wouldn’t know that.
Q All right. When you operated these ice crushers at your convention, sir.

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Related

Allied Finance Company v. Gammill
440 S.W.2d 897 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1969)
Lobley v. Gilbert
236 S.W.2d 121 (Texas Supreme Court, 1951)
Baumler v. Hazelwood
347 S.W.2d 560 (Texas Supreme Court, 1961)
Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp.
435 S.W.2d 854 (Texas Supreme Court, 1968)
Burke Wiley, Inc. v. Lenderman
545 S.W.2d 226 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1976)
Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp.
237 S.W.2d 352 (Texas Supreme Court, 1951)
Rounsaville v. Bullard
276 S.W.2d 791 (Texas Supreme Court, 1955)
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. American Statesman
552 S.W.2d 99 (Texas Supreme Court, 1977)
Texas & Pacific Railway Company v. McCleery
418 S.W.2d 494 (Texas Supreme Court, 1967)
Joske v. Irvine
44 S.W. 1059 (Texas Supreme Court, 1898)
Blanton v. E. & L. Transport Co.
207 S.W.2d 368 (Texas Supreme Court, 1948)

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578 S.W.2d 867, 1979 Tex. App. LEXIS 3307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barker-v-bateman-foundry-machine-co-texapp-1979.