Barfield v. Reynolds Banking Co.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Barfield v. Reynolds Banking Co.

149 S.E. 302, 40 Ga. App. 305, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 142

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedAugust 24, 1929

Docket19435

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 149 S.E. 302 (Barfield v. Reynolds Banking Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Barfield v. Reynolds Banking Co., 149 S.E. 302, 40 Ga. App. 305, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 142 (Ga. Ct. App. 1929).

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Opinion

Stephens, J.

1. The description, in a schedule of personal property filed by a debtor as exempt from levy and sale by virtue of the homestead and exemption laws as provided in section 3417 of the Civil Code of 1910, which reads “one mule value $50,” is insufficient to constitute constructive notice that a mule upon which a person after-wards acquired a mortgage was the mule described in the schedule. Harris v. Hill, 1 Ga. App. 425 (58 S. E. 124); Arnold v. Faulk, 19 Ga. App. 797 (92 S. E. 294). See also, in this connection, Kendall v. Parker, 146 Ga. 260 (91 S. E. 31). This ruling is not in conflict with that of the Supreme Court in McNair v. Fortner, 149 Ga. 654 (101 S. E. 772), where the description of the property scheduled as exempt was such as to render the property capable of identification, and it was held that the description was sufficiently specific to constitute constructive notice.

2. It being conclusive from the evidence that the plaintiff in fi. fa., who was the mortgagee, had neither actual nor constructive notice of the exemption from levy and sale of the mule levied upon, a verdict was properly directed against the claimant as head of a family, claiming the property levied upon as being exempt from levy and sale.

Judgment affirmed.

Jenkins, P. J., and Bell, J., concur.

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Stephens, J.

1. The description, in a schedule of personal property filed by a debtor as exempt from levy and sale by virtue of the homestead and exemption laws as provided in section 3417 of the Civil Code of 1910, which reads “one mule value $50,” is insufficient to constitute constructive notice that a mule upon which a person after-wards acquired a mortgage was the mule described in the schedule. Harris v. Hill, 1 Ga. App. 425 (58 S. E. 124); Arnold v. Faulk, 19 Ga. App. 797 (92 S. E. 294). See also, in this connection, Kendall v. Parker, 146 Ga. 260 (91 S. E. 31). This ruling is not in conflict with that of the Supreme Court in McNair v. Fortner, 149 Ga. 654 (101 S. E. 772), where the description of the property scheduled as exempt was such as to render the property capable of identification, and it was held that the description was sufficiently specific to constitute constructive notice.

2. It being conclusive from the evidence that the plaintiff in fi. fa., who was the mortgagee, had neither actual nor constructive notice of the exemption from levy and sale of the mule levied upon, a verdict was properly directed against the claimant as head of a family, claiming the property levied upon as being exempt from levy and sale.

Judgment affirmed.

Jenkins, P. J., and Bell, J., concur.

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149 S.E. 302, 40 Ga. App. 305, 1929 Ga. App. LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barfield-v-reynolds-banking-co-gactapp-1929.

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