11/19/2024
DA 23-0571 Case Number: DA 23-0571
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2024 MT 274
PAUL PHILLIP BARDOS AND MARY L. BARDOS, REVOCABLE TRUST,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
ROBERT L. SPOKLIE,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-2021-1490 Honorable Dan Wilson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Kimberly S. More, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Marcel A. Quinn, Thomas A. Hollo, Hammer, Quinn & Shaw PLLC, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 15, 2024
Decided: November 19, 2024
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The Paul Phillip Bardos and Mary L. Bardos Revocable Trust (Bardos) appeals the
decision of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granting summary
judgment to Robert Spoklie (Spoklie) and thereby denying Bardos’s application for
injunctive relief enjoining Spoklie from challenged uses of an easement across Bardos’s
property. Bardos contends that disputes over material facts remain, and summary judgment
was improperly entered.
¶2 We affirm, and address the following issue:
Did the District Court err by entering summary judgment regarding the scope of Spoklie’s easement upon Bardos’s property?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2018, Spoklie purchased a tract of land neighboring Bardos’s property to the west
and south, near Foy’s Lake outside Kalispell, Montana. Spoklie divided the tract into
several smaller parcels with the intention of developing residential properties. The road
system in the area is not well developed and easements are utilized to create legal access
to the properties. To that end, in December 2018, Spoklie and Bardos entered into an
Easement Agreement that exchanged easements among their respective properties. As
shown in the map below,1 the easement to Spoklie (Spoklie’s Easement) granted access to
Bardos’s property from Daley Lane, a county road, northwest across Deer Run and then
south along Soler Run, while the easement to Bardos (Bardos’s Easement) granted access
1 This map is not in the record in this form but was created using word processing software and satellite images for reader convenience based on information contained within the record. 2 to Spoklie’s property along Soler Run as it meandered south of Bardos’s property, and then
north through Spoklie’s property lying west of Bardos’s property.
¶4 Regarding Spoklie’s Easement, the Agreement states:
GRANT OF EASEMENT (Bardos to Spoklie): Bardos hereby grants, conveys and transfers to Spoklie, his heirs, successors and assigns a nonexclusive easement, in as it follows Daley Lane, Deer Run and Soler Run to Spoklie’s property. This easement and roadway is more particularly shown and described on Exhibit “A” attached hereto and be this reference
3 made a part hereof. The centerline of the easement shall be the centerline of the present roadway described above.
The easement granted by Bardos to Spoklie shall be 60 feet in width and shall be used for the following purposes:
(a). For roadway travel (ingress and egress) and for installation, maintenance and repair of underground utility services to the properties described above and any tracts or parcels divided therefrom.
(b). Bardos further grants to Spoklie an easement for the purpose of widening the corner where Deer Run and Soler Run intersect and to remove trees for the purpose of improving driveability around the corner. Upon completion of corner widening construction the new center line of the roadway as then built shall be the substituted 60 foot easement and shall be the new 60 foot easement in that affected area. The roadway built on the widened area shall be built substantially equal in grade, width and condition as that provided by the easement and right of way as originally located herein. Further, upon completion of the widening of the roadway then any property lying outside of the new 60 foot easement in the substituted area is automatically abandoned to the extent it has been replaced by the substituted easement area. (See Exhibit A).
(c). Nothing herein contained shall affect the right of Bardos to use the easement and right of way for his own purposes or to go upon or across the easement and right of way at any time for any purpose whatsoever provided that such use will not unreasonably burden or interfere with the rights granted Spoklie. In this regard no gates shall be placed across the roadway, without the written consent of a majority of the affected parties.
Provided however under no circumstances shall the finished road bed be wider than 24 feet. Furthermore, the easement shall be used solely for residential purposes and not for commercial purposes. No signs shall be posted upon the easement property for any purpose unless required by Flathead County for road safety. (Emphasis added).
¶5 Following the easement exchange, Spoklie and his agents began transporting
construction equipment to and from his property, along the easement on Bardos’s property.
4 The equipment was utilized for the development of Spoklie’s lots. Because the corner
where Deer Run intersects with Soler Run proved too sharp and steep for large trucks to
navigate during the winter, Spoklie began offloading construction vehicles from their
ferrying trucks along the north side of Deer Run, near a meadow on Bardos’s property.
The construction equipment would then be driven around the sharp corner and the
remainder of the way, independent of the truck. The unloading and subsequent loading
occurred on the edge of the meadow north of Deer Run—off the roadway surface—but
within the 60-foot span of the easement.2 At times, this process resulted in construction
equipment being parked along the side of Deer Run for several days or weeks at a time.
Bardos protested and requested that Spoklie stop parking equipment along the edge of the
easement. When Spoklie’s vehicles continued to be parked along Deer Run, Bardos placed
large boulders along the edge of the road, within the easement, to block access to the road’s
shoulder. Spoklie had one of his workers push the boulders out of the way using
construction equipment. Spoklie constructed a gate across Soler Run just south of the
southern boundary of Bardos’s property but provided Bardos an access code to open the
gate. Spoklie expressed an intention to construct a larger set of mailboxes at the corner of
Deer Run and Daley Lane, within the boundary of both the county and Spoklie’s Easement.
2 Bardos argues that some of Spoklie’s equipment activities extended beyond the width of the easement but offered no other evidence in the record to support the contention, which the District Court deemed to be speculative, as further discussed herein. Spoklie’s agent testified to having measured the 60-foot right-of-way to ensure equipment would not encroach beyond the easement boundary. 5 Since the commencement of this action by Bardos, Spoklie has ceased parking equipment
along Deer Run.
¶6 Bardos sued for injunctive relief, asserting trespass, nuisance, and quiet title actions
against Spoklie regarding the two easements, and requested a temporary restraining order.
The District Court denied the request and set a show cause hearing for issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The hearing was continued for a month, over Bardos’s objection.
The parties presented evidence at the show cause hearing on February 16, 2022, and, at the
close of the hearing, the District Court denied Bardos’s motion for preliminary injunction.
Bardos appealed the denial, and this Court affirmed, noting that “Bardos presented
evidence showing only minor disturbances to the land surface.” Bardos v. Spoklie, 2023
MT 16N, ¶ 9, 411 Mont. 389, 523 P.3d 51. Prior to the appeal, Spoklie moved for summary
judgment, which the District Court stayed pending the outcome of the appellate
proceedings. After issuance of remittitur, Spoklie renewed his request for summary
judgment and, after another hearing, the District Court granted the motion, reasoning that
Spoklie’s activities were “within the scope” of Spoklie’s Easement because “[t]he instances
of Spoklie temporarily parking construction vehicles off the side of the roadway but within
the Spoklie Easement was for the purpose of ingress and egress of the vehicles and
incidental to the express rights of ingress and egress,” and “[a]s to the location where the
equipment-hauling trucks and trailers were parked temporarily, there is no genuine issue
of material fact.” The District Court also did not take issue with Spoklie’s removal of the
boulders, as it constituted the clearing of an obstruction to the easement, or rule on
Spoklie’s proposed erection of a larger set of cluster mailboxes, as it had not yet occurred.
6 Accordingly, the District Court dismissed each of Bardos’s claims against Spoklie with
prejudice. Bardos appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Johnson v. City
of Bozeman, 2024 MT 168, ¶ 11, 417 Mont. 400, 553 P.3d 432. Summary judgment is
appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “We must determine
whether the court correctly found no genuine issue of material facts existed and whether it
applied the law correctly.” Johnston v. Flying S Title & Escrow, Inc., 2024 MT 39, ¶ 13,
415 Mont. 332, 545 P.3d 679.
¶8 An easement is an interest held by one person in the land of another, consisting of
the right to use the land for a certain purpose. Woods v. Shannon, 2015 MT 76, ¶ 10, 378
Mont. 365, 344 P.3d 413. The construction and interpretation of a contract is generally a
question of law. Ophus v. Fritz, 2000 MT 251, ¶ 19, 301 Mont. 447, 11 P.3d 1192.
However, we consider the determination of whether an activity is reasonably necessary for
the enjoyment of an easement to be a question of fact. Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 2012
MT 318, ¶¶ 34, 38, 368 Mont. 1, 291 P.3d 1209 (hereinafter, Mattson II). In reviewing a
District Court’s declaratory judgment, we look to whether the District Court’s factual
findings were “clearly erroneous.” Thibodeau v. Bechtold, 2008 MT 412, ¶ 14, 347 Mont.
277, 198 P.3d 785. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by
substantial evidence, the court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or our review
7 of the record convinces us that a mistake has been made.” State v. Warclub, 2005 MT 149,
¶ 23, 327 Mont. 352, 114 P.3d 254.
DISCUSSION
¶9 Did the District Court err by entering summary judgment regarding the scope of Spoklie’s easement upon Bardos’s property?
¶10 Bardos contends the District Court’s summary judgment order was incorrect
because issues of material fact remain regarding the location of Spoklie’s parking of
vehicles, and because Spoklie’s actions exceeded the scope of his easement, constituting
trespass and nuisance.
¶11 The assessment of the scope of an easement is informed by the language of the
easement grant and is reviewed in accordance with the rules of contract interpretation.
Mary J. Baker Revoc. Tr. v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 2007 MT 159, ¶ 18, 338
Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851; § 70-17-106(1), MCA; Whitefish Congregation of Jehovah’s
Witnesses, Inc. v. Caltabiano, 2019 MT 228, ¶ 28, 397 Mont. 284, 449 P.3d 812 (internal
citations omitted). “When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to
be ascertained from the writing alone if possible.” Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 2009 MT
286, ¶ 18, 352 Mont. 22, 215 P.3d 675 (hereinafter, Mattson I) (citing § 28-3-303, MCA).
The writing must be taken together as a whole, “so as to give effect to every part if
reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” Section
28-3-202, MCA. Thus, the plain language of the easement grant governs its interpretation
so long as the “language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity.” Section
28-3-401, MCA. “Upon creation of an easement by grant or reservation, a rebuttable
8 presumption arises that the parties anticipated such uses as might reasonably be required
by a normal development of the dominant tenement.” O’Keefe v. Mustang Ranches HOA,
2019 MT 179, ¶ 30, 396 Mont. 454, 446 P.3d 509 (internal quotations omitted). Generally,
we regard easements “for the purpose of ‘ingress and egress’ as specific in nature.” Woods,
¶ 14 (citing Clark v. Pennock, 2010 MT 192, ¶ 27, 357 Mont. 338, 239 P.3d 922).
¶12 The easement granted to Spoklie by Bardos allowed “[f]or roadway travel (ingress
and egress) and for installation, maintenance and repair of underground utility services to
the properties described above and any tracts or parcels divided therefrom.” Additionally,
the easement set forth Spoklie’s right to use the property “for residential purposes and not
for commercial purposes.” The language of Spoklie’s Easement gave Spoklie and his heirs,
successors, and assigns the right to use a 60-foot-wide area through Bardos’s property for
ingress and egress to Spoklie’s partitioned properties, and also explicitly contemplated that
Spoklie would undertake “corner widening construction” to establish “grade, width and
condition” of the intersection at Deer Run and Soler Run in a manner to improve
“driveability around the corner.” As we reasoned in McCauley v. Thompson-Nistler, 2000
MT 215, ¶ 49, 301 Mont. 81, 10 P.3d 794, such a specifically termed easement would also
include the right to engage in conduct incidental to ingress and egress within those 60 feet.
In Woods, we explained that “[a]n express easement for the purpose of ingress and egress,
with no other restriction, entitles the holder of the easement and his or her ‘family, tenants,
and invitees . . . to use the road 24 hours a day by any form of transportation that does not
inflict unreasonable damage or unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment’ of the land
crossed by the easement, also termed the servient estate.” Woods, ¶ 15 (citing Restatement
9 (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.10 illus. 1 (2000)). Thus, when the right to use an easement
in a particular way is granted, the grantee receives the right to do everything which is
reasonably necessary to enjoy that use. See Mattson I, ¶ 37.
¶13 In O’Keefe, ¶ 30, we held that “temporary incidental parking . . . and occasional
removal of roadway obstructions” did not “unreasonably increase the burden” on the
servient tenement. Bardos cites Sampson v. Grooms, 230 Mont. 190, 197, 748 P.2d 960,
964 (1988), for the proposition that “long term parking and storage of vehicles” is an
impermissible use of an ingress easement. We indeed so held in Sampson on a record that
demonstrated that “[v]ehicles and other items parked and stored for protracted periods of
time render[ed] the private road impassable,” and that requiring the servient tenant to
advance-request the dominant tenant to clear the easement would burden “the servient
estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time of the grant.” Sampson, 230
Mont. at 196, 748 P.2d at 964. However, Bardos overlooks that our holding also permitted
“reasonable and necessary short term parking of vehicles to load and unload cargo or
passengers,” recognizing that such use would neither “unreasonably burden the servient
tenement” nor “interfere with the use and right reserved to the dominant tenement.”
Sampson, 230 Mont. at 197, 748 P.2d at 964 (emphasis added).
¶14 The District Court held that Bardos’s opinion regarding vehicles parking outside the
60-foot boundary was speculative, and the summary judgment record supports the District
Court’s assessment. Spoklie used the easement to move construction equipment around a
corner that both parties acknowledged lacked “driveability” at the time they entered their
Agreement. In the winter, loading and unloading equipment prior to navigating the turn
10 became necessary to bring the equipment to Spoklie’s properties. Spoklie moved the
obstructions placed within his easement by Bardos to effectuate the parking and unloading,
and made measurements to keep his equipment within the easement’s distances. Spoklie
did not use his easement for permanent or long-term storage of vehicles, did not block
Bardos’s use of the road at any time, and has since ceased the practice of loading and
unloading machinery at the location. The easement granted to Spoklie specifically
contemplated “construction” at that location, anticipating the use of machinery in the area,
and recognized Spoklie’s intention to further develop “the properties” by installing utility
services for residential uses, necessitating the use of heavy equipment for these purposes.
¶15 Bardos contends Spoklie’s temporary parking, loading, and unloading equates to
civil trespass and nuisance, but that is undermined by our holding herein that Spoklie’s
uses were within the scope of the Easement Agreement. Trespass requires an intentional
entry on another’s property “without consent or legal right.” Davis v. Westphal, 2017 MT
276, ¶ 15, 389 Mont. 251, 405 P.3d 73. “Conduct that would otherwise constitute an
intentional trespass is not unlawful if it is privileged conduct pursuant to an easement.”
Lee v. Musselshell Cnty., 2004 MT 64, ¶ 30, 320 Mont. 294, 87 P.3d 423. Similarly, a
nuisance includes any “obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or that unlawfully obstructs the free passage or
use” of navigable waters or public places. See § 27-30-101(1), MCA (emphasis added.)
Given our affirming of the District Court’s holding on the scope of easement issues, these
violations did not here occur.
11 ¶16 Bardos also sought to enjoin Spoklie from placing a larger cluster mailbox structure
at the corner of Deer Run and Soler Run. The District Court stated that no such conduct
had yet occurred but noted that such placement of mailboxes within an easement for ingress
and egress would facilitate the use of essential postal services. See Snyder v. Eberts, 727
N.W.2d 374 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). Nevertheless, a case is not ripe for adjudication unless
it presents an actual and present controversy that is not hypothetical or speculative.
Advocates for Sch. Trust Lands v. State, 2022 MT 46, ¶ 20, 408 Mont. 39, 505 P.3d 825.
The District Court stated, “Spoklie has taken no substantial step toward replacing the
existing mailboxes with a cluster mailbox at any particular location and there is no evidence
of Spoklie’s imminent threat to do so.”
¶17 The District Court concluded that Spoklie did not exceed the scope of his easement
by temporarily parking, loading, or unloading construction equipment within the 60-foot
width of the easement, and by using the road for his equipment’s passage onto his
properties for further development. Given the language of the easement and the record on
appeal, we conclude the District Court properly determined there was no genuine issue of
material fact, and correctly applied the governing standards regarding Bardos’s claims.
¶18 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON