Bardon v. Land & River Improvement Co.

157 U.S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 650, 39 L. Ed. 719, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2206
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 25, 1895
Docket138
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 157 U.S. 327 (Bardon v. Land & River Improvement Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bardon v. Land & River Improvement Co., 157 U.S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 650, 39 L. Ed. 719, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2206 (1895).

Opinion

Mr. Chief' Justice Fuller

delivered the opinion of the court.

We remarked in Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 348, that while the rule was well settled that remedies in the courts of the United States at common law or in equity, according to the' essential character of the case, are uncontrolled in that particular by the practice of the state courts, yet an enlargement of equitable rights by state statutes may be administered by the Circuit Courts of the United States, as well as by the courts of the State; and when the case is one of a remedial proceeding, essentially of an equitable character, there can be no objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction. Broderick Will Case, 21 Wall. 503, 520; Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, 25; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552, 557.

Notwithstanding the statute may have enlarged the ordinary equitable action to quiet title and to remove a cloud, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to award the relief prayed if the bill were properly brought under the section in question ; and, as that section provided that any person having the possession and legal title might institute the suit, we perceive no reason why the complainant could not, if it were in’ possession, as is conceded, and had obtained the legal title through either of the tax deeds, a matter to be hereafter examined.

Section 35 of chapter 22 of the General Laws of Wisconsin of 1859, reenacted as section 1197 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, (Gen. Laws Wis. 1859, p. 21; Rev. Stat. Wis. 1878, c. 50, p. 383,) provided that the grantee in a tax deed might, at any time within three years after its date, commence an action against the owner or any person claiming under him for the purpose of barring such owner or his grantees from all right, title, interest, or claim in the land conveyed, and it *331 is argued that that remedy was exclusive, and not having been availed of by Hayes, that complainant; cannot maintain this suit. But there is nothing in the statute to show that the remedy existing during three years after the date of the tax deed was intended to contract the jurisdiction and practice in equity, independently of statute, in respect of bills to quiet title, or to exclude the general remedy given by section 3186, (a remedy existing in Wisconsin since 1858, § 29, c. 141, Rev. Stat. 1858,) in favor of a person having the legal title and actual possession, though that legal title depended on a tax deed. Stridde v. Saroni, 21 Wisconsin, 173; Grimmer v. Sumner, 21 Wisconsin, 179; Wals v. Grosvenor, 31 Wisconsin, 681; Grignon v. Black, 76 Wisconsin, 674.

Nor can’ we regard the position of appellant that this suit was barred under section 22 of chapter 138 of the Revised Statutes of 1858 as tenable. That section provided that “an action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued,” and the enumerated actions apparently did not include this suit. But this alleged limitation was not set up in the answer or the question raised in any way so far as appears, in the Circuit Court, and, if so, comes too late. And, apart from that, actual possession was not taken until October 13, 1889, and the bill was filed November 1, 1889.

We proceed then to the objections urged to the validity of the tax deed of September 5,1870, and these must be disposed of, in accordance with the interpretation of the statutes of Wisconsin, by the highest judicial tribunal of that State. As was observed in Lewis v. Munson, 151 U. S. 545, 549: “ No question is more clearly a matter of local law thgn one arising under the tax laws. Tax proceedings are carried on by the State for the purpose of collecting its revenue, and the various steps which shall.be taken in such proceedings, the force and’ effect to be given to any act of the taxing officers, the results to follow the non-payment of taxes, and the form and efficacy of the tax deed, are all subjects which the State has power to prescribe, and peculiarly and vitally affecting its well-being. The determination of any questions affecting them is a matter *332 primarily bélonging to the courts of the State, and the national tribunals universally follow their rulings except in cases where it is claimed that some right protected by the Federal constitution has been invaded.”

Under the laws of Wisconsin the owner of land sold for taxes might, at any time within three years from date of the certificate of sale, redeem the same in the manner prescribed, and in like manner redeem at any time before the tax deed executed upon such sale was recorded. Gen. Laws Wis. 1859, c. 22, §§ 18, 19; Rev. Statutes of 1878, § 1165.

By section 25, c. 22, of the laws of 1859, carried forward into section 1176 of the Revised Statutes of 1878, it was provided that the tax deed, “duly witnessed and acknowledged, shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings, from the valuation of the land by the assessor inclusive, up to the exécution of the deed, and may, be recorded with like effect as other conveyances of land.”

; Section 5 of chapter 138 of the laws of 1861 provided that no action should be commenced by the former owner to recover, possession of land which had been sold and conveyed for nonpayment of taxes or to avoid the deed, unless the action should be commenced within three years next after the recording of the deed. Rev. Stat. 1878, § 1188.

By section 32 of chapter 22 of the laws of 1859 it was enacted that no action should be maintained by the grantee in a tax deed or any one claiming under him, to recover the possession of the land described therein unless such action should be brought within three years next after the date of the recording of such deed, or unless such grantee, or those claiming under him shall have paid the taxes assessed on such land for five years next after the date of such deed, or unless such grantee, or those claiming under him, had been in actual, continual possession of said land claiming title for three years previous to the expiration of five years next after the date of such deed. Rev. Stat. 1878, § 1187.

The rule may be accepted as thoroughly settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that when a tax deed is in due form and recorded in the proper office and the *333 lands described therein remain vacant and unoccupied for three years or more after the recording thereof, the tax title claimant is deemed to be in the constructive possession, .the statute runs in his favor, and the original owner is barred from attacking its validity. Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co., 106 U. S. 379; Gunnison v. Hoehne,

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Bluebook (online)
157 U.S. 327, 15 S. Ct. 650, 39 L. Ed. 719, 1895 U.S. LEXIS 2206, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bardon-v-land-river-improvement-co-scotus-1895.