Barclays Bank Delaware v. Schmaltz

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO MADISON COUNTY

BARCLAYS BANK DELAWARE, :

CASE NO. CA2026-02-006

Appellee, :

OPINION AND

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 8/24/2026

SHANE SCHMALTZ, :

Appellant. :

:

CIVIL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT Case No. CVF2300526

Corporation Service Company, for appellee. Shane Schmaltz, pro se.

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OPINION

SIEBERT, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Shane Schmaltz, appeals from a judgment of the Madison County Municipal Court dismissing his amended counterclaim. Because the municipal court failed to rule on Schmaltz's timely filed objection to the magistrate's decision, no

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final appealable order exists.1 Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} Barclays Bank Delaware ("Barclays") filed a complaint against Schmaltz seeking to recover $2,924.69 allegedly owed on a credit card account. Schmaltz answered and later filed a counterclaim alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). Barclays moved to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Schmaltz responded and filed an amended counterclaim that retained some of his original claims, added a claim under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("OCSPA"), and included additional factual allegations.

{¶ 3} While the motion to dismiss remained pending, Schmaltz filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which automatically stayed the proceedings. Following discharge from the bankruptcy proceedings, Schmaltz notified the municipal court, and the matter resumed.

{¶ 4} On July 29, 2025, the magistrate issued a decision recommending dismissal of Schmaltz's counterclaim with prejudice. Schmaltz timely objected. In a January 27, 2026 entry, the municipal court raised concerns regarding the effect of Schmaltz's bankruptcy on his counterclaim, including whether the claim became property of the bankruptcy estate and whether judicial estoppel applied. The municipal court's entry is difficult to discern. The court cited neither the record nor any legal authority supporting its conclusions. Additionally, the entry is framed largely in speculative terms. The court stated that the counterclaim had "presumably" transferred to the bankruptcy trustee, acknowledged that it was "unknown" whether the trustee was aware of the claim, and remarked that it "feels" the doctrine of estoppel would bar the action. Such tentative

1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we hereby sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for purposes of issuing this opinion.

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observations do not constitute findings of fact, conclusions of law, or a ruling on the pending objections. The municipal court then declined to rule on Schmaltz's objection, although it stated that the magistrate had "likely made the correct decision." Schmaltz now appeals, raising four assignments of error.

Appeal

{¶ 5} As a threshold matter, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b), permits a party to file objections to a magistrate's decision within 14 days, and Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires the trial court to rule on those objections. When timely objections are filed, the trial court must resolve them before a final appealable order exists. Ludwick v. Ludwick, 2003-Ohio-2925, ¶ 5 (12th Dist.), citing McCown v. McCown, 145 Ohio App.3d 170, 172 (12th Dist. 2001). Accord Drummond v. Drummond, 2003-Ohio-587, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.); Peric v. Buccilli, 2002-Ohio-6234, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 6} Here, Schmaltz timely objected to the magistrate's decision, but the municipal court declined to rule on that objection. The court neither sustained nor overruled the objection, nor did it independently adopt, reject, or modify the magistrate's decision as contemplated by Civ.R. 53. Because no final appealable order exists, we lack jurisdiction to consider Schmaltz's assignments of error.

{¶ 7} Appeal dismissed.

PIPER, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

Upon consideration of the appeal and the brief before this court, and the above Opinion, it is the order of this court that this appeal should be and hereby is dismissed because the order appealed from is not a final appealable order. This court is therefore without jurisdiction.

It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Madison County Municipal Court for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.

Costs to be taxed 50% to appellant and 50% to appellee.

/s/ Robin N. Piper, Presiding Judge

/s/ Mike Powell, Judge

/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge