Barclay Estate

18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489, 1959 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 255
CourtPennsylvania Orphans' Court, Montgomery County
DecidedMarch 17, 1959
Docketno. 46,986
StatusPublished

This text of 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489 (Barclay Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Orphans' Court, Montgomery County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barclay Estate, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489, 1959 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 255 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).

Opinion

Taxis, P. J.,

The reason or purpose of the filing of the account now before the court is [491]*491the death of the sole life beneficiary, Marie M. Moelhoff, on October 2,1950. . . .

On April 26, 1955, the United States Attorney General filed with the clerk of this court formal written objections to the account seeking to surcharge the trustees in the amount of $10,000, said sum representing the amount of an allegedly wrongful payment to the estate of the deceased life tenant. . . .

The interest of the United States Attorney General in this proceeding stems from a vesting order (no. 5122) issued on July 17, 1945, by the Alien Property Custodian, which vested “for the benefit of the United States ... all right, title, interest and claim of any kind or character whatsoever of the trustees or governing body of any college or university to be designated in accordance with the provisions of the Will of Marie Moelhoff Barclay, deceased . . .”. The Attorney General of the United States has succeeded to the powers and functions of the Alien Property Custodian.

The will of this decedent provides for the disposition of the remainder of decedent’s testamentary trust to a German college or university to be designated by the life tenant. The present order vested “right, title and interest” of my trustee or governing body of a college or university so designated. Accordingly, the Attorney General is not entitled to possession of any of these funds until the court has adjudicated the extent of the interest which he has acquired in this estate.

The $10,000 payment questioned by the Attorney General was paid by the trustees to the estate of Marie Moelhoff, niece of decedent, pursuant to the terms of the following portion of decedent’s will:

“Should it be deemed advisable to dispose of the assets at Narberth, Pennsylvania, the proceeds of the assets shall be accumulated until all the assets have been sold and proceeds collected. Then, after all taxes and expenses relative thereto have been paid, I direct [492]*492my Trustees and Executors to pay outright to my niece, Marie Moelhoff, the sum of $10,000 and to my nephew, William Moelhoff, the sum of $8,000.”

Marie Moelhoff, subsequently known as Marie Moelhoff Hansen, died on October 2, 1950, and it is conceded in the brief of the attorneys for the accountants that her death occurred before the sale of the assets at Narberth had been completely consummated. The Attorney General takes the position that this fact defeats the legacy on the theory that the legacy was contingent upon the niece surviving the liquidation of the “assets at Narberth.”

The interpretation of whether or not a legacy is vested or contingent is dependent upon testatrix’ intention as expressed in her will. Such intention is to be gathered from a reading of the whole will: Packer’s Estate (No. 2), 246 Pa. 116, 124; Wain’s Estate, 228 Pa. 259, 264. “The proper course of procedure for the interpreter of a testamentary writing is not to apply rules of construction until all reasonable effort to deduce a meaning from the writing itself has been exhausted with no understandable and sensible result” : Buzby Estate, 386 Pa. 1, 8.

A careful reading of the entire will impels the conclusion that testatrix intended this legacy to be vested in her niece and not contingent.

In her will testatrix stated that her life had been one of “hardship and a struggle to surmount economic obstacles and sickness.” She also noted that during the course of this struggle she had not received any assistance from her relatives with the exception of her niece, Marie Moelhoff, the beneficiary of the disputed legacy, and her nephew, William Moelhoff, both of whom helped her in the operation of her business. Accordingly, at the outset of her will testatrix asserted : “It is therefore my sincere wish to compensate [493]*493my niece, Marie Moelhoff, and my nephew, William Moelhoff, for their devotion and assistance to me.”

Testatrix then addressed herself to the creation of certain charitable trusts discussed infra, and referred to these trusts as “my next chief concern.” From this express statement, as well as from the tenor of the will as a whole, it is apparent that testatrix’ first chief concern was her niece and nephew alluded to in the immediately previous paragraph of the will. It should also be noted that testatrix referred to her niece and nephew concurrently and placed them both in a favorable position as compared to that of her other relatives who had “shown no concern or consideration for my welfare to warrant any consideration of them in the distribution of my estate.”

Testatrix then gave all her assets, real and personal, to her testamentary trustees and directed that if her niece, Marie Moelhoff, continued to manage the business, she was to receive a salary of $2,000 per annum and 30 percent of the net annual profit. Her nephew, if he participated in the operation of the business, was to receive 20 percent of the net annual profits. The disputed legacy was created when testatrix turned her attention to the possibility of liquidation of the business assets at Narberth. Testatrix directed that should liquidation of the business become advisable and after said liquidation had been completely effected, the executors were to pay “to my niece Marie Moelhoff, the sum of $10,000, and to my nephew, William Moelhoff, the sum of $8,000.” Again it is significant that both legatees were dealt with concurrently and that no distinction was made between them other than the variance in the amounts of the legacies.

Testatrix then directed that the proceeds of the liquidation of her Narberth assets be invested in first grade income-producing securities, and directed that the income be paid to her niece for life.

[494]*494With regard to the $8,000 legacy to her nephew, testatrix directed that if her nephew decided not to return to Germany and did not wish to continue working for the estate, his legacy was to be paid to him “outright instead of waiting until the Narberth assets are liquidated.”

Clearly, then, testatrix did not intend the legacy to her nephew to be contingent upon the complete liquidation of the Narberth assets. Furthermore testatrix asked that her niece buy out her nephew’s “interest” or arrange for the trustees to mortgage the Narberth real estate in order to raise the necessary $8,000. The description of the nephew’s legacy as an interest supports the conclusion that this legacy was vested, and in view of the similar treatment accorded to both legacies throughout the will, it cannot be concluded that testatrix intended to distinguish between them. The cogency of this conclusion is highlighted by the fact that testatrix’ niece and nephew were her first and primary concern, and as between the two, it is apparent that the niece was favored above the nephew. It would then be incongruous to find an intention on the part of testatrix to discriminate against the niece and to favor the nephew with regard to these legacies by placing the nephew’s legacy on a higher plane than that of the niece.

The Attorney General has argued that the purpose of the legacy to the niece was to tide her over in the event of a liquidation during the hiatus between the cessation of her income from Narberth assets and the time when the trust investment would begin to yield dividends and that therefore her legacy was not to become effective until the Narberth assets had been completely liquidated.

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Related

Buzby Estate
123 A.2d 723 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1956)
Newlin Estate
80 A.2d 819 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
Mears's Estate
149 A. 157 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1930)
City of Philadelphia v. Heirs of Girard
45 Pa. 9 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1863)
Frazier v. St. Luke's Church
23 A. 442 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1892)
Waln's Estate
77 A. 458 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1910)
Packer's Estate
92 A. 70 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1914)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
18 Pa. D. & C.2d 489, 1959 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barclay-estate-paorphctmontgo-1959.