Barcenas-Morales v. Garland
This text of Barcenas-Morales v. Garland (Barcenas-Morales v. Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN BARCENAS-MORALES, No. 23-2513 Agency No. Petitioner, A078-539-936 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted November 6, 2024** Pasadena, California
Before: W. FLETCHER and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and MÁRQUEZ, District Judge.***
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Rosemary Márquez, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. Petitioner Juan Barcenas-Morales petitions for review of a decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen removal
proceedings and declining to sua sponte reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion, Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022),
and we review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening for the limited purpose of
determining whether the decision rests “on a constitutionally or legally erroneous
premise.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 592 (9th Cir. 2016).
Petitioner’s motion to reopen was untimely by over fifteen years. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of a
final order of removal). Ineffective assistance of counsel may warrant equitable
tolling of the deadline for filing a motion to reopen, but only if the petitioner “acted
with ‘due diligence’ in pursuing his rights.” Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 801
(quoting Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1224, 1230–32 (9th Cir. 2020)). Here, Petitioner
did not act with due diligence: he avers that he called his attorney to check on the
status of his case during the pendency of his appeal before the BIA, but he does not
explain why he failed to make further inquiries, seek other legal advice, or find
replacement counsel during the subsequent fifteen years. Given the lack of
explanation for Petitioner’s “exceedingly long” delay, the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in denying equitable tolling. Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 583 (finding a lack of
2 23-2513 diligence where petitioner did not explain six-year delay in seeking legal advice from
another attorney).
We also find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s determination that Petitioner
failed to establish prejudice from his counsel’s ineffectiveness. Petitioner asserts
that his former attorney’s deficient performance prevented him from filing a petition
for review of the denial of his application for cancellation of removal, but he fails to
identify any plausible grounds for relief that he would have raised in a petition for
review. See Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 2011) (“failure to file a
necessary document creates a presumption of prejudice” that is rebutted when the
petitioner “lacks plausible grounds for relief”). Indeed, even if Petitioner’s counsel
had filed a timely petition for review, the petition would have been denied for lack
of jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327
F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
discretionary determination that an alien failed to satisfy the ‘exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship’ requirement for cancellation of removal.”).
Finally, the BIA identified the correct legal standard governing the exercise
of its authority to sua sponte reopen immigration proceedings under 8 C.F.R. §
1003.2(a), and its decision “evinces no misunderstanding of the agency’s broad
discretion to grant or deny sua sponte relief.” Lona, 958 F.3d at 1235. Accordingly,
“there is nothing left for us to review.” Id.
3 23-2513 Petition DENIED.
4 23-2513
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